Ahead of South Korea’s 2026 annual shareholder meeting season, cumulative voting is once again a focal point for the debate around corporate governance in Asia’s fifth largest economy. Market observers often view cumulative voting as a necessary reform to ensure minority shareholder rights and help narrow the so-called “Korea discount.” This paper suggests that cumulative voting may not be reformists’ long-sought panacea because it functions as a ‘conditional safeguard’ rather than a definitive avenue to board influence. Examining more than 75,000 agenda items between 2020 and 2025 as well as voting records over multiple years, the paper presents finds that cumulative voting’s impact is regularly constrained by board architecture, particularly board size, slate design, seat availability, election sequencing, and committee structure. With mandatory adoption commencing in 2026, the coming year will serve as a transition and signaling phase, providing investors with insights into how issuers design governance structures that either reinforce or neutralize the mechanism’s intended effect.