



INTERNATIONAL

GLOBAL BOARD-ALIGNED PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES 2024 Policy Recommendations

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INTRODUCTION

ISS' Global Board-Aligned Policy is designed to enable subscribing investors to vote in a manner that upholds foundational corporate governance principles as a means of protecting and maximizing their investments, whilst generally aligning with issuers' board recommendations for voting on environmental and social matters.

On matters of corporate governance, executive compensation, and corporate structure, the Global Board-Aligned Policy guidelines are focused on widely accepted good standards of corporate governance and shareholder rights protection, and on the creation and preservation of economic value. On environmental or social matters, the Global Board-Aligned Policy will generally be in line with the board's recommendations, with support limited to circumstances where it is considered that greater disclosure will directly enhance or protect shareholder value and is reflective of a clearly established reporting standard in the market. Details are as further described in these guidelines.

1. Operational Items

Financial Results/Director and Auditor Reports

Policy Recommendation: Vote for approval of financial statements and director and auditor reports, unless:

- There are concerns about the accounts presented or audit procedures used; or
- The company is not responsive to shareholder questions about specific items that should be publicly disclosed.

Approval of Non-Financial Information Statement/Report

Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for the approval of mandatory non-financial information statement/report, unless the independent assurance services provider has raised material concerns about the information presented.

Appointment of Auditors and Auditor Fees

Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for the reelection of auditors and proposals authorizing the board to fix auditor fees, unless:

- The name of the proposed auditors has not been published;
- There are serious concerns about the effectiveness of the auditors;
- The lead audit partner(s) has been linked with a significant auditing controversy;
- There is reason to believe that the auditor has rendered an opinion which is neither accurate nor indicative of the company's financial position;
- The lead audit partner(s) has previously served the company in an executive capacity or can otherwise be considered affiliated with the company;
- The auditors are being changed without explanation;
- Fees for non-audit services exceed either 100 percent of standard audit-related fees or any stricter limit set in local best practice recommendations or law; or
- Audit fees are undisclosed.

In circumstances where fees for non-audit services include fees related to significant one-time capital structure events, such as initial public offerings, bankruptcy emergence, and spinoffs, and the company makes public disclosure of the amount and nature of those fees which are an exception to the standard "non-audit fee" category, then such fees may be excluded from the non-audit fees considered in determining the ratio of non-audit to audit fees.

For concerns relating to the audit procedures, independence of auditors, audit fees disclosure, and/or name of auditors, the Global Board-Aligned policy will focus on the auditor election and/or the audit committee members. For concerns relating to fees paid to the auditors, the Global Board-Aligned policy will focus on remuneration of auditors if this is a separate voting item, otherwise the Global Board-Aligned policy would focus on the auditor election.

Appointment of Internal Statutory Auditors

Policy Recommendation: Vote for the appointment or reelection of statutory auditors, unless:

- There are serious concerns about the statutory reports presented or the audit procedures used;

- Questions exist concerning any of the statutory auditors being appointed; or
- The auditors have previously served the company in an executive capacity or can otherwise be considered affiliated with the company.

Allocation of Income

Policy Recommendation: Vote for approval of the allocation of income, unless:

- The dividend payout ratio has been consistently below 30 percent without adequate explanation; or
- The payout is excessive given the company's financial position.

Stock (Scrip) Dividend Alternative

Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on stock (scrip) dividend proposals, considering factors such as:

- Whether the proposal allows for a cash option; and
- If the proposal is in line with market standards.

Amendments to Articles of Association (Bylaws)

Policy Recommendation: Vote amendments to the articles of association on a case-by-case basis.

Virtual Meetings (UK/Ireland, Japan, Australia, and Europe)

Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals allowing for the convening of hybrid¹ shareholder meetings.

Vote case-by-case on proposals concerning virtual-only meetings², considering:

- Whether the company has committed to ensuring shareholders will have the same rights participating electronically as they would have for an in-person meeting;
- Rationale of the circumstances under which virtual-only meetings would be held;
- In-person or hybrid meetings are not precluded;
- Whether an authorization is restricted in time or allows for the possibility of virtual-only meetings indefinitely; and
- Local laws and regulations concerning the convening of virtual meetings.

Change in Company Fiscal Term

Policy Recommendation: Vote for resolutions to change a company's fiscal term unless a company's motivation for the change is to postpone its AGM.

¹ The phrase "hybrid shareholder meeting" refers to an in-person meeting in which shareholders are also permitted to participate online.

² The phrase "virtual-only shareholder meeting" refers to a meeting of shareholders that is held exclusively through the use of online technology without a corresponding in-person meeting.

Lower Disclosure Threshold for Stock Ownership

Policy Recommendation: Vote against resolutions to lower the stock ownership disclosure threshold below 5 percent unless specific reasons exist to implement a lower threshold.

Amend Quorum Requirements

Policy Recommendation: Vote proposals to amend quorum requirements for shareholder meetings on a case-by-case basis.

Transact Other Business

Policy Recommendation: Vote against other business when it appears as a voting item.

2. Board of Directors

Director Elections

Policy Recommendation: Vote for management nominees in the election of directors, unless:

- Adequate disclosure has not been provided in a timely manner;
- There are clear concerns over questionable finances or restatements;
- There have been questionable transactions with conflicts of interest;
- There are any records of abuses against minority shareholder interests;
- The board fails to meet minimum corporate governance standards, including board independence standards;
- There are specific concerns about the individual, such as criminal wrongdoing or breach of fiduciary responsibilities; or
- Repeated absences at board and key committee³ meetings have not been explained (in countries where this information is disclosed).

Vote for employee and/or labor representatives if they sit on either the audit or compensation committee *and* are required by law to be on those committees. Vote against employee and/or labor representatives if they sit on either the audit or compensation committee, if they are not required to be on those committees.

Diversity

The Global Board-Aligned policy will evaluate gender and racial/ethnic minority composition on boards in international markets when reviewing director elections, to the extent that disclosures and market practices permit, and will generally vote against or withhold from the Chair of the Nominating Committee or Chair of the committee designated with the responsibility of a nominating committee (or other directors on a case-by-case basis) if the board's gender or racial/ethnic minority composition is not in adherence with domestic legal requirements or local best market or established practices as dictated by ISS' market-specific Benchmark Policy Guidelines.

Material Governance Failures

Policy Recommendation: Under extraordinary circumstances, vote against or withhold from directors individually, committee members, or the entire board due to:

- Material failures of governance, stewardship, risk oversight⁴, or fiduciary responsibilities at the company;
- Failure to replace management as appropriate; or
- Egregious actions related to the director(s)' service on the boards that raise substantial doubt about his or her ability to effectively oversee management and serve the best interests of shareholders at any company.

For director elections, the Global Board-Aligned policy will also take into consideration market-specific provisions which are listed below:

³ Key committees are usually the ones performing the functions of audit, remuneration and nomination (plus risk for financial institutions).

⁴ Examples of failure of risk oversight include but are not limited to: bribery; large or serial fines or sanctions from regulatory bodies; significant adverse legal judgments or settlements; or hedging of company stock.

Canadian Guidelines

Board Structure and Independence (TSX)

Policy Recommendation: Vote withhold for any Executive Director or Non-Independent, Non-Executive Director where:

- The board is less than majority independent; or
- The board lacks a separate compensation or nominating committee.

Non-Independent Directors on Key Committees (TSX)

Policy Recommendation: Vote withhold for members of the audit, compensation, or nominating committee who:

- Are Executive Directors;
- Are Controlling Shareholders; or
- Is a Non-employee officer of the company or its affiliates if he/she is among the five most highly compensated.

Non-Independent Directors on Key Committees -TSX-V

Policy Recommendation: Vote withhold for Executive Directors, Controlling Shareholders or a Non-employee officer of the company or its affiliates if he/she is among the five most highly compensated who:

- Are members of the audit committee;
- Are members of the compensation committee or the nominating committee and the committee is not majority independent; or
- Are board members and the entire board fulfills the role of a compensation committee or a nominating committee and the board is not majority independent.

Overboarding -TSX and Venture-Listed

Policy Recommendation: Generally vote withhold for individual director nominees who:

- Are non-CEO directors and serve on more than five public company boards; or
- Are CEOs of public companies who serve on the boards of more than two public companies besides their own – withhold only at their outside boards⁵.
- **Transitioning directors:** It is preferable for a director to step down from a board at the annual meeting to ensure orderly transitions, which may result in a director being temporarily overboarded (e.g. joining a new board in March but stepping off another board in June). The Global Board-Aligned policy will generally not count a board for policy application purposes when it is publicly-disclosed that the director will be stepping off that board at its next annual meeting. This disclosure must be included within the company's proxy circular to be taken into consideration. Conversely, the Global Board-Aligned policy will include the new boards that the director is joining even if the shareholder meeting with his or her election has not yet taken place.

⁵ Although a CEO's subsidiary boards will be counted as separate boards, the Global Board-Aligned policy will not recommend a withhold vote for the CEO of a parent company board or any of the controlled (>50 percent ownership) subsidiaries of that parent but may do so at subsidiaries that are less than 50 percent controlled and boards outside the parent/subsidiary relationship.

Externally-Managed Issuers (EMIs) –TSX and TSXV

Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on say-on-pay resolutions where provided, or on individual directors, committee members, or the entire board as appropriate, when an issuer is externally-managed and has provided minimal or no disclosure about their management services agreements and how senior management is compensated. Factors taken into consideration may include but are not limited to:

- The size and scope of the management services agreement;
- Executive compensation in comparison to issuer peers and/or similarly structured issuers;
- Overall performance;
- Related party transactions;
- Board and committee independence;
- Conflicts of interest and process for managing conflicts effectively;
- Disclosure and independence of the decision-making process involved in the selection of the management services provider;
- Risk mitigating factors included within the management services agreement such as fee recoupment mechanisms;
- Historical compensation concerns;
- Executives' responsibilities; and
- Other factors that may reasonably be deemed appropriate to assess an externally-managed issuer's governance framework.

Unilateral Adoption of an Advance Notice Provision

Policy Recommendation: Generally withhold from individual directors, committee members, or the entire board as appropriate in situations where an advance notice policy has been adopted by the board but has not been included on the voting agenda at the next shareholders' meeting. Continued lack of shareholder approval of the advanced notice policy in subsequent years may result in further withhold recommendations.

European Guidelines

In **European markets**, the Global Board-Aligned policy looks at different factors to make determinations regarding director elections. The following factors are taken into account:

Director Terms

Generally vote against the election or re-election of any director when his/her term is not disclosed or when it exceeds four years and adequate explanation for non-compliance has not been provided. Under best practice recommendations, companies should shorten the terms for directors when the terms exceed the limits suggested by best practices. The policy will be applied to all companies, for bundled as well as unbundled items.

Beyond that, as directors should be accountable to shareholders on a more regular basis, the Global Board-Aligned policy may consider moving to maximum board terms of less than four years in the future.

Policy Recommendation: Vote against article amendment proposals to extend board terms.

In cases where a company's articles provide for a shorter limit and where the company wishes to extend director terms from three or fewer years to four years, for example, the Global Board-Aligned policy will recommend a vote against, based on the general principle that director accountability is maximized by elections with a short period of renewal.

Bundling of Proposals to Elect Directors

Bundling together proposals that could be presented as separate voting items is not considered good market practice, because bundled resolutions leave shareholders with an all-or-nothing choice, skewing power disproportionately towards the board and away from shareholders. As director elections are one of the most important voting decisions that shareholders make, directors should be elected individually.

Policy Recommendation: For the markets of **Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia,** and **Slovenia** vote against the election or reelection of any directors if the company proposes a single slate of directors.

Bundled director elections in Poland may be supported for companies that go beyond market practice by disclosing the names of nominees on a timely basis.

Board Independence

Widely-held companies

A. Non-controlled companies

Policy Recommendation: Generally vote against the election or reelection of any non-independent directors (excluding the CEO) if:

- Fewer than 50 percent of the board members elected by shareholders – excluding, where relevant, employee shareholder representatives – would be independent; or
- Fewer than one-third of all board members would be independent.

Portugal is excluded from Provision (1.) in the above-mentioned voting policy.

B. Controlled companies

Policy Recommendation: Generally vote against the election or reelection of any non-independent directors (excluding the CEO) if less than one-third of the board members are independent.

Board Leadership

Given the importance of board leadership, the Global Board-Aligned policy may consider that the chair of the board should be an independent non-executive director according to the Global Board-Aligned policy's Classification of Directors.

Non-widely held companies

Policy Recommendation: Generally vote against the election or reelection of any non-independent directors (excluding the CEO) if less than one-third of the board members are independent.

Definition of terms

'Widely-held companies' are determined based on their membership in a major index and/or the number of the ISS clients holding the securities. For Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Finland, this is based on membership on a local blue-chip market index and/or MSCI EAFE companies. For Portugal, it is based on membership in the PSI-20 and/or MSCI EAFE index.

A company is considered to be controlled for the purposes of the above-mentioned voting policies if a shareholder, or multiple shareholders acting in concert, control a majority of the company's equity capital (i.e. 50 percent + one share). If a company is majority-controlled by virtue of a shareholder structure in which shareholders' voting rights do not accrue in accordance with their equity capital commitment (e.g. unequal or multi-class share structures), the company will not be classified as controlled unless the majority shareholder/majority shareholding group also holds a majority of the company's equity capital

Disclosure of Nominee Names

Policy Recommendation: Vote against the election or reelection of any and all director nominees when the names of the nominees are not available at the time the proxy analysis is being written.

This policy will be applied to all companies in these markets, for bundled and unbundled items.

Combined Chair/CEO

Policy Recommendation: Generally, vote against the (re)election of combined chair/CEOs at widely-held European companies.

When the company provides assurance that the chair/CEO would only serve in the combined role on an interim basis (no more than two years), the vote recommendation would be made on a case-by-case basis.

In the above-mentioned situation, the Global Board-Aligned policy will consider the rationale provided by the company and whether it has set up adequate control mechanisms on the board (such as a lead independent director, a high overall board independence, and a high level of independence on the board's key committees).

Election of Former CEO as Chair of the Board

Policy Recommendation: Generally vote against the (re)election of a former CEO to the supervisory board or board of directors in **Austria, Germany, and the Netherlands** if the former CEO is to be chair of the relevant board. To this end, companies are expected to confirm prior to the general meeting that the former CEO will not be (re)appointed as chair of the relevant board.

Given the importance of board leadership, the Global Board-Aligned policy may consider that the chair of the board should be an independent non-executive director according to the Global Board-Aligned policy's Classification of Directors.

Overboarded Directors

Policy Recommendation: In **Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland**, the Global Board-Aligned policy will generally recommend a vote against a candidate when they hold an excessive number of board appointments, as referenced by the more stringent of the provisions prescribed in local law or best practice governance codes, or the following guidelines:

- Any person who holds more than five mandates at listed companies will be classified as overboarded. For the purposes of calculating this limit, a non-executive directorship counts as one mandate, a non-executive chair position counts as two mandates, and a position as executive director (or a comparable role) is counted as three mandates.
- Also, any person who holds the position of executive director (or a comparable role) at one company and serves as a non-executive chair at a different company will be classified as overboarded.

CEOs and Board Chairs

- An adverse vote recommendation will not be applied to a director within a company where they serve as CEO; instead, any adverse vote recommendations will be applied to their additional seats on other company boards. For chairs, negative recommendations would first be applied towards non-executive positions held, but the chair position itself would be targeted where they are being elected as chair for the first time or, when in aggregate their chair positions are three or more in number, or if the chair holds an outside executive position.

One Board Seat per Director

Policy Recommendation: In cases where a director holds more than one board seat on a single board and the corresponding votes, manifested as one seat as a physical person plus an additional seat(s) as a representative of a legal entity, vote against the election/reelection of such legal entities and in favor of the physical person.

However, an exception is made if the representative of the legal entity holds the position of CEO. In such circumstances, the Global Board-Aligned policy will typically recommend a vote in favor of the legal entity and against the election/reelection of the physical person.

While such occurrences are rare, there have been cases where a board member may have multiple board seats and corresponding votes. Holding several board seats concurrently within one board increases this person's direct influence on board decisions and creates an inequality among board members.

This situation has manifested in Belgium, Luxembourg, and France. This is not a good corporate governance practice, as it places disproportionate influence and control in one person.

Composition of Committees

Policy Recommendation:

For widely-held companies, generally vote against the (re)election of any non-independent members of the audit committee if fewer than 50 percent of the audit committee members, who are elected by shareholders in such capacity or another – excluding, where relevant, employee shareholder representatives – would be independent.

Generally vote against the election or reelection of the non-independent member of the audit committee designated as chair of that committee.

For widely-held companies, generally vote against the (re)election of any non-independent members of the remuneration committee if fewer than 50 percent of the remuneration committee members, who are elected by shareholders in such capacity or another - excluding, where relevant, employee shareholder representatives - would be independent.

For all companies:

Generally vote against the (re)election of executives who serve on the company's audit or remuneration committee. the Global Board-Aligned policy may recommend against if the disclosure is too poor to determine whether an executive serves or will serve on a committee. If a company does not have an audit or a remuneration committee, the Global Board-Aligned policy may consider that the entire board fulfills the role of a committee. In such case, the Global Board-Aligned policy may recommend against the executives, including the CEO, up for election to the board.

Unequal Voting Rights

Policy Recommendation: For meetings held on or after Feb. 1, 2024, at widely-held companies, generally vote against directors or against the discharge of (non-executive) directors, if the company employs a stock structure with unequal voting rights⁶. Vote recommendations will generally be directed against the nominees primarily responsible for, or benefiting from, the unequal vote structure.

Exceptions to this policy will generally be limited to:

- Newly-public companies⁷ with a sunset provision of no more than seven years from the date of going public;
- Situations where the unequal voting rights are considered de minimis⁸; or
- The company provides sufficient protections for minority shareholders, for example such as allowing minority shareholders a regular binding vote on whether the capital structure should be maintained or a commitment to abolish the structure by the next AGM.

Voto di Lista (Italy)

In Italy, director elections generally take place through the *voto di lista* mechanism (similar to slate elections). Since the Italian implementation of the European Shareholder Rights Directive (effective since Nov. 1, 2010), Italian issuers whose shares are listed on the Italian regulated market Euronext Milan must publish the various lists 21 days in advance of the meeting.

Since shareholders only have the option to support one such list, where lists are published in sufficient time, the Global Board-Aligned policy will recommend a vote on a case-by-case basis, determining which list of nominees it considers is best suited to add value for shareholders.

Those companies that are excluded from the provisions of the European Shareholder Rights Directive generally publish lists of nominees seven days before the meeting. In the case where nominees are not published in sufficient time, the Global Board-Aligned policy will recommend a vote against the director elections before the lists of director nominees are disclosed. Once the various lists of nominees are disclosed, the Global Board-Aligned policy will issue an alert to its clients and, if appropriate, change its vote recommendation to support one particular list.

Composition of the Nominating Committee (Sweden/Norway/Finland)

Vote for proposals in **Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden** to elect or appoint a nominating committee consisting mainly of non-board members.

Vote for shareholder proposals calling for disclosure of the names of the proposed candidates at the meeting, as well as the inclusion of a representative of minority shareholders in the committee.

⁶ This generally includes classes of common stock that have additional votes per share than other shares; classes of shares that are not entitled to vote on all the same ballot items or nominees; or stock with time-phased voting rights (“loyalty shares” or “double-voting” shares).

⁷ Newly-public companies generally include companies that emerge from bankruptcy, SPAC transactions, spin-offs, direct listings, and those who complete a traditional initial public offering.

⁸ Distortion between voting and economic power does not exceed 10 percent, where this is calculated relative to the entire share capital for multiple share classes and on individual shareholder or concert level in case of loyalty share structures.

Vote against proposals where the names of the candidates (in the case of an election) or the principles for the establishment of the committee have not been disclosed in a timely manner.

Vote against proposals in **Sweden** to elect or appoint such a committee if the company is on the MSCI-EAFE or local main index and the following conditions exist:

- A member of the executive management would be a member of the committee;
- More than one board member who is dependent on a major shareholder would be on the committee; or
- The chair of the board would also be the chair of the committee.

In cases where the principles for the establishment of the nominating committee, rather than the election of the committee itself, are being voted on, vote against the adoption of the principles if any of the above conditions are met for the current committee, and there is no publicly available information indicating that this would no longer be the case for the new nominating committee.

Election of Censors (France)

The Global Board-Aligned policy will generally recommend a vote against proposals seeking shareholder approval to elect a censor, to amend bylaws to authorize the appointment of censors, or to extend the maximum number of censors to the board.

However, the Global Board-Aligned policy will recommend a vote on a case-by-case basis when the company provides assurance that the censor would serve on a short-term basis (maximum one year) with the intent to retain the nominee before his/her election as director. In this case, consideration shall also be given to the nominee's situation (notably overboarding or other factors of concern).

In consideration of the principle that censors should be appointed on a short-term basis, vote against any proposal to renew the term of a censor or to extend the statutory term of censors.

Please see the International Classification of Directors on the following page.

International Markets

Overboarding – Brazil and Americas Regional

Policy Recommendation: Generally, vote against management nominees who:

- Sit on more than five public company boards; or
- Are CEOs of public companies who sit on the boards of more than two public companies besides their own— recommend against only at their outside boards⁹Error! Bookmark not defined.

Generally, vote against the bundled election of directors if one or more nominees, if elected, would be overboarded.

Cumulative Voting – Middle East and Africa (MEA)

Under a cumulative voting system, each share represents a number of votes equal to the size of the board that will be elected. These votes may be apportioned equally among the candidates or, if a shareholder wishes to exclude some nominees, among the desired candidates.

For MEA markets, when directors are elected through a cumulative voting system, or when the number of nominees exceeds the number of board vacancies, vote case-by-case on directors, taking into consideration additional factors to identify the nominees best suited to add value for shareholders.

Policy Recommendation: Generally vote to abstain from all candidates if the disclosure provided by the company is not sufficient to allow the assessment of independence and the support of all proposed candidates on equal terms.

If the disclosure is sufficient to allow an assessment of the independence of proposed candidates, generally vote in favor of the following types of candidates:

- Candidates who can be identified as representatives of minority shareholders of the company, or independent candidates:
- Candidates whose professional background may have the following benefits:
 - Increasing the diversity of incumbent directors' professional profiles and skills (thanks to their financial expertise, international experience, executive positions/directorships at other listed companies, or other relevant factors.
 - Bringing to the current board of directors relevant experience in areas linked to the company's business, evidenced by current or past board memberships or management functions at other companies.
- Incumbent board members and candidates explicitly supported by the company's management.

Please see the International Classification of Directors on the following page.

⁹ Although all of a CEO's subsidiary boards with publicly-traded common stock will be counted as separate boards, the Global Board-Aligned policy will not recommend an against vote for the CEO of a parent company board or any of the controlled (>50 percent ownership) subsidiaries of that parent but may do so at subsidiaries that are less than 50 percent controlled and boards outside the parent/subsidiary relationships.

Classification of Directors – International Policy

Executive Director

- Employee or executive of the company or a wholly-owned subsidiary of the company;
- Any director who is classified as a non-executive, but receives salary, fees, bonus, and/or other benefits that are in line with the highest-paid executives of the company.

Non-Independent Non-Executive Director (NED)

- Any director who is attested by the board to be a non-independent NED;
- Any director specifically designated as a representative of a shareholder of the company;
- Any director who is also an employee or executive of a significant¹ shareholder of the company;
- Any director who is also an employee or executive of a subsidiary, associate, joint venture, or company that is affiliated with a significant¹ shareholder of the company;
- Any director who is nominated by a dissenting significant shareholder unless there is a clear lack of material² connection with the dissident, either currently or historically;
- Beneficial owner (direct or indirect) of at least 10 percent of the company's stock, either in economic terms or in voting rights (this may be aggregated if voting power is distributed among more than one member of a defined group, e.g., members of a family that beneficially own less than 10 percent individually, but collectively own more than 10 percent), unless market best practice dictates a lower ownership and/or disclosure threshold (and in other special market-specific circumstances);
- Government representative;
- Currently provides or has provided (or a relative³ provides) during the most recently concluded financial year under review professional services⁴ to the company, to an affiliate of the company, or to an individual officer of the company or of one of its affiliates in the latest fiscal year in excess of USD 10,000 per year;
- Represents customer, supplier, creditor, banker, or other entity with which the company maintains a transactional/commercial relationship (unless the company discloses information to apply a materiality test³);
- Any director who has a conflicting relationship with the company, including but not limited to cross-directorships with executive directors or the chair of the company;
- Relative³ of a current or former executive of the company or its affiliates;
- A new appointee elected other than by a formal process through the general meeting (such as a contractual appointment by a substantial shareholder);
- Founder/co-founder/member of founding family but not currently an employee or executive;
- Former executive or employee (five-year cooling off period); Years of service is generally not a determining factor unless it is recommended best practice in a market and/or in extreme circumstances, in which case it may be considered⁶.
- Any additional relationship or principle considered to compromise independence under local corporate governance best practice guidance⁷.

Independent NED

- No material² connection, either direct or indirect, to the company (other than a board seat) or to a significant shareholder.

Employee Representative

- Represents employees or employee shareholders of the company (classified as "employee representative" and considered a non-independent NED).

Footnotes

¹ At least 10 percent of the company's stock, unless market best practice dictates a lower ownership and/or disclosure threshold.

² For purposes of the Global Board-Aligned policy's director independence classification, "material" will be defined as a standard of relationship financial, personal, or otherwise that a reasonable person might conclude could potentially influence one's objectivity in the boardroom in a manner that would have a meaningful impact on an individual's ability to satisfy requisite fiduciary standards on behalf of shareholders.

³ "Relative" follows the definition of "immediate family members" which covers spouses, parents, children, stepparents, step-children, siblings, in-laws, and any person (other than a tenant or employee) sharing the household of any director, nominee for director, executive officer, or significant shareholder of the company.

⁴ Professional services can be characterized as advisory in nature and generally include the following: investment banking/financial advisory services; commercial banking (beyond deposit services); investment services; insurance services; accounting/audit services; consulting services; marketing services; and legal services. The case of participation in a banking syndicate by a non-lead bank should be considered a transaction (and hence subject to the associated materiality test) rather than a professional relationship.

⁵ A business relationship may be material if the transaction value (of all outstanding transactions) entered into between the company and the company or organization with which the director is associated is equivalent to either 1 percent of the company's turnover or 1 percent of the turnover of the company or organization with which the director is associated; or

A business relationship may be material if the transaction value (of all outstanding financing operations) entered into between the company and the company or organization with which the director is associated is more than 10 percent of the company's shareholder equity or the transaction value (of all outstanding financing operations) compared to the company's total assets is more than 5 percent.

⁶ For example, in continental Europe and Latin America, directors with a tenure exceeding 12 years will be considered non-independent. In the United Kingdom, Ireland, Hong Kong and Singapore, directors with a tenure exceeding nine years will be considered non-independent, unless the company provides sufficient and clear justification that the director is independent despite his long tenure. For purposes of independence classification of directors incorporated in the Middle East and Africa region, this criterion will be taken into account in accordance with market best practice and disclosure standards and availability.

⁷ For MEA markets, directors' past services as statutory auditor/partner of the statutory audit firm will be taken into account, with cooling-off periods in accordance with local market best practice.

Contested Director Elections

Policy Recommendation: For contested elections of directors, e.g. the election of shareholder nominees or the dismissal of incumbent directors, the Global Board-Aligned policy will make its recommendation on a case-by-case basis, determining which directors are considered best suited to add value for shareholders.

The analysis will generally be based on, but not limited to, the following major decision factors:

- Company performance relative to its peers;
- Strategy of the incumbents versus the dissidents;
- Independence of directors/nominees;
- Experience and skills of board candidates;
- Governance profile of the company;
- Evidence of management entrenchment;
- Responsiveness to shareholders;
- Whether a takeover offer has been rebuffed; and
- Whether minority or majority representation is being sought.

When analyzing a contested election of directors, the Global Board-Aligned policy will generally focus on two central questions: (1) Have the proponents proved that board change is warranted? And if so, (2) Are the proponent board nominees likely to effect positive change (i.e., maximize long-term shareholder value).

Discharge of Board and Management

Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for discharge of directors, including members of the management board and/or supervisory board, unless there is reliable information about significant and compelling concerns that the board is not fulfilling its fiduciary duties, warranted on a case-by-case basis, by:

- A lack of oversight or actions by board members which invoke shareholder distrust related to malfeasance or poor supervision, such as operating in private or company interest rather than in shareholder interest;
- Any legal issues (e.g. civil/criminal) aiming to hold the board responsible for breach of trust in the past or related to currently alleged actions yet to be confirmed (and not only the fiscal year in question), such as price fixing, insider trading, bribery, fraud, and other illegal actions; or
- Other egregious governance issues where shareholders will bring legal action against the company or its directors.

For markets which do not routinely request discharge resolutions (e.g. common law countries or markets where discharge is not mandatory), analysts may voice concern in other appropriate agenda items, such as approval of the annual accounts or other relevant resolutions, to enable shareholders to express discontent with the board.

Director, Officer, and Auditor Indemnification and Liability Provisions

Policy Recommendation:

- Vote proposals seeking indemnification and liability protection for directors and officers on a case-by-case basis.
- Vote against proposals to indemnify auditors.

Board Structure

Policy Recommendation:

- Vote for proposals to fix board size.
- Vote against the introduction of classified boards and mandatory retirement ages for directors.
- Vote against proposals to alter board structure or size in the context of a fight for control of the company or the board.

3. Capital Structure

Share Issuance Requests

General Issuances:

Policy Recommendation: Evaluate share issuance requests on a case-by-case basis taking into consideration market-specific guidelines as applicable.

For *European markets*, vote for issuance authorities with preemptive rights to a maximum of 50 percent over currently issued capital and as long as the share issuance authorities' periods are clearly disclosed (or implied by the application of a legal maximum duration) and in line with market-specific practices and/or recommended guidelines (e.g. issuance periods limited to 18 months for the **Netherlands**).

Vote for issuance authorities without preemptive rights to a maximum of 10 percent (or a lower limit if local market best practice recommendations provide) of currently issued capital as long as the share issuance authorities' periods are clearly disclosed (or implied by the application of a legal maximum duration) and in line with market-specific practices and/or recommended guidelines (e.g. issuance periods limited to 18 months for the **Netherlands**).

These thresholds are mutually exclusive.

When calculating the defined limits, all authorized and conditional capital authorizations are considered, including existing authorizations that will remain valid beyond the concerned shareholders' meeting.

For **UK** and **Irish** companies, generally vote for a resolution to authorize the issuance of equity, unless:

- The general issuance authority exceeds one-third (33 percent) of the issued share capital. Assuming it is no more than one-third, a further one-third of the issued share capital may also be applied to a fully pre-emptive rights issue taking the acceptable aggregate authority to two-thirds (66 percent); or
- The routine authority to disapply pre-emption rights exceeds 20 percent of the issued share capital, provided that any amount above 10 percent is to be used for the purposes of an acquisition or a specified capital investment. For the general disapplication authority and specific disapplication authority, a further disapplication of up to 2 percent may be used for each authority for the purposes of a follow-on offer.

For **French** companies:

- Vote for general issuance requests with preemptive rights, or without preemptive rights but with a binding "priority right," for a maximum of 50 percent over currently issued capital.
- Generally vote for general authorities to issue shares without preemptive rights up to a maximum of 10 percent of share capital. When companies are listed on a regulated market, the maximum discount on share issuance price proposed in the resolution must, in addition, comply with the legal discount for a vote for to be warranted.

For **Hong Kong** companies, generally vote for the general issuance mandate for companies that:

- Limit the issuance request to 10 percent or less of the relevant class of issued share capital for cash and non-cash consideration;
- Limit the discount to 10 percent of the market price of shares (rather than the maximum 20 percent permitted by the Listing Rules) for issuance for cash and non-cash consideration; and

- Have no history of renewing the General Issuance Mandate several times within a period of one year which may result in the share issuance limit exceeding 10 percent of the relevant class of issued share capital for issuance for cash and non-cash consideration within the 12-month period.

Generally vote for a general issuance of equity or equity-linked securities without preemptive rights when the share issuance limit is not more than 10 percent of the company's issued share capital and 50 percent with preemptive rights for all **Singapore** companies, with the exception of Catalist-listed companies and Real Estate Investment Trusts.

For **Singapore** companies listed on the Catalist market of the SGX, generally vote for a general issuance of equity or equity-linked securities without preemptive rights when the share issuance limit is not more than 20 percent of the company's issued share capital and 100 percent with preemptive rights. For Real Estate Investment Trusts, generally vote for a general issuance of equity or equity-linked securities without preemptive rights when the unit issuance limit is not more than 20 percent of its issued unit capital and 50 percent with preemptive rights.

For companies listed on the Main Market and ACE Market of the Bursa Malaysia Securities Bhd (Exchange), vote for issuance requests without preemptive rights to a maximum of 10 percent of currently issued capital. For real estate investment trusts (REITs), vote for issuance requests without preemptive rights to a maximum of 20 percent of currently issued capital.

For **Latin American** companies, generally vote for issuance requests with preemptive rights to a maximum of 100 percent over currently issued capital. Vote for issuance requests without preemptive rights to a maximum of 20 percent of currently issued capital. Specific Issuances requested will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.

For shelf registration programs at Latin American companies (**Argentina, Colombia, Chile, Mexico, and Peru**), vote on a case-by-case basis on all requests, with or without preemptive rights. Approval of a multi-year authority for the issuance of securities under Shelf Registration Programs will be considered on a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration, but not limited to, the following:

- Whether the company has provided adequate and timely disclosure including detailed information regarding the rationale for the proposed program;
- Whether the proposed amount to be approved under such authority, the use of the resources, the length of the authorization, the nature of the securities to be issued under such authority, including any potential risk of dilution to shareholders is disclosed; and
- Whether there are concerns regarding questionable finances, the use of the proceeds, or other governance concerns.

Increases in Authorized Capital

Policy Recommendation: Vote for proposals to increase authorized capital on a case-by-case basis if such proposals do not include the authorization to issue shares from the (pre-)approved limit.

In case the proposals to increase authorized capital include the authorization to issue shares according to the (pre-) approved limit without obtaining separate shareholder approval, the general issuance policy applies.

Reduction of Capital

Policy Recommendation: Vote for proposals to reduce capital for routine accounting purposes unless the terms are unfavorable to shareholders.

Vote proposals to reduce capital in connection with corporate restructuring on a case-by-case basis.

Capital Structures

Policy Recommendation: Vote for resolutions that seek to maintain or convert to a one-share, one-vote capital structure.

Vote against requests for the creation or continuation of dual-class capital structures or the creation of new or additional supervoting shares.

Preferred Stock

Policy Recommendation:

- Vote for the creation of a new class of preferred stock or for issuances of preferred stock up to 50 percent of issued capital unless the terms of the preferred stock would adversely affect the rights of existing shareholders.
- Vote for the creation/issuance of convertible preferred stock as long as the maximum number of common shares that could be issued upon conversion meets the guidelines on equity issuance requests.
- Vote against the creation of a new class of preference shares that would carry superior voting rights to the common shares.
- Vote against the creation of blank check preferred stock unless the board clearly states that the authorization will not be used to thwart a takeover bid.
- Vote proposals to increase blank check preferred authorizations on a case-by-case basis.

Debt Issuance Requests

Policy Recommendation: Vote non-convertible debt issuance requests on a case-by-case basis, with or without pre-emptive rights.

Vote for the creation/issuance of convertible debt instruments as long as the maximum number of common shares that could be issued upon conversion meets the guidelines on equity issuance requests.

Vote for proposals to restructure existing debt arrangements unless the terms of the restructuring would adversely affect the rights of shareholders.

Pledging of Assets for Debt

Policy Recommendation: Vote proposals to approve the pledging of assets for debt on a case-by-case basis.

Increase in Borrowing Powers

Policy Recommendation: Vote proposals to approve increases in a company's borrowing powers on a case-by-case basis.

Share Repurchase Plans

Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for market repurchase authorities (share repurchase programs) if the terms comply with the following criteria:

- A repurchase limit of up to 10 percent of issued share capital;

- A holding limit of up to 10 percent of a company's issued share capital in treasury ("on the shelf"); and
- Duration of no more than 5 years, or such lower threshold as may be set by applicable law, regulation, or code of governance best practice.

Authorities to repurchase shares in excess of the 10 percent repurchase limit will be assessed on a case-by-case basis. The Global Board-Aligned policy may support such share repurchase authorities under special circumstances, which are required to be publicly disclosed by the company, provided that, on balance, the proposal is in shareholders' interests. In such cases, the authority must comply with the following criteria:

- A holding limit of up to 10 percent of a company's issued share capital in treasury ("on the shelf"); and
- Duration of no more than 18 months.

In markets where it is normal practice not to provide a repurchase limit, the Global Board-Aligned policy will evaluate the proposal based on the company's historical practice. However, the Global Board-Aligned policy expects companies to disclose such limits and, in the future, may recommend a vote against companies that fail to do so. In such cases, the authority must comply with the following criteria:

- A holding limit of up to 10 percent of a company's issued share capital in treasury ("on the shelf"); and
- Duration of no more than 18 months.

In addition, the Global Board-Aligned policy will recommend against any proposal where:

- The repurchase can be used for takeover defenses;
- There is clear evidence of abuse;
- There is no safeguard against selective buybacks;
- Pricing provisions and safeguards are deemed to be unreasonable in light of market practice.

Market-Specific Exceptions

For **Singapore**, generally vote for resolutions authorizing the company to repurchase its own shares, unless the premium over the average trading price of the shares as implied by the maximum price paid exceeds 5 percent for on-market repurchases and 20 percent for off-market repurchases.

Reissuance of Shares Repurchased

Policy Recommendation: Vote for requests to reissue any repurchased shares unless there is clear evidence of abuse of this authority in the past.

Capitalization of Reserves for Bonus Issues/Increase in Par Value

Policy Recommendation: Vote for requests to capitalize reserves for bonus issues of shares or to increase par value.

Private Placement

Policy Recommendation: For Canadian companies, vote case-by-case on private placement issuances taking into account:

- Whether other resolutions are bundled with the issuance;
- Whether the rationale for the private placement issuance is disclosed;

- Dilution to existing shareholders' position:
 - issuance that represents no more than 30 percent of the company's outstanding shares on a non-diluted basis is considered generally acceptable;
- Discount/premium in issuance price to the unaffected share price before the announcement of the private placement;
- Market reaction: The market's response to the proposed private placement since announcement; and
- Other applicable factors, including conflict of interest, change in control/management, evaluation of other alternatives.

Generally vote for the private placement issuance if it is expected that the company will file for bankruptcy if the transaction is not approved or the company's auditor/management has indicated that the company has going concern issues.

4. Compensation

Preamble

The assessment of compensation follows the Global Board-Aligned policy's Global Principles on Executive and Director Compensation which are detailed below. These principles take into account global corporate governance best practice.

The Global Principles on Compensation underlie market-specific policies in all markets:

- Provide shareholders with clear, comprehensive compensation disclosures;
- Maintain appropriate pay structure with emphasis on long-term shareholder value;
- Avoid arrangements that risk "pay for failure;"
- Maintain an independent and effective compensation committee;
- Avoid inappropriate pay to non-executive directors.

European Guidelines

Pursuant to the European Directive 2017/828 (a.k.a. the Shareholder Rights Directive II or SRDII), companies which have their registered office in a Member State and the shares of which are admitted to trading on a regulated market situated or operating within a Member State must (i) submit their director remuneration policy to shareholder (binding or advisory) vote at every material change and in any case at least every four years, and (ii) submit a director remuneration report to discussion or shareholder vote on an annual basis.

In applying the Five Global Principles, the Global Board-Aligned policy has formulated European Compensation Guidelines which take into account local codes of governance, market best practice, and the Recommendations published by the European Commission. The Global Board-Aligned policy analyzes compensation-related proposals based on the role of the beneficiaries and has therefore divided its executive and director compensation policy into two domains:

- Executive compensation-related proposals; and
- Non-executive director compensation-related proposals

Executive Compensation-Related Proposals

The Global Board-Aligned policy will evaluate management proposals seeking ratification of a company's executive compensation-related items on a case-by-case basis, and, where relevant, will take into account the European Pay for Performance (EP4P) model¹⁰ outcomes within a qualitative review of a company's remuneration practices.

Policy Recommendation: The Global Board-Aligned policy will generally recommend a vote against a company's compensation-related proposal if such proposal fails to comply with one or a combination of several of the global principles and their corresponding rules:

- Provide shareholders with clear and comprehensive compensation disclosures:
 - Information on compensation-related proposals shall be made available to shareholders in a timely manner;
 - The level of disclosure of the proposed compensation policy and remuneration report shall be sufficient for shareholders to make an informed decision and shall be in line with what local market best practice standards dictate;
 - Remuneration report disclosure is expected to include amongst others: amounts paid to executives, alignment between company performance and payout to executives, disclosure of variable incentive targets and according levels of achievement and performance awards made, after the relevant performance period (ex-post), and disclosure and explanation of use of any discretionary authority or derogation clause by the board or remuneration committee to adjust pay outcomes.
 - Companies are expected to provide meaningful information regarding the average remuneration of employees of the company, in a manner which permits comparison with directors' remuneration.
 - Companies shall adequately disclose all elements of the compensation, including:
 - Any short- or long-term compensation component must include a maximum award limit.
 - Long-term incentive plans must provide sufficient disclosure of (i) the exercise price/strike price (options); (ii) discount on grant; (iii) grant date/period; (iv) exercise/vesting period; and, if applicable, (v) performance criteria.
 - Discretionary payments, if applicable.
 - The derogation policy, if applicable, which shall clearly define and limit any elements (e.g., base salary, STI, LTI, etc.) and extent (e.g., caps, weightings, etc.) to which derogations may apply.
- Maintain appropriate pay structure with emphasis on long-term shareholder value:
 - The structure of the company's short-term incentive plan shall be appropriate.
 - The compensation policy must notably avoid guaranteed or discretionary compensation.
 - The structure of the company's long-term incentives shall be appropriate, including, but not limited to, dilution, vesting period, and, if applicable, performance conditions.
 - Equity-based plans or awards that are linked to long-term company performance will be evaluated using the Global Board-Aligned policy's general policy for equity-based plans; and

¹⁰ Definition of Pay-for-Performance Evaluation:

The Global Board-Aligned policy annually conducts a pay-for-performance analysis to measure the alignment between pay and performance over a sustained period. With respect to companies in the European Main Indices, this analysis considers the following:

- Peer Group Alignment:
 - ✓ The degree of alignment between the company's annualized TSR rank and the CEO's annualized total pay rank within a peer group, each measured over a three-year period.
 - ✓ The multiple of the CEO's total pay relative to the peer group median.
- Absolute Alignment – the absolute alignment between the trend in CEO pay and company TSR over the prior five fiscal years – i.e., the difference between the trend in annual pay changes and the trend in annualized TSR during the period.

- For awards granted to executives, the Global Board-Aligned policy will generally require a clear link between shareholder value and awards, and stringent performance-based elements.
 - The balance between short- and long-term variable compensation shall be appropriate.
 - The company's executive compensation policy must notably avoid disproportionate focus on short-term variable element(s)
- Avoid arrangements that risk “pay for failure”:
 - The board shall demonstrate good stewardship of investor's interests regarding executive compensation practices (principle being supported by Pay for Performance Evaluation).
 - There shall be a clear link between the company's performance and variable incentives. Financial and non-financial conditions, including ESG criteria, are relevant as long as they reward an effective performance in line with the purpose, strategy, and objectives adopted by the company.
 - There shall not be significant discrepancies between the company's performance, financial and non-financial, and real executive payouts.
 - The level of pay for the CEO and members of executive management should not be excessive relative to peers, company performance, and market practices.
 - Significant pay increases shall be explained by a detailed and compelling disclosure.
 - Termination payments¹¹ must not be in excess of (i) 24 months' pay or of (ii) any more restrictive provision pursuant to local legal requirements and/or market best practices.
 - Arrangements with a company executive regarding pensions and post-mandate exercise of equity-based awards must not result in an adverse impact on shareholders' interests or be misaligned with good market practices.
- Maintain an independent and effective compensation committee:
 - No executives may serve on the compensation committee.
 - In certain markets the compensation committee shall be composed of a majority of independent members, as per the Global Board-Aligned policies on director election and board or committee composition.
- Compensation committees should use the discretion afforded them by shareholders to ensure that rewards properly reflect business performance¹².

In addition to the above, the Global Board-Aligned policy will generally recommend a vote against a compensation-related proposal if such proposal is in breach of any other supplemental market-specific voting policies.

Non-Executive Director Compensation

- Avoid inappropriate pay to non-executive directors.

Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals to award cash fees to non-executive directors.

Vote against where:

¹¹ Termination payments' means any payment linked to early termination of contracts for executive or managing directors, including payments related to the duration of a notice period or a non-competition clause included in the contract.

¹² In cases where a remuneration committee uses its discretion to determine payments, it should provide a clear explanation of its reasons, which are expected to be clearly justified by the financial results and the underlying performance of the company.

The remuneration committee should disclose how it has taken into account any relevant environmental, social, and governance (ESG) matters when determining remuneration outcomes. Such factors may include (but are not limited to): workplace fatalities and injuries, significant environmental incidents, large or serial fines or sanctions from regulatory bodies and/or significant adverse legal judgments or settlements.

It is relatively rare that a remuneration committee chooses to amend the targets used for either the annual bonus or the LTIP following the start of the performance period, but where this has occurred, it is good practice for the company to demonstrate how the revised targets are in practice no less challenging than the targets which were originally set.

- Documents (including general meeting documents, annual report) provided prior to the general meeting do not mention fees paid to non-executive directors.
- Proposed amounts are excessive relative to other companies in the country or industry.
- The company intends to increase the fees excessively in comparison with market/sector practices, without stating compelling reasons that justify the increase.
- Proposals provide for the granting of stock options, performance-based equity compensation (including stock appreciation rights and performance-vesting restricted stock), and performance-based cash to non-executive directors.
- Proposals introduce retirement benefits for non-executive directors.

Vote on a case-by-case basis where:

- Proposals include both cash and share-based components to non-executive directors.
- Proposals bundle compensation for both non-executive and executive directors into a single resolution.

Equity-Based Compensation Guidelines

Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for equity based compensation proposals or the like if the plan(s) is(are) in line with long-term shareholder interests and align the award with shareholder value. This assessment includes, but is not limited to, the following factors:

- The volume of awards (to be) transferred to participants under all outstanding plans must not be excessive: the awards must not exceed 5 percent of a company's issued share capital. This number can be up to 10 percent for high-growth companies or particularly well-designed plans (e.g., with challenging performance criteria, extended vesting/performance period, etc.).
- The plan(s) must be sufficiently long-term in nature/structure: the vesting of awards (i) must occur no less than three years from the grant date, and (ii) if applicable, should be conditioned on meeting performance targets that are measured over a period of at least three consecutive years;
- If applicable, performance criteria must be fully disclosed, measurable, quantifiable, and long-term oriented.
- The awards must be granted at market price. Discounts, if any, must be mitigated by performance criteria or other features that justify such discount.

Employee Share Purchase Plans

Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for employee stock purchase plans if the number of shares allocated to the plan is 10 percent or less of the company's issued share capital.

Compensation-Related Voting Sanctions

Should a company be deemed:

- To have egregious remuneration practices;
- To have failed to follow market practice by not submitting expected resolutions on executive compensation; or
- To have failed to respond to significant shareholder dissent on remuneration-related proposals;

an adverse vote recommendation could be applied to any of the following on a case-by case basis:

- The reelection of the chair of the remuneration committee or, where relevant, any other members of the remuneration committee;
- The reelection of the board chair;

- The discharge of directors; or
- The annual report and accounts.

This recommendation could be made in addition to other adverse recommendations under existing remuneration proposals (if any).

Stock Option Plans – Adjustment for Dividend (Nordic Region)

Policy Recommendation: Vote against stock option plans in **Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden** if evidence is found that they contain provisions that may result in a disconnect between shareholder value and employee/executive reward.

This includes one or a combination of the following:

- Adjusting the strike price for future ordinary dividends AND including expected dividend yield above 0 percent when determining the number of options awarded under the plan;
- Having significantly higher expected dividends than actual historical dividends;
- Favorably adjusting the terms of existing options plans without valid reason; and/or
- Any other provisions or performance measures that result in undue award.

This policy applies to both new plans and amendments to introduce the provisions into already existing stock option plans. The Global Board-Aligned policy will make an exception if a company proposes to reduce the strike price by the amount of future special (extraordinary) dividends only.

Generally vote against if the potential increase of share capital amounts to more than 5 percent for mature companies or 10 percent for growth companies or if options may be exercised below the market price of the share at the date of grant, or that employee options do not lapse if employment is terminated.

Share Matching Plans (Sweden and Norway)

Policy Recommendation:

The Global Board-Aligned policy considers the following factors when evaluating share matching plans:

- For every share matching plan, the Global Board-Aligned policy requires a holding period.
- For plans without performance criteria, the shares must be purchased at market price.
- For broad-based share matching plans directed at all employees, the Global Board-Aligned policy accepts an arrangement up to a 1:1 ratio, i.e. no more than one free share is awarded for every share purchased at market value.

In addition, for plans directed at executives, we require that sufficiently challenging performance criteria be attached to the plan. Higher discounts demand proportionally higher performance criteria.

The dilution of the plan when combined with the dilution from any other proposed or outstanding employee stock purchase/stock matching plans, must comply with the Global Board-Aligned policy guidelines.

Canadian Guidelines

Policy Recommendation: Evaluate executive pay and practices, as well as certain aspects of outside director compensation on a case-by-case basis.

Vote against management say on pay (MSOP) proposals, withhold from compensation committee members (or in rare cases where the full board is deemed responsible, all directors including the CEO), and/or against an equity-based incentive plan proposal if:

- There is a misalignment between CEO pay and company performance (pay for performance);
- The company maintains problematic pay practices; or
- The board exhibits poor communication and responsiveness to shareholders.

Pay for Performance:

- Rationale for determining compensation (e.g., why certain elements and pay targets are used, how they are used in relation to the company's business strategy, and specific incentive plan goals, especially retrospective goals) and linkage of compensation to long-term performance;
- Evaluation of peer group benchmarking used to set target pay or award opportunities;
- Analysis of company performance and executive pay trends over time, taking into account our Pay-for-Performance policy;
- Mix of fixed versus variable and performance versus non-performance-based pay.

Pay Practices:

- Assessment of compensation components included in the Problematic Pay Practices policy such as: perks, severance packages, employee loans, supplemental executive pension plans, internal pay disparity and equity plan practices (including option backdating, repricing, option exchanges, or cancellations/surrenders and re-grants, etc.);
- Existence of measures that discourage excessive risk taking which include but are not limited to: clawbacks, holdbacks, stock ownership requirements, deferred compensation practices etc.

Board Communications and Responsiveness:

- Clarity of disclosure (e.g. whether the company's Form 51-102F6 disclosure provides timely, accurate, clear information about compensation practices in both tabular format and narrative discussion);
- Assessment of board's responsiveness to investor concerns on compensation issues (e.g., whether the company engaged with shareholders and / or responded to majority-supported shareholder proposals relating to executive pay).

Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation (Say-on-Pay) Management Proposals

Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on management proposals for an advisory shareholder vote on executive compensation. Vote against these resolutions in cases where boards have failed to demonstrate good stewardship of investors' interests regarding executive compensation practices.

In general, the management say on pay (MSOP) ballot item is the primary focus of voting on executive pay practices-- dissatisfaction with compensation practices can be expressed by voting against MSOP rather than withholding or voting against the compensation committee. However, if there is no MSOP on the ballot, then the negative vote will apply to members of the compensation committee. In addition, in egregious cases, or if the

board fails to respond to concerns raised by a prior MSOP proposal, then vote against or withhold from compensation committee members (or, if the full board is deemed accountable, all directors). If the negative factors involve equity-based compensation, then vote against an equity-based plan proposal presented for shareholder approval.

Equity Compensation Plans

Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on equity-based compensation plans using an "equity plan scorecard" (EPSC) approach. Under this approach, certain features and practices related to the plan¹³ are assessed in combination, with positively-assessed factors potentially counterbalancing negatively-assessed factors and vice-versa. Factors are grouped into three pillars:

- **Plan Cost:** The total estimated cost of the company's equity plans relative to industry/market cap peers, measured by the company's estimated Shareholder Value Transfer (SVT) in relation to peers and considering both:
 - SVT based on new shares requested plus shares remaining for future grants, plus outstanding unvested/unexercised grants; and
 - SVT based only on new shares requested plus shares remaining for future grants.
- **Plan Features:**
 - Absence of problematic change-in-control (CIC) provisions, including:
 - Single-trigger acceleration of award vesting in connection with a CIC; and
 - Settlement of performance-based equity at target or above in the event of a CIC-related acceleration of vesting regardless of performance.
 - No financial assistance to plan participants for the exercise or settlement of awards;
 - Public disclosure of the full text of the plan document; and
 - Reasonable share dilution from equity plans relative to market best practices.
- **Grant Practices:**
 - Reasonable three-year average burn rate relative to market best practices;
 - Meaningful time vesting requirements for the CEO's most recent equity grants (three-year lookback);
 - The issuance of performance-based equity to the CEO;
 - A clawback provision applicable to equity awards; and
 - Post-exercise or post-settlement share-holding requirements (S&P/TSX Composite Index only).

Generally vote against the plan proposal if the combination of above factors, as determined by an overall score, indicates that the plan is not in shareholders' interests. In addition, vote against the plan if any of the following unacceptable factors have been identified:

- Discretionary or insufficiently limited non-employee director participation;
- An amendment provision which fails to adequately restrict the company's ability to amend the plan without shareholder approval;
- A history of repricing stock options without shareholder approval (three-year look-back);
- The plan is a vehicle for problematic pay practices or a significant pay-for-performance disconnect under certain circumstances; or
- Any other plan features that are determined to have a significant negative impact on shareholder interests.

¹³ In cases where certain historic grant data are unavailable (e.g. following an IPO or emergence from bankruptcy), Special Cases models will be applied which omit factors requiring these data.

Director Compensation- TSX

Policy Recommendation: On a case-by-case basis, generally vote withhold for members of the committee responsible for director compensation (or, where no such committee has been identified, the board chair or full board) where director compensation practices which pose a risk of compromising a non-employee director's independence or which otherwise appear problematic from the perspective of shareholders have been identified, including:

- Excessive (relative to standard market practice) inducement grants issued upon the appointment or election of a new director to the board (consideration will be given to the form in which the compensation has been issued and the board's rationale for the inducement grant);
- Performance-based equity grants to non-employee directors which could pose a risk of aligning directors' interests away from those of shareholders and toward those of management; and
- Other significant problematic practices relating to director compensation.

Other Compensation Plans

Employee Stock Purchase Plans (ESPPs, ESOPs)

Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for broadly based (preferably all employees of the company with the exclusion of individuals with 5 percent or more beneficial ownership of the company) employee stock purchase plans where the following apply:

- Reasonable limit on employee contribution (may be expressed as a fixed dollar amount or as a percentage of base salary excluding bonus, commissions and special compensation);
- Employer contribution of up to 25 percent of employee contribution and no purchase price discount or employer contribution of more than 25 percent of employee contribution and SVT cost of the company's equity plans is within the allowable cap for the company;
- Purchase price is at least 80 percent of fair market value with no employer contribution;
- Potential dilution together with all other equity-based plans is 10 percent of outstanding common shares or less; and
- The Plan Amendment Provision requires shareholder approval for amendments to:
 - The number of shares reserved for the plan;
 - The allowable purchase price discount;
 - The employer matching contribution amount.

Treasury funded ESPPs, as well as market purchase funded ESPPs requesting shareholder approval, will be considered to be incentive based compensation if the employer match is greater than 25 percent of the employee contribution. In this case, the plan will be run through the Global Board-Aligned policy's compensation model to assess the Shareholder Value Transfer (SVT) cost of the plan together with the company's other equity-based compensation plans.

Eligibility and administration are also key factors in determining the acceptability of an ESPP/ESOP plan.

The Global Board-Aligned policy will also take into account other compensation and benefit programs, in particular pensions.

Deferred Share Unit Plans

Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for Deferred Compensation Plans if:

- Potential dilution together with all other equity-based compensation is ten percent of the outstanding common shares or less.

Other elements of director compensation to evaluate in conjunction with deferred share units include:

- Director stock ownership guidelines of a minimum of three times annual cash retainer;
- Vesting schedule or mandatory deferral period which requires that shares in payment of deferred units may not be paid out until the end of three years;
- The mix of remuneration between cash and equity; and
- Other forms of equity-based compensation, i.e. stock options, restricted stock.

International Guidelines

Policy Recommendation: Evaluate executive and director compensation proposals on a case-by-case basis taking into consideration the Global Principles as applicable.

5. Environmental and Social Issues

Global Approach – E&S Shareholder Proposals

Environmental and social proposals will be reviewed with a focus on how, and to what extent, the issues dealt with in such proposals will directly affect shareholder value, and with a presumption on environmental and social topics that the board's recommendations should generally prevail. In those circumstances where it is widely considered that greater disclosure will directly enhance or protect shareholder value and is reflective of a clearly established reporting standard in the market, the Global Board-Aligned Policy will generally recommend in support of such proposals. In the absence of a clear determination that environmental and social proposals will have a positive effect on shareholder value or there are proposals that seek information that exceeds a widely endorsed standard in the market or place any burden upon the company beyond a reasonable and clearly established reporting standard in the market, the Global Board-Aligned policy will generally recommend voting against such proposals, or in line with the board's recommendations if different.

Say on Climate (SoC) Management Proposals

Policy Recommendation: Generally vote with the board's recommendation on management proposals that request shareholders to approve the company's climate transition action plan.¹⁴

Say on Climate (SoC) Shareholder Proposals

General Recommendation: Generally vote against shareholder proposals that request the company to disclose a report providing its GHG emissions levels and reduction targets and/or its upcoming/approved climate transition action plan and provide shareholders the opportunity to express approval or disapproval of its GHG emissions reduction plan.

¹⁴ Variations of this request also include climate transition related ambitions, or commitment to reporting on the implementation of a climate plan.

6. Other Items

Reorganizations/Restructurings

Policy Recommendation: Vote reorganizations and restructurings on a case-by-case basis.

Mergers and Acquisitions

Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on mergers and acquisitions taking into account the following:

For every M&A analysis, the Global Board-Aligned policy reviews publicly available information as of the date of the report and evaluates the merits and drawbacks of the proposed transaction, balancing various and sometimes countervailing factors including:

- **Valuation** - Is the value to be received by the target shareholders (or paid by the acquirer) reasonable? While the fairness opinion may provide an initial starting point for assessing valuation reasonableness, the Global Board-Aligned policy places emphasis on the offer premium, market reaction, and strategic rationale;
- **Market reaction** - How has the market responded to the proposed deal? A negative market reaction will cause the Global Board-Aligned policy to scrutinize a deal more closely;
- **Strategic rationale** - Does the deal make sense strategically? From where is the value derived? Cost and revenue synergies should not be overly aggressive or optimistic, but reasonably achievable. Management should also have a favorable track record of successful integration of historical acquisitions;
- **Conflicts of interest** - Are insiders benefiting from the transaction disproportionately and inappropriately as compared to non-insider shareholders? The Global Board-Aligned policy will consider whether any special interests may have influenced these directors and officers to support or recommend the merger;
- **Governance** - Will the combined company have a better or worse governance profile than the current governance profiles of the respective parties to the transaction? If the governance profile is to change for the worse, the burden is on the company to prove that other issues (such as valuation) outweigh any deterioration in governance.
- **Stakeholder impact** - Impact on community stakeholders including impact on workforce, environment, etc.

Vote against if the companies do not provide sufficient information upon request to make an informed voting decision.

Mandatory Takeover Bid Waivers

Policy Recommendation: Vote proposals to waive mandatory takeover bid requirements on a case-by-case basis.

Reincorporation Proposals

Policy Recommendation: Vote reincorporation proposals on a case-by-case basis.

Expansion of Business Activities

Policy Recommendation: Vote for resolutions to expand business activities unless the new business takes the company into risky areas.

Related-Party Transactions

Policy Recommendation: Vote related-party transactions on a case-by-case basis considering factors including, but not limited to, the following:

- The parties on either side of the transaction;
- The nature of the asset to be transferred/service to be provided;
- The pricing of the transaction (and any associated professional valuation);
- The views of independent directors (where provided);
- The views of an independent financial adviser (where appointed);
- Whether any entities party to the transaction (including advisers) is conflicted; and
- The stated rationale for the transaction, including discussions of timing.

Commonly seen related-party transactions include (but are not limited to):

- Transactions involving the sale or purchase of property and/or assets;
- Transactions involving the lease of property and/or assets;
- Transactions involving the provision or receipt of services or leases; and
- Transactions involving the acquisition or transfer of intangible items (e.g., research and development, trademarks, license agreements).

If there is a transaction that is deemed problematic and that was not put to a shareholder vote, the Global Board-Aligned policy may recommend against the election of the director(s) involved in the related-party transaction or against the full board.

In the case of Nigerian companies, vote for proposals relating to renewal of the general mandate for the company to enter into recurrent transactions with related parties necessary for its day-to-day operations in the absence of any concerns with the related party transactions concluded pursuant to this general mandate.

Antitakeover Mechanisms

Policy Recommendation: Vote against all antitakeover proposals unless they are structured in such a way that they give shareholders the ultimate decision on any proposal or offer.

For the Netherlands, vote recommendations regarding management proposals to approve protective preference shares will be determined on a case-by-case basis. In general, the Global Board-Aligned policy will recommend voting for protective preference shares (PPS) only if:

- The supervisory board needs to approve an issuance of shares and the supervisory board is independent within the meaning of ISS' categorization rules (ISS' European Director Independence Guidelines) and the Dutch Corporate Governance Code (*i.e.*, a maximum of one member can be non-independent);
- No call / put option agreement exists between the company and a foundation for the issuance of PPS;
- The issuance authority is for a maximum of 18 months;
- The board of the company-friendly foundation is fully independent;
- There are no priority shares or other egregious protective or entrenchment tools;
- The company states specifically that the issue of PPS is not meant to block a takeover, but will only be used to investigate alternative bids or to negotiate a better deal;
- The foundation buying the PPS does not have as a statutory goal to block a takeover; and
- The PPS will be outstanding for a period of maximum 6 months (an EGM must be called to determine the continued use of such shares after this period).

Following the Florange act of 2016, for French companies listed on a regulated market, generally vote against any general authorities impacting the share capital (i.e. authorities for share repurchase plans and any general share issuances with or without preemptive rights) if they can be used for antitakeover purposes without shareholders' prior explicit approval.

Shareholder Proposals

Policy Recommendation: Vote all shareholder proposals on a case-by-case basis.

Vote for proposals that would improve the company's corporate governance or business profile at a reasonable cost.

Vote against proposals that limit the company's business activities or capabilities or result in significant costs being incurred with little or no benefit.

Policies dealing with environmental and social themes are covered by their own dedicated policy, presented separately in this document.

Exclusive Forum Proposals (TSX-Listed Companies and Venture Companies)

Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to adopt an exclusive forum by-law or to amend by-laws to add an exclusive forum provision, taking the following into consideration:

- Jurisdiction of incorporation;
- Board rationale for adopting exclusive forum;
- Legal actions subject to the exclusive forum provision;
- Evidence of past harm as a result of shareholder legal action against the company originating outside of the jurisdiction of incorporation;
- Company corporate governance provisions and shareholder rights;
- Any other problematic provisions that raise concerns regarding shareholder rights.

7. Foreign Private Issuers

Foreign private issuers ("FPIs") are defined as companies whose business is administered principally outside the U.S., with more than 50 percent of assets located outside the U.S.; a majority of whose directors/officers are not U.S. citizens or residents; and a majority of whose outstanding voting shares are held by non-residents of the U.S. Companies that are incorporated outside of the U.S. and listed solely on U.S. exchanges, where they qualify as FPIs, will be subject to the following policy:

Vote against or withhold from non-independent director nominees at companies which fail to meet the following criteria: a majority-independent board, and the presence of an audit, compensation, and a nomination committee, each of which is entirely composed of independent directors. Where the design and disclosure levels of equity compensation plans are comparable to those seen at U.S. companies, U.S. compensation policy will be used to evaluate the compensation plan proposals. All other voting items will be evaluated using the relevant regional or market proxy voting guidelines.

While a firm's country of incorporation will remain the primary basis for evaluating companies, the Global Board-Aligned policy will generally apply its U.S. policies to the extent possible with respect to issuers that file DEF 14As,

10-K annual reports, and 10-Q quarterly reports, and are thus considered domestic issuers by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). U.S. policies will also apply to companies listed on U.S. exchanges as Foreign Private Issuers (FPIs) and that may be exempt from the disclosure and corporate governance requirements that apply to most companies traded on U.S. exchanges, including a number of SEC rules and stock market listing requirements. Corporations that have reincorporated outside the U.S. have found themselves subject to a combination of governance regulations and best practice standards that may not be entirely compatible with an evaluation framework based solely on the country of incorporation.

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