

# SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Proxy Voting Guidelines
Benchmark Policy Recommendations

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# Coverage

These policy document applies to companies listed in Sub-Saharan African (SSA) markets (ex-South Africa). Currently, ISS coverage includes the following 17 markets: Botswana, Burkina Faso, Gabon, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. This is not an exhaustive list and may expand based on our institutional clients' portfolio holdings.

# Introduction

The Sub-Saharan African (SSA) markets policy guidelines were introduced in 2020, effective for the proxy season of 2021. Initially, the markets were covered by the regional EMEA (Europe, Middle East and Africa) guidelines prior to an initiative undertaken in 2020 to create separate policy guidelines for two regions: Sub-Saharan Africa and Middle East & Northern Africa.

Generally, SSA Companies present relatively high levels of disclosure and transparency within annual reports, as published by most companies sufficiently ahead of the AGMs. This gives greater scope for analysis of the proposed resolutions on general meetings. Some changes were implemented in this policy compared to the previous EMEA regional policy to reflect the unique aspects of the region as observed through companies' practices, and to codify current policy application in the analysis of certain proposals seen regularly on meeting agendas. Policy changes originate from a detailed research of local legal requirements, monitoring of current market practices and supported by the results of the annual Policy Survey of institutional investors and corporate issuers prepared by ISS Global Research teams.

Local governance regulations and practices within the SSA region have evolved, influenced mainly by the South African market. In fact, the local governance codes of the majority of these markets are inspired by the King IV Report on Corporate Governance, currently in force in South Africa, issued in 2016. While most of these codes still apply the previous "comply or explain" approach, as did the King III Report, Nigerian governance code of 2018 followed the King IV " apply and explain " approach, moving forward from the subject of compliance to how the principles and recommended practices can be applied to the business.

Publicly listed companies based in these markets are regulated through their corresponding local laws and corporate governance codes issued by regulatory authorities. These rules, as it is the case for other regions in the world, may be incorporated into companies' articles of associations, the constitutional document covering the governance of the company.

Within the SSA countries, two main regions emerged: Eastern African Community (EAC) and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The EAC, whose united currency is the East African Shilling (EAS) comprises of the following six countries: Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda aspiring to establish a single federated sovereign state. The ECOWAS is comprised by two regions. One region is the West African Economic and Monetary Union with eight, mainly French-speaking, states, namely Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo which share a customs union and have a united currency CFA Franc (pegged to the Euro). In May 2020, France passed a bill modifying its monetary agreement with the eight member states of the West African Economic and Monetary Union. Pursuant to this bill, the union's currency would be renamed as "the Eco" which will remain pegged to the euro but the state members will not have to deposit half of their foreign exchange reserves with the Bank of France and no French representative would be required to sit on the boards of their monetary governance bodies such as the Central Bank of West African States. The other region under the ECOWAS is the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) comprises six states which are namely Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone. While the WAMZ is planning to establish its own currency, most of these countries have adopted the CFA franc, with exception for Ghana and Nigeria.

At the typical AGM, shareholders will be asked to approve the following:

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- Receipt of annual financial statements;
- Auditors' reappointment and remuneration;
- Approval of dividends;
- Re/election of directors;
- Election of audit committee members;
- Approval of director fees;
- Approval of remuneration policy and implementation report;
- Related-party transactions (renewal of the general mandate for Nigerian companies)

Other items that may be submitted for shareholder approval include:

- Share issuance authorities;
- Share buyback authorities;
- Amendments to articles of associations;
- Debt issuance requests;
- Other proposals to be analyzed on a case-by-case basis.

This document is intended to provide investors with an insight into how ISS analyses companies in the SSA region. ISS will apply this policy as a guideline, but analysts will take a holistic view of the company's situation, and consider any explanation for non-standard practice, when determining voting recommendations. For proposals which typically appear on an infrequent basis at Sub-Saharan African meetings, and which are not covered in this document, ISS will refer to the EMEA Regional Policy as a framework for analysis.

The principle underpinning the ISS approach is that shareholders are the owners of listed companies. To that end, ISS designs its proxy voting guidelines to enhance shareholders' long-term economic interests. ISS' benchmark proxy voting guidelines serve as a tool to assist institutional investors in meeting their responsibilities with respect to voting by promoting shareholder value creation and risk mitigation at their portfolio firms. ISS also manages fully custom voting policies and implements voting recommendations for clients who want to vote their proxies according to their own specific guidelines and philosophies.

ISS voting policies are based on four global key principles which underline our approach to developing recommendations on both management and shareholder proposals at publicly traded companies:

**Accountability** - Boards should be accountable to shareholders, the owners of the companies, by holding regular board elections, by providing sufficient information for shareholders to be able to assess directors and board composition, and by providing shareholders with the ability to remove directors. Directors should respond to investor input such as that expressed through vote results on management and shareholder proposals, as well as any other and other shareholder communications. Shareholders should have meaningful rights on structural provisions, such as approval of or amendments to the corporate governing documents and a vote on takeover defenses.

**Stewardship** - A company's governance, social, and environmental practices should meet or exceed the standards of its market regulations and general practices and should take into account relevant factors that may impact significantly the company's long-term value creation. Issuers and investors should recognize constructive engagement as both a right and responsibility.

**Independence** - Boards should be sufficiently independent so as to ensure that they are able and motivated to effectively supervise management's performance and remuneration, for the benefit of all shareholders. Boards should include an effective independent leadership position and sufficiently independent committees that focus on key governance concerns such as audit, compensation, and the selection and evaluation of directors.

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**Transparency** - Companies should provide sufficient and timely information that enables shareholders to understand key issues, make informed vote decisions, and effectively engage with companies on substantive matters that impact shareholders' long-term interests in the company.

These values form the basis for research analysis to guide our work to assist institutional investors in meeting their fiduciary requirements, with respect to voting. The objective is to promote long-term shareholder value creation and risk mitigation at institutional investors' portfolio firms through support of responsible global corporate governance practices.



# 1. Operational Items

# **Financial Results/Director and Auditor Reports**

General Recommendation: Vote for approval of financial statements and director and auditor reports, unless:

- There are concerns about the accounts presented or audit procedures used; or
- The company is not responsive to shareholder questions about specific items that should be publicly disclosed.

### **Appointment of Auditors and Auditor Fees**

**General Recommendation:** Vote for the (re)election of auditors and/or proposals authorizing the board to fix auditor fees, unless:

- There are serious concerns about the procedures used by the auditor;
- There is reason to believe that the auditor has rendered an opinion which is neither accurate nor indicative of the company's financial position;
- External auditors have previously served the company in an executive capacity or can otherwise be considered
  affiliated with the company;
- The name(s) of the proposed auditors has not been published;
- The auditors are being changed without explanation;
- The auditor(s)' fees for the fiscal year in review are not publicly disclosed by the company in a timely manner;
- For widely-held companies, fees for non-audit services exceed either 100 percent of standard audit-related fees or any stricter limit set in local best practice recommendations or law.

In circumstances where fees for non-audit services include fees related to significant one-time capital structure events (initial public offerings, bankruptcy emergencies, and spinoffs) and the company makes public disclosure of the amount and nature of those fees, which are an exception to the standard "non-audit fee" category, then such fees may be excluded from the non-audit fees considered in determining the ratio of non-audit to audit fees.

For concerns related to the audit procedures, independence of auditors, and/or name of auditors, audit fees disclosure, ISS may recommend against the auditor (re)election. For concerns related to fees paid to the auditors, ISS may recommend against remuneration of auditors if this is a separate voting item; otherwise, ISS may recommend against the auditor election.

# **Appointment of Internal Statutory Auditors**

General Recommendation: Vote for the appointment or (re)election of statutory auditors, unless:

- There are serious concerns about the statutory reports presented or the audit procedures used;
- Questions exist concerning any of the statutory auditors being appointed; or
- The auditors have previously served the company in an executive capacity or can otherwise be considered
  affiliated with the company.

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### Allocation of Income

General Recommendation: Vote for approval of the allocation of income, unless:

- The dividend payout ratio has been consistently below 30 percent without adequate explanation; or
- The payout is excessive given the company's financial position.

# Stock (Scrip) Dividend Alternative

General Recommendation: Vote for most stock (scrip) dividend proposals.

Vote against proposals that do not allow for a cash option unless management demonstrates that the cash option is harmful to shareholder value.

# Amendments to Articles of Association (Bylaws)

**General Recommendation:** Vote for proposals seeking the approval of amendments to the articles of association (bylaws) unless:

- The current version of bylaws and proposed amendments are not publicly available in a timely manner; or
- On balance, the proposed amendments are not in shareholders' interest.

This policy applies to both bundled and unbundled proposals to amend the bylaws.

### **Donations**

**General Recommendation:** Vote for proposals seeking the approval of donations for the fiscal year under review unless:

- The amount of donations for the fiscal year in review is not publicly available at the time of analysis; or
- There are controversies surrounding the company's use of donations.

Vote for proposals seeking the approval of donations for the upcoming fiscal year unless:

- The company does not provide a cap for the amount of future donations, and there is no disclosure regarding donations being made under the fiscal year in review; or
- There are controversies surrounding the company's use of donations.

## **Change in Company Fiscal Term**

**General Recommendation:** Vote for resolutions to change a company's fiscal term unless a company's motivation for the change is to postpone its AGM.



# **Lower Disclosure Threshold for Stock Ownership**

**General Recommendation:** Vote against resolutions to lower the stock ownership disclosure threshold below 5 percent unless specific reasons exist to implement a lower threshold.

# **Amend Quorum Requirements**

**General Recommendation:** Vote proposals to amend quorum requirements for shareholder meetings on a case-by-case basis.

### **Transact Other Business**

General Recommendation: Vote against other business when it appears as a voting item.



# 2. Board of Directors

### **Director Elections**

General Recommendation: Vote for management nominees in the election of directors, unless:

- The (re)elections are bundled;
- Adequate disclosure has not been provided in a timely manner;
- There are clear concerns over questionable finances or restatements;
- There have been questionable transactions with conflicts of interest;
- There are any records of abuses against minority shareholder interests;
- The board fails to meet minimum corporate governance standards;
- There are specific concerns about the individual, such as criminal wrongdoing or breach of fiduciary responsibilities; or
- Repeated absences at board and committee meetings (less than 75 percent attendance) have not been explained (in countries where this information is disclosed).

Vote against the election of directors at all companies if the name of the nominee is not disclosed in a timely manner prior to the meeting.

### **Board Independence**

Independence will be determined according to <u>ISS' Sub-Saharan Africa Policy Classification of Directors</u>, if a nominee cannot be categorized, ISS will consider that person non-independent and include that nominee in the calculation of overall board independence.

ISS will generally recommend against the election or reelection of non-independent directors (excluding the CEO) if overall board independence is less than one-third, excluding, where relevant, employee shareholder representatives.

Vote for employee and/or labour representatives if they sit on either the audit or compensation committee and are required by Law to be on these committees. Vote against employee and/or labour representatives if they sit on either the audit or compensation committee, if they are not required to be on these committees.

### **Audit Committee Independence**

Vote against proposals seeking the election of non-independent members of the audit committee if:

- Fewer than one-third of all audit committee members, excluding, where relevant, employee shareholder representatives, would be independent; or
- A non-independent member is being presented for election or reelection as the audit committee chair.

This policy applies to bundled and unbundled items.

Vote against the (re)election of executives who serve on the company's audit committee. ISS may also recommend against if the disclosure is insufficient to determine whether an executive serves or will serve on the audit committee. If a company does not have an audit committee, ISS may consider that the entire board fulfills the role of the committee, and recommend against any executives, including the CEO, on the ballot.



For Nigerian companies, vote for the election of shareholders' representatives as members of the statutory audit committee unless the names of the proposed candidates are not publicly disclosed in a timely manner or there are specific concerns about the candidates.

### **Board Accountability**

### **Climate Accountability**

For companies that are significant greenhouse gas (GHG) emitters, through their operations or value chain<sup>1</sup>, generally vote against the responsible incumbent director(s) in cases where ISS determines that the company is not taking the minimum steps needed to understand, assess, and mitigate risks related to climate change to the company and the larger economy.

In cases where the responsible director(s) is not presented for re-election, ISS may consider voting against the chair of the board or any other appropriate item(s). This policy applies to bundled and unbundled items.

Minimum steps to understand and mitigate those risks are considered to be the following. Both minimum criteria will be required to be in alignment with the policy:

- Detailed disclosure of climate-related risks, such as according to the framework established by the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD), including:
  - Board governance measures;
  - Corporate strategy;
  - Risk management analyses; and
  - Metrics and targets.
- Appropriate GHG emissions reduction targets.

At this time, "appropriate GHG emissions reductions targets" will be medium-term GHG reduction targets or Net Zero-by-2050 GHG reduction targets for a company's operations (Scope 1) and electricity use (Scope 2). Targets should cover the vast majority of the company's direct emissions.

### **Governance Failures**

Under extraordinary circumstances, vote against individual directors, members of a committee, or the entire board, due to:

- Material failure of governance, stewardship, risk oversight (including, but not limited to, environmental, social, and climate change issues), or fiduciary responsibilities at the company;
- Failure to replace management as appropriate; or
- Egregious actions related to a director's service on other boards that raise substantial doubt about his or her ability to effectively oversee management and serve the best interests of shareholders at any company.

[Please see the ISS Sub-Saharan Africa Classification of Directors on the following page.]

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Companies defined as "significant GHG emitters" will be those on the current Climate Action 100+ Focus Group list.



# ISS Classification of Directors - Sub-Saharan Africa Policy

#### **Executive Director**

- Employee or executive of the company;
- Any director who is classified as a non-executive, but receives salary, fees, bonus, and/or other benefits that are in line with the highest-paid executives of the company<sup>[6]</sup>.

### Non-Independent Non-Executive Director (NED)

- Any director who is attested by the board to be a non-independent NED;
- Any director specifically designated as a representative of a significant shareholder of the company;
- Any director who is also an employee or executive of a significant shareholder of the company;
- Any director who is nominated by a dissenting significant shareholder, unless there is a clear lack of material<sup>[5]</sup> connection with the dissident, either currently or historically;
- Beneficial owner (direct or indirect) of at least 10 percent of the company's stock, either in economic terms or in voting rights (this may be aggregated if voting power is distributed among more than one member of a defined group, e.g., family members who beneficially own less than 10 percent individually, but collectively own more than 10 percent), unless market best practice dictates a lower ownership and/or disclosure threshold (and in other special market-specific circumstances);
- Government representative;
- Currently provides (or a relative<sup>[1]</sup> provides) professional services<sup>[2]</sup> to the company, to an affiliate of the company, or to an individual officer of the company or of one of its affiliates in excess of \$10,000 per year;
- Represents customer, supplier, creditor, banker, or other entity with which company maintains transactional/commercial relationship (unless company discloses information to apply a materiality test<sup>[3]</sup>);
- Any director who has conflicting or cross-directorships with executive directors or the chair of the company<sup>[6]</sup>;
- Relative<sup>[1]</sup> of a current or former executive of the company or its affiliates;
- A new appointee elected other than by a formal process through the General Meeting (such as a contractual appointment by a substantial shareholder);
- Founder/co-founder/member of founding family but not currently an employee;
- Former executive (five-year cooling off period) [6];
- Years of service is generally not a determining factor unless it is recommended best practice in a market and/or in extreme circumstances, in which case it may be considered.<sup>[4]</sup>
- Any additional relationship or principle considered to compromise independence under local corporate governance best practice guidance.<sup>[7]</sup>

### **Independent NED**

• No material<sup>[5]</sup> connection, either direct or indirect, to the company (other than a board seat) or to a significant shareholder.

### **Employee Representative**

Represents employees or employee shareholders of the company (classified as "employee representative" but considered a non-independent NED).

#### **Footnotes**

[1] "Relative" follows the definition of "immediate family members" which covers spouses, parents, children, stepparents, step-children, siblings, in-laws, and any person (other than a tenant or employee) sharing the household of any director, nominee for director, executive officer, or significant shareholder of the company.

<sup>12]</sup> Professional services can be characterized as advisory in nature and generally include the following: investment banking/financial advisory services; commercial banking (beyond deposit services); investment services; insurance services; accounting/audit services; consulting services; marketing services; and legal services. The case of participation in a banking syndicate by a non-lead bank should be considered a transaction (and hence subject to the associated materiality test) rather than a professional relationship.



[3] A business relationship may be material if the transaction value (of all outstanding transactions) entered into between the company and the company or organization with which the director is associated is equivalent to either 1 percent of the company's turnover or 1 percent of the turnover of the company or organization with which the director is associated. OR, A business relationship may be material if the transaction value (of all outstanding financing operations) entered into between the company and the company or organization with which the director is associated is more than 10 percent of the company's shareholder equity or the transaction value, (of all outstanding financing operations), compared to the company's total assets, is more than 5 percent.

<sup>[4]</sup> For example, in continental Europe, directors with a tenure exceeding 12 years will be considered non-independent. In the United Kingdom, Ireland, Hong Kong, and Singapore, directors with a tenure exceeding nine years will be considered non-independent, unless the company provides sufficient and clear justification that the director is independent despite his/her long tenure.

<sup>[5]</sup> For purposes of ISS' director independence classification, "material" will be defined as a standard of relationship financial, personal, or otherwise that a reasonable person might conclude could potentially influence one's objectivity in the boardroom in a manner that would have a meaningful impact on an individual's ability to satisfy requisite fiduciary standards on behalf of shareholders.

[6] For purposes of independence classification of directors incorporated in the Middle East and Africa region, this criterion will be taken into account in accordance with market best practice and disclosure standards and availability.

<sup>[7]</sup> For MEA markets, directors' past services as statutory auditor/partner of the statutory audit firm will be taken into account, with cooling-off periods in accordance with local market best practice.

### **Contested Director Elections**

**General Recommendation:** For contested elections of directors, e.g. the election of shareholder nominees or the dismissal of incumbent directors, ISS will make its recommendation on a case-by-case basis, determining which directors are best suited to add value for shareholders.

The analysis will generally be based on, but not limited to, the following major decision factors:

- Company performance relative to its peers;
- Strategy of the incumbents versus the dissidents;
- Independence of directors/nominees;
- Experience and skills of board candidates;
- Governance profile of the company;
- Evidence of management entrenchment;
- Responsiveness to shareholders;
- Whether a takeover offer has been rebuffed;
- Whether minority or majority representation is being sought.

When analyzing a contested election of directors, ISS will generally focus on two central questions: (1) Have the dissidents proved that board change is warranted. And (2) if so, are the dissident board nominees likely to effect positive change (i.e., maximize long-term shareholder value).

# **Discharge of Directors**

**General Recommendation:** Generally vote for the discharge of directors, including members of the management board and/or supervisory board, *unless* there is reliable information about significant and compelling controversies as to whether the board is fulfilling its fiduciary duties, as evidenced by:

• A lack of oversight or actions by board members that invoke shareholder distrust related to malfeasance or poor supervision, such as operating in private or company interest rather than in shareholder interest; or



- Any legal proceedings (either civil or criminal) aiming to hold the board responsible for breach of trust in the
  past or related to currently alleged actions yet to be confirmed (and not only the fiscal year in question), such
  as price fixing, insider trading, bribery, fraud, and other illegal actions; or
- Other egregious governance issues where shareholders will bring legal action against the company or its directors.

For markets that do not routinely request discharge resolutions (e.g. common law countries or markets where discharge is not mandatory), investors may voice concern in other appropriate agenda items, such as approval of the annual accounts or other relevant resolutions, to enable shareholders to express discontent with the board.

### Director, Officer, and Auditor Indemnification and Liability Provisions

**General Recommendation:** Vote proposals seeking indemnification and liability protection for directors and officers on a case-by-case basis.

Vote against proposals to indemnify external auditors.

### **Board Structure**

General Recommendation: Vote for proposals to fix board size.

Vote against the introduction of classified boards and mandatory retirement ages for directors.

Vote against proposals to alter board structure or size in the context of a fight for control of the company or the board.

# 3. Capital Structure

### **Share Issuance Requests**

#### **General Issuances**

**General Recommendation:** Vote for issuance requests with preemptive rights to a maximum of 100 percent over currently issued capital.

Vote for issuance requests without preemptive rights to a maximum of 20 percent of currently issued capital.

### **Specific Issuances**

General Recommendation: Vote on a case-by-case basis on all requests, with or without preemptive rights.



# **Increases in Authorized Capital**

**General Recommendation:** Vote for non-specific proposals to increase authorized capital up to 100 percent over the current authorization unless the increase would leave the company with less than 30 percent of its new authorization outstanding.

Vote for specific proposals to increase authorized capital to any amount, unless:

- The specific purpose of the increase (such as a share-based acquisition or merger) does not meet ISS guidelines for the purpose being proposed; or
- The increase would leave the company with less than 30 percent of its new authorization outstanding after adjusting for all proposed issuances.

Vote against proposals to adopt unlimited capital authorizations.

### **Reduction of Capital**

**General Recommendation:** Vote for proposals to reduce capital for routine accounting purposes unless the terms are unfavorable to shareholders.

Vote proposals to reduce capital in connection with corporate restructuring on a case-by-case basis.

### **Capital Structures**

**General Recommendation:** Vote for resolutions that seek to maintain or convert to a one-share, one-vote capital structure.

Vote against requests for the creation or continuation of dual-class capital structures or the creation of new or additional super-voting shares.

### **Preferred Stock**

**General Recommendation:** Vote for the creation of a new class of preferred stock or for issuances of preferred stock up to 50 percent of issued capital unless the terms of the preferred stock would adversely affect the rights of existing shareholders.

Vote for the creation/issuance of convertible preferred stock as long as the maximum number of common shares that could be issued upon conversion meets ISS guidelines on equity issuance requests.

Vote against the creation of a new class of preference shares that would carry superior voting rights to the common shares.

Vote against the creation of blank check preferred stock unless the board clearly states that the authorization will not be used to thwart a takeover bid.



Vote proposals to increase blank check preferred authorizations on a case-by-case basis.

# **Debt Issuance Requests**

**General Recommendation:** Vote non-convertible debt issuance requests on a case-by-case basis, with or without preemptive rights.

Vote for the creation/issuance of convertible debt instruments as long as the maximum number of common shares that could be issued upon conversion meets ISS guidelines on equity issuance requests.

Vote for proposals to restructure existing debt arrangements unless the terms of the restructuring would adversely affect the rights of shareholders.

# **Pledging of Assets for Debt**

General Recommendation: Vote proposals to approve the pledging of assets for debt on a case-by-case basis.

# **Increase in Borrowing Powers**

**General Recommendation:** Vote proposals to approve increases in a company's borrowing powers on a case-by-case basis.

# **Share Repurchase Plans**

**General Recommendation:** Generally, vote for market repurchase authorities (share repurchase programs) if the terms comply with the following criteria:

- A repurchase limit of up to 10 percent of outstanding issued share capital;
- A holding limit of up to 10 percent of a company's issued share capital in treasury ("on the shelf") (where
  information is disclosed); and
- A duration of no more than 18 months.

Authorities to repurchase shares in excess of the 10 percent repurchase limit will be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Such share repurchase authorities under special circumstances, which are required to be publicly disclosed by the company, may be supported provided that, on balance, the proposal is in shareholders' interests. In such cases, the authority must comply with the following criteria:

- A holding limit of up to 10 percent of a company's issued share capital in treasury ("on the shelf"); and
- A duration of no more than 18 months.

In addition, vote against any proposal where:



- The repurchase can be used for takeover defenses;
- There is clear evidence of abuse of similar authorities;
- There is no safeguard against selective buybacks; and/or
- Pricing provisions and safeguards are deemed to be unreasonable in light of market practice.

### **Reissuance of Repurchased Shares**

**General Recommendation:** Vote for requests to reissue any repurchased shares unless there is clear evidence of abuse of this authority in the past.

## Capitalization of Reserves for Bonus Issues/Increase in Par Value

**General Recommendation:** Vote for requests to capitalize reserves for bonus issues of shares or to increase par value.

# 4. Compensation

# **Compensation Plans – Share Incentive Schemes**

**General Recommendation:** Generally vote against share incentive schemes (or amendment to current schemes) if the level of disclosure is below what is required for shareholders to make an informed decision on the scheme.

In the event of sufficient disclosure, generally vote for a share incentive scheme (or an amendment to a current scheme) if the scheme is in line with long-term shareholder interests. This assessment includes, but is not limited to, the following factors:

- Existence of performance conditions and relevant disclosure such as performance period;
- Vesting period is sufficiently long-term;
- The potential maximum dilution under all share incentive schemes must not exceed 10 percent of the issued share capital;
- The scheme has caps on individual participation;
- Whether NEDs participate in the scheme;
- The scheme does not allow for option repricing or issue of options at a discount or backdating of options;
- The scheme does not provide for payment of dividends on unvested shares or options.

# **Director Compensation**

General Recommendation: Vote for proposals to award cash fees to non-executive directors unless:

- The board fees paid for the fiscal year under review are not disclosed in a timely manner;
- The proposed amounts are excessive relative to similarly sized companies in the same market/sector, with no
  justification provided by the company; or



• There is significant concern on the company's past practices regarding directors' remuneration.

In case there is a significant increase in fees with limited or no justification, vote on the proposal on a case-by-case basis.

Vote non-executive director compensation proposals that include both cash and share-based components on a case-by-case basis.

# Remuneration Policy/Report

**General Recommendation:** Vote on compensation related-proposal including both non-executive and executive directors (or executive directors only) on a case-by-case basis taking into account the following factors:

- Information on compensation-related proposals shall be made publicly available in a timely manner;
- The level of disclosure of the proposed compensation policy shall be sufficient for shareholders to make an informed decision and shall be in line with what local best market practice standards dictate;
- Companies shall adequately disclose all elements of the compensation, including any short- or long-term compensation component.

When assessing a company's remuneration policy and/or report, ISS generally recommends a vote against if the level of disclosure around the policy and/or the application of the policy is below what is required for shareholders to make an informed judgment. In the event of satisfactory disclosure, ISS recommends a vote for the approval of the executive remuneration policy and/or the remuneration report on a case-by-case approach.

Vote against proposals to introduce retirement benefits for non-executive directors.

# 5. Other Items

# Reorganizations/Restructurings

General Recommendation: Vote reorganizations and restructurings on a case-by-case basis.

# **Mergers and Acquisitions**

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on mergers and acquisitions taking into account the following:

For every M&A analysis, ISS reviews publicly available information as of the date of the report and evaluates the merits and drawbacks of the proposed transaction, balancing various and sometimes countervailing factors including:

- Valuation Is the value to be received by the target shareholders (or paid by the acquirer) reasonable? While
  the fairness opinion may provide an initial starting point for assessing valuation reasonableness, ISS places
  emphasis on the offer premium, market reaction, and strategic rationale.
- Market reaction How has the market responded to the proposed deal? A negative market reaction will cause ISS to scrutinize a deal more closely.



- Strategic rationale Does the deal make sense strategically? From where is the value derived? Cost and
  revenue synergies should not be overly aggressive or optimistic, but reasonably achievable. Management
  should also have a favorable track record of successful integration of historical acquisitions.
- Conflicts of interest Are insiders benefiting from the transaction disproportionately and inappropriately as compared to non-insider shareholders? ISS will consider whether any special interests may have influenced these directors and officers to support or recommend the merger.
- Governance Will the combined company have a better or worse governance profile than the current governance profiles of the respective parties to the transaction? If the governance profile is to change for the worse, the burden is on the company to prove that other issues (such as valuation) outweigh any deterioration in governance.

Vote against if the companies do not provide sufficient information upon request to make an informed voting decision.

# **Mandatory Takeover Bid Waivers**

**General Recommendation:** Vote proposals to waive mandatory takeover bid requirements on a case-by-case basis.

## **Reincorporation Proposals**

General Recommendation: Vote reincorporation proposals on a case-by-case basis.

## **Expansion of Business Activities**

**General Recommendation:** Vote for resolutions to expand business activities unless the new business takes the company into risky areas.

### **Related-Party Transactions**

**General Recommendation:** In evaluating resolutions that seek shareholder approval on related-party transactions (RPTs), vote on a case-by-case basis, considering factors including, but not limited to, the following:

- The parties on either side of the transaction;
- The nature of the asset to be transferred/service to be provided;
- The pricing of the transaction (and any associated professional valuation);
- The views of independent directors (where provided);
- The views of an independent financial adviser (where appointed);
- Whether any entities party to the transaction (including advisers) is conflicted; and
- The stated rationale for the transaction, including discussions of timing.



If there is a transaction that ISS deemed problematic and that was not put to a shareholder vote, ISS may recommend against the election of the director involved in the related-party transaction or the full board.

In the case of Nigerian companies, vote for proposals relating to renewal of the general mandate for the company to enter into recurrent transactions with related parties necessary for its day-to-day operations in the absence of any concerns with the related party transactions concluded pursuant to this general mandate.

### **Antitakeover Mechanisms**

**General Recommendation:** Generally vote against all antitakeover proposals, unless they are structured in such a way that they give shareholders the ultimate decision on any proposal or offer.

# **Shareholder Proposals**

General Recommendation: Vote all shareholder proposals on a case-by-case basis.

Vote for proposals that would improve the company's corporate governance or business profile at a reasonable cost

Vote against proposals that limit the company's business activities or capabilities or result in significant costs being incurred with little or no benefit.

# 6. Social and Environmental Issues

# **Global Approach**

ISS applies a common approach globally to evaluating social and environmental proposals which cover a wide range of topics, including consumer and product safety, environment and energy, labor standards and human rights, workplace and board diversity, and corporate political issues. While a variety of factors goes into each analysis, the overall principle guiding all vote recommendations focuses on how the proposal may enhance or protect shareholder value in either the short or long term.

**General Recommendation:** Generally vote case-by-case, examining primarily whether implementation of the proposal is likely to enhance or protect shareholder value. The following factors will be considered:

- If the issues presented in the proposal are being appropriately or effectively dealt with through legislation or government regulation;
- If the company has already responded in an appropriate and sufficient manner to the issue(s) raised in the proposal;
- Whether the proposal's request is unduly burdensome (scope or timeframe) or overly prescriptive;
- The company's approach compared with any industry standard practices for addressing the issue(s) raised by the proposal;
- Whether there are significant controversies, fines, penalties, or litigation associated with the company's practices related to the issue(s) raised in the proposal;



- If the proposal requests increased disclosure or greater transparency, whether reasonable and sufficient
  information is currently available to shareholders from the company or from other publicly available sources;
  and
- If the proposal requests increased disclosure or greater transparency, whether implementation would reveal proprietary or confidential information that could place the company at a competitive disadvantage.

# Say on Climate (SoC) Management Proposals

**General Recommendation:** Vote case-by-case on management proposals that request shareholders to approve the company's climate transition action plan<sup>2</sup>, taking into account the completeness and rigor of the plan. Information that will be considered where available includes the following:

- The extent to which the company's climate related disclosures are in line with TCFD recommendations and meet other market standards;
- Disclosure of its operational and supply chain GHG emissions (Scopes 1, 2, and 3);
- The completeness and rigor of company's short-, medium-, and long-term targets for reducing operational and supply chain GHG emissions (Scopes 1, 2, and 3 if relevant);
- Whether the company has sought and approved third-party approval that its targets are science-based;
- Whether the company has made a commitment to be "net zero" for operational and supply chain emissions (Scopes 1, 2, and 3) by 2050;
- Whether the company discloses a commitment to report on the implementation of its plan in subsequent years;
- Whether the company's climate data has received third-party assurance;
- Disclosure of how the company's lobbying activities and its capital expenditures align with company strategy;
- Whether there are specific industry decarbonization challenges; and
- The company's related commitment, disclosure, and performance compared to its industry peers.

# Say on Climate (SoC) Shareholder Proposals

**General Recommendation:** Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals that request the company to disclose a report providing its GHG emissions levels and reduction targets and/or its upcoming/approved climate transition action plan and provide shareholders the opportunity to express approval or disapproval of its GHG emissions reduction plan, taking into account information such as the following:

- The completeness and rigor of the company's climate-related disclosure;
- The company's actual GHG emissions performance;
- Whether the company has been the subject of recent, significant violations, fines, litigation, or controversy related to its GHG emissions; and
- Whether the proposal's request is unduly burdensome (scope or timeframe) or overly prescriptive.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Variations of this request also include climate transition related ambitions, or commitment to reporting on the implementation of a climate plan.



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