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COVERAGE UNIVERSE

The following is a condensed version of the proxy voting recommendations contained in ISS’ European Proxy Voting Manual.

ISS’ European Policy applies to Member States of the European Union (EU) or the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), with the exception of the United Kingdom and Ireland, which are subject to the UK and Ireland policy which is based on the National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF) Corporate Governance Policy and Voting Guidelines. In both cases, European territories that are politically associated with a given Member State are subject to the same policy as that Member State. Other European territories are subject to either ISS’ separate, market-specific policies, or ISS’ EMEA Regional Policy.

Specifically, ISS’ European Policy applies to companies incorporated in the following territories: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, the Faroe Islands, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Greenland, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, and Switzerland.

ISS’ approach is not “one-size-fits-all” and takes relevant market-specific factors into account in our research and recommendations. Therefore this document distinguishes in various places between different markets and on the basis of other differentiating factors. These distinctions are based on different market practices and best practice recommendations throughout Europe.

DEFINITIONS AND EXPLANATIONS

The term "widely held" refers to companies that ISS designates as such based on their membership in a major index and/or the number of ISS clients holding the securities.

For stylistic purposes, this document may use the adjectival form of country names to refer to companies incorporated or listed in a given market.
1. OPERATIONAL ITEMS

Financial Results/Director and Auditor Reports

**General Recommendation:** Vote for approval of financial statements and director and auditor reports, unless:

- There are concerns about the accounts presented or audit procedures used; or
- The company is not responsive to shareholder questions about specific items that should be publicly disclosed.

Appointment of Auditors and Auditor Fees

**General Recommendation:** Vote for proposals to ratify auditors and/or proposals authorizing the board to fix auditor fees, unless:

- There are serious concerns about the procedures used by the auditor;
- There is reason to believe that the auditor has rendered an opinion which is neither accurate nor indicative of the company's financial position;
- External auditors have previously served the company in an executive capacity or can otherwise be considered affiliated with the company;
- Name of the proposed auditors has not been published;
- The auditors are being changed without explanation; or
- For widely-held companies, fees for non-audit services exceed either 100 percent of standard audit-related fees or any stricter limit set in local best practice recommendations or law.

In circumstances where fees for non-audit services include fees related to significant one-time capital structure events: initial public offerings, bankruptcy emergence, and spinoffs; and the company makes public disclosure of the amount and nature of those fees which are an exception to the standard "non-audit fee" category, then such fees may be excluded from the non-audit fees considered in determining the ratio of non-audit to audit fees.

For concerns relating to the audit procedures, independence of auditors, and/or name of auditors, ISS will focus on the auditor election. For concerns relating to fees paid to the auditors, ISS will focus on remuneration of auditors if this is a separate voting item, otherwise ISS would focus on the auditor election.

Appointment of Internal Statutory Auditors

**General Recommendation:** Vote for the appointment or reelection of statutory auditors, unless:

- There are serious concerns about the statutory reports presented or the audit procedures used; or
- Questions exist concerning any of the statutory auditors being appointed; or
- The auditors have previously served the company in an executive capacity or can otherwise be considered affiliated with the company.
Allocation of Income

**General Recommendation:** Vote for approval of the allocation of income, unless:

› The dividend payout ratio has been consistently below 30 percent without adequate explanation; or
› The payout is excessive given the company's financial position.

Amendments to Articles of Association

**General Recommendation:** Vote amendments to the articles of association on a case-by-case basis.

Change in Company Fiscal Term

**General Recommendation:** Vote for resolutions to change a company's fiscal term unless a company's motivation for the change is to postpone its AGM.

Lower Disclosure Threshold for Stock Ownership

**General Recommendation:** Vote against resolutions to lower the stock ownership disclosure threshold below 5 percent unless specific reasons exist to implement a lower threshold.

Amend Quorum Requirements

**General Recommendation:** Vote proposals to amend quorum requirements for shareholder meetings on a case-by-case basis.

Transact Other Business

**General Recommendation:** Vote against other business when it appears as a voting item.
2. BOARD OF DIRECTORS

Non-Contested Director Elections

General Recommendation: Vote for management nominees in the election of directors, unless:

› Adequate disclosure has not been provided in a timely manner;
› There are clear concerns over questionable finances or restatements;
› There have been questionable transactions with conflicts of interest;
› There are any records of abuses against minority shareholder interests;
› The board fails to meet minimum corporate governance standards;
› There are specific concerns about the individual, such as criminal wrongdoing or breach of fiduciary responsibilities; and
› Repeated absences at board meetings have not been explained (in countries where this information is disclosed).

In addition to these general factors, ISS may recommend against due to concerns related to at least one of the following specific factors, which are presented below as separate subsections:

I. Director Terms
II. Bundling of Proposals to Elect Directors
III. Board independence
IV. Disclosure of Names of Nominees
V. Combined Chairman/CEO
VI. Election of a Former CEO as Chairman of the Board
VII. Overboarded Directors
VIII. Voto di Lista (Italy)
IX. One Board Seat per Director
X. Composition of Committees
XI. Composition Nominating Committee (Sweden and Norway)
XII. Election of Censors (France)

This policy is distinct from ISS' policy on contested director elections, which is presented as a separate policy item.

Note also that this policy is complemented by three additional policies: "Compensation-Related Voting Sanctions" and "Voting on Directors for Egregious Actions," which both address a comparatively rare set of additional circumstances, and "Corporate Assembly and Committee of Representatives Elections," which states how ISS applies its director election policy in Norway and Denmark in cases where the board is not directly elected by shareholders.

Director Terms

For Belgium, France, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, and Switzerland, vote against the election or re-election of any director when his/her term is not disclosed or when it exceeds four years and adequate explanation for non-compliance has not been provided. In these markets, the maximum board terms are either recommended best practice or required by legislation. Under best practice recommendations, companies should shorten the terms for directors when the terms exceed the limits suggested by best practices. The policy will be applied to all companies in these markets, for bundled as well as unbundled items.

Clients will also be advised to vote against article amendment proposals to extend board terms. In cases where a company's articles provide for a shorter limit and where the company wishes to extend director terms from three or fewer years to four years, for example, ISS will recommend a vote against, based on the general principle that director accountability is maximized by elections with a short period of renewal.
Bundling of Proposal to Elect Directors

Bundling together proposals that could be presented as separate voting items is not considered good market practice, because bundled resolutions leave shareholders with an all-or-nothing choice, skewing power disproportionately towards the board and away from shareholders. As director elections are one of the most important voting decisions that shareholders make, directors should be elected individually.

For the markets of Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain vote against the election or reelection of any directors if individual director elections are an established market practice and the company proposes a single slate of directors.

Board Independence

Independence will be determined according to ISS’ European Classification of Directors. If a nominee cannot be categorized, ISS will consider that person non-independent and include that nominee in the calculation.

The following policies would be applied to all widely held companies¹, unless there is a majority shareholder:

› For all markets (except Greece or Portugal), vote against the election or reelection of any non-independent directors (excluding the CEO) if:
  › Fewer than 50 percent of the board members elected by shareholders, excluding, where relevant, employee shareholder representatives, would be independent, or
  › Fewer than one-third of all board members, including those who, in accordance with local law(s) requiring their mandatory board membership, are not elected by shareholders, would be independent.

› In Italy, at least half of the board should be independent (50 percent). Issuers with a controlling shareholder will be required to have a board consisting of at least one-third independent members (33 percent). This applies to individual director appointments (co-options). In the case of complete board renewals that are regulated by the Italian slate system (“voto di lista”), board independence will be one of the factors for determining which list of nominees ISS considers best suited to add value for shareholders based, as applicable, on ISS European policies.

› For companies incorporated in Portugal or Greece, at least one-third of the board will be required to be independent. ISS will recommend a vote against the entire slate of candidates (in the case of bundled elections), or a vote against the election of any non-independent directors (in the case of unbundled elections) if board independence level does not meet the minimum recommended one-third threshold.

For companies with a majority shareholder (excluding Italy and Portugal):

› Generally vote against the election or reelection of any non-independent directors (excluding the CEO) if the level of independence on the board will be lower than minority shareholders’ percentage of equity ownership, or, in any case, if the board will be less than one-third independent (whichever is higher).

¹ Widely held companies are interpreted as:
› Generally, based on their membership in a major index and/or the number of ISS clients holding the securities;
› For Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland, and Luxembourg: based on local blue chip market index and/or MSCI EAFE companies;
› For Portugal, based on their membership in the PSI-20 and/or MSCI-EAFE index
Minority shareholders' ownership percentage is calculated by subtracting the majority shareholder's equity ownership percentage from 100 percent. Majority control is defined in terms of economic interest and not voting rights, and is considered to be any shareholder or group of shareholders acting collectively that control at least 50 percent + 1 share of the company's equity capital. This independence threshold is applied to controlled widely held companies or main index-listed/MSCI-EAFE member companies which would otherwise fall under a 50-percent independence guideline as described in the Board Independence Policy.

However, in markets where the local corporate governance code addresses board independence at controlled companies, ISS will generally recommend against the election or reelection of any non-independent directors (excluding the CEO) if the level of independence on the board is lower than the local code recommendation, but in any case, if the level of board independence will be less than one-third.

**Disclosure of Names of Nominees**

Vote against the election or reelection of any and all director nominees when the names of the nominees are not available at the time the ISS analysis is being written. This policy will be applied to all companies in these markets, for bundled and unbundled items.

**Combined Chairman/CEO**

Generally, vote against (re)election of combined chair/CEOs at widely held European companies. However, when the company provides assurance that the chair/CEO would only serve in the combined role on an interim basis (no more than two years), with the intent of separating the roles within a given time frame, considerations should be given to these exceptional circumstances. In this respect, the vote recommendation would be made on a case-by-case basis. In order for ISS to consider a favorable vote recommendation for a combined chair/CEO to serve on an interim basis, the company would need to provide adequate control mechanisms on the board (such as a lead independent director, a high overall level of board independence, and a high level of independence on the board’s key committees).

This policy will be applied to all widely held European companies that propose the (re)election of a combined chair/CEO to the board, including cases where the chair/CEO is included in an election by slate.

**Election of a Former CEO as Chairman of the Board**

Generally vote against the election or reelection of a former CEO as chairman to the supervisory board or board of directors at widely held companies in **Germany**, **Austria**, and the **Netherlands**. In markets such as **Germany**, where the general meeting only elects the nominees and, subsequently, the new board’s chairman, ISS will generally recommend a vote against the election or reelection of a former CEO, unless the company has publicly confirmed prior to the general meeting that he will not proceed to become chairman of the board.

Considerations should be given to any of the following exceptional circumstances on a case-by-case basis if:

› There are compelling reasons that justify the election or reelection of a former CEO as chairman; or
› The former CEO is proposed to become the board’s chairman only on an interim or temporary basis; or
› The former CEO is proposed to be elected as the board’s chairman for the first time after a reasonable cooling-off period; or

**Overboarded Directors**

In **Austria**, **Belgium**, **France**, **Germany**, **Italy**, **Luxembourg**, the **Netherlands**, **Spain**, and **Switzerland**, at widely held companies, ISS will generally recommend a vote against a candidate when s/he holds an excessive number of board
appointments, as referenced by the more stringent of the provisions prescribed in local law or best practice governance codes, or as defined by the following guidelines:

› Directors who hold more than five non-chair non-executive director positions.
› A non-executive chairman who, in addition to this role, holds (i) more than three non-chair non-executive director positions, (ii) more than one other non-executive chair position and one non-chair non-executive director position, or (iii) any executive position.
› Executive directors or those in comparable roles holding (i) more than two non-chair non-executive director positions, (ii) any other executive positions, or (iii) any non-executive chair position.

An adverse vote recommendation will not be applied to a director within a company where he/she serves as CEO; instead, any adverse vote recommendations will be applied to his/her additional seats on other company boards. The same is also valid for non-executive chairmen, except (i) where they exclusively hold other non-executive chair and/or executive positions or (ii) where they are elected as non-executive chairman for the first time.

ISS will take into account board positions held in global publicly listed companies outside the same group, defined as a group of companies in which a common parent company controls at least 50 percent + 1 share of equity capital, alone or in concert.

For directors standing for (re)election at French companies, ISS will take into account board appointments as censors in French publicly listed companies.

Executive directors or those in comparable roles within investment holding companies will generally be treated similar to non-executive directors when applying this policy.

**Voto di Lista (Italy)**

In Italy, director elections generally take place through the *voto di lista* mechanism (similar to slate elections). Since the Italian implementation of the European Shareholder Rights Directive (effective since Nov. 1, 2010), issuers must publish the various lists 21 days in advance of the meeting.

Since shareholders only have the option to support one such list, where lists are published in sufficient time, ISS will recommend a vote on a case-by-case basis, determining which list of nominees it considers is best suited to add value for shareholders based, as applicable, on ISS European policies for Director Elections and for Contested Director Elections.

Those companies that are excluded from the provisions of the European Shareholder Rights Directive publish lists of nominees 10 days before the meeting. In the case where nominees are not published in sufficient time, ISS will recommend a vote against the director elections before the lists of director nominees are disclosed. Once the various lists of nominees are disclosed, ISS will issue an alert to its clients and, if appropriate, change its vote recommendation to support one particular list.

**One Board Seat per Director**

In cases where a director holds more than one board seat on a single board and the corresponding votes, manifested as one seat as a physical person plus an additional seat(s) as a representative of a legal entity, vote against the election/reelection of such legal entities and in favor of the physical person.

However, an exception is made if the representative of the legal entity holds the position of CEO. In such circumstances, ISS will typically recommend a vote in favor of the legal entity and against the election/reelection of the physical person.
While such occurrences are rare, there have been cases where a board member may have multiple board seats and corresponding votes. Holding several board seats concurrently within one board increases this person’s direct influence on board decisions and creates an inequality among board members.

This situation has manifested in Belgium, Luxembourg, and France. This is not a good corporate governance practice, as it places disproportionate influence and control in one person.

Composition of Committees

In Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland, vote against the (re)election of executives who serve on the company’s audit or remuneration committee. ISS may recommend against if the disclosure is too poor to determine whether an executive serves or will serve on a committee. If a company does not have an audit or a remuneration committee, ISS may consider that the entire board fulfills the role of a committee. In such case, ISS may recommend against the executives, including the CEO, up for election to the board.

For Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, vote against the (re)election of non-independent members of the audit committee and/or the remuneration committee if their (re)election would lead to a non-independent majority on the respective committee.

These policies apply only to companies for which ISS includes overall board independence as a factor in its analysis of board elections.

Markets where local corporate governance codes prescribe specific composition requirements are assessed in accordance with compliance with their local codes. More stringent requirements are applied to those markets where local corporate governance codes prescribe more robust composition requirements.

Composition Nomination Committee (Sweden, Norway, and Finland)

Vote for proposals in Sweden, Norway, and Finland to elect or appoint a nominating committee consisting mainly of non-board members.

Vote for shareholder proposals calling for disclosure of the names of the proposed candidates at the meeting, as well as the inclusion of a representative of minority shareholders in the committee.

The above policy notwithstanding, vote against proposals in Sweden to elect or appoint such a committee if the company is on the MSCI-EAFE or local main index and the following conditions exist:

1. A member of the executive management would be a member of the committee;
2. More than one board member who is dependent on a major shareholder would be on the committee; or
3. The chair of the board would also be the chair of the committee.

In cases where the principles for the establishment of the nominating committee, rather than the election of the committee itself, are being voted on, vote against the adoption of the principles if any of the above conditions are met for the current committee, and there is no publicly available information indicating that this would no longer be the case for the new nominating committee.
**Election of Censors (France)**

For widely held companies, ISS will generally recommend a vote against proposals seeking shareholder approval to elect a censor, to amend bylaws to authorize the appointment of censors, or to extend the maximum number of censors to the board. However, ISS will recommend a vote on a case-by-case basis when the company provides assurance that the censor would serve on a short-term basis (maximum one year) with the intent to retain the nominee before his/her election as director. In this case, consideration shall also be given to the nominee's situation (notably overboarding or other factors of concern).

In consideration of the principle that censors should be appointed on a short-term basis, vote against any proposal to renew the term of a censor or to extend the statutory term of censors.
### ISS Classification of Directors - European Policy

#### Executive Director
- Employee or executive of the company;
- Any director who is classified as a non-executive, but receives salary, fees, bonus, and/or other benefits that are in line with the highest-paid executives of the company.

#### Non-Independent Non-Executive Director (NED)
- Any director who is attested by the board to be a non-independent NED;
- Any director specifically designated as a representative of a significant shareholder of the company;
- Any director who is also an employee or executive of a significant shareholder of the company;
- Any director who is nominated by a dissenting significant shareholder unless there is a clear lack of material connection with the dissident, either currently or historically;
- Beneficial owner (direct or indirect) of at least 10 percent of the company's stock, either in economic terms or in voting rights (this may be aggregated if voting power is distributed among more than one member of a defined group, e.g., members of a family that beneficially own less than 10 percent individually, but collectively own more than 10 percent), unless market best practice dictates a lower ownership and/or disclosure threshold (and in other special market-specific circumstances);
- Government representative;
- Currently provides (or a relative provides) professional services to the company, to an affiliate of the company, or to an individual officer of the company or one of its affiliates in excess of $10,000 per year;
- Represents customer, supplier, creditor, banker, or other entity with which the company maintains a transactional/commercial relationship (unless the company discloses information to apply a materiality test);
- Any director who has conflicting or cross-directorships with executive directors or the chairman of the company;
- Relative of a current or former executive of the company or its affiliates;
- A new appointee elected other than by a formal process through the general meeting (such as a contractual appointment by a substantial shareholder);
- Founder/co-founder/member of founding family but not currently an employee;
- Former executive (five-year cooling off period);
- Excessive years of service from date of first appointment, as determined by the EC Recommendation 2005/162/EC, local corporate governance codes, or local best practice, is generally a determining factor in evaluating director independence;
- Any additional relationship or principle considered to compromise independence under local corporate governance best practice guidance.

#### Independent NED
- Not classified as non-independent by ISS (see above);
- No material connection, either direct or indirect, to the company (other than a board seat) or to a significant shareholder.

#### Employee Representative
- Represents employees or employee shareholders of the company (classified as "employee representative" and considered a non-independent NED).

### Footnotes
1. “Relative” follows the definition of “immediate family members” which covers spouses, parents, children, stepparents, stepchildren, siblings, in-laws, and any person (other than a tenant or employee) sharing the household of any director, nominee for director, executive officer, or significant shareholder of the company.

2. Professional services can be characterized as advisory in nature and generally include the following: investment banking/financial advisory services; commercial banking (beyond deposit services); investment services; insurance services; accounting/audit services; consulting services; marketing services; and legal services. The case of participation in a banking syndicate by a non-lead bank should be considered a transaction (and hence subject to the associated materiality test) rather than a professional relationship.

3. A business relationship may be material if the transaction value (of all outstanding transactions) entered into between the
company and the company or organization with which the director is associated is equivalent to either 1 percent of the company’s turnover or 1 percent of the turnover of the company or organization with which the director is associated; or

A business relationship may be material if the transaction value (of all outstanding financing operations) entered into between the company and the company or organization with which the director is associated is more than 10 percent of the company’s shareholder equity or the transaction value (of all outstanding financing operations) compared to the company’s total assets is more than 5 percent.

For example, the EC recommendation 2005/162/EC’s definition of independence provides that in order to remain independent, a non-executive director shall have served on the [supervisory] board for no more than 12 years. For countries governed by ISS’ European policy, ISS will follow the EC recommendation and apply stricter tenure limits where recommended by local corporate governance codes or established by local best practice.

For purposes of ISS’ director independence classification, “material” will be defined as a standard of relationship (financial, personal, or otherwise) that a reasonable person might conclude could potentially influence one’s objectivity in the boardroom in a manner that would have a meaningful impact on an individual’s ability to satisfy requisite fiduciary standards on behalf of shareholders.

Contested Director Elections

General Recommendation: For contested elections of directors, e.g. the election of shareholder nominees or the dismissal of incumbent directors, ISS will make its recommendation on a case-by-case basis, determining which directors are considered best suited to add value for shareholders.

The analysis will generally be based on, but not limited to, the following major decision factors:

- Company performance relative to its peers;
- Strategy of the incumbents versus the dissidents;
- Independence of directors/nominees;
- Experience and skills of board candidates;
- Governance profile of the company;
- Evidence of management entrenchment;
- Responsiveness to shareholders;
- Whether a takeover offer has been rebuffed;
- Whether minority or majority representation is being sought.

When analyzing a contested election of directors, ISS will generally focus on two central questions: (1) Have the proponents proved that board change is warranted? And if so, (2) Are the proponent board nominees likely to effect positive change (i.e., maximize long-term shareholder value).

Voting on Directors for Egregious Actions

General Recommendation: Under extraordinary circumstances, vote against or withhold from directors individually, on a committee, or the entire board, due to:

- Material failures of governance, stewardship, risk oversight, or fiduciary responsibilities at the company;
- Failure to replace management as appropriate; or
- Egregious actions related to the director(s)’ service on other boards that raise substantial doubt about his or her ability to effectively oversee management and serve the best interests of shareholders at any company.
Committee of Representatives and Corporate Assembly Elections (Denmark and Norway)

**General Recommendation:** For Norwegian and Danish companies where shareholders vote on elections for members of the corporate assembly or committee of representatives, but not directly on the board of directors, vote case-by-case on corporate assembly and committee of representative elections based on the board of directors’ compliance with ISS’ director election policy.

Discharge of Directors

**General Recommendation:** Vote for the discharge of directors, including members of the management board and/or supervisory board, unless there is reliable information about significant and compelling concerns that the board is not fulfilling its fiduciary duties, warranted on a case-by-case basis, by:

› A lack of oversight or actions by board members which invoke shareholder distrust related to malfeasance or poor supervision, such as operating in private or company interest rather than in shareholder interest;
› Any legal issues (e.g. civil/criminal) aiming to hold the board responsible for breach of trust in the past or related to currently alleged action yet to be confirmed (and not only in the fiscal year in question) such as price fixing, insider trading, bribery, fraud, and other illegal actions;
› Other egregious governance issues where shareholders will bring legal action against the company or its directors.

For markets which do not routinely request discharge resolutions (e.g. common law countries or markets where discharge is not mandatory), analysts may voice concern in other appropriate agenda items, such as approval of the annual accounts or other relevant resolutions, to enable shareholders to express discontent with the board.

Director, Officer, and Auditor Indemnification and Liability Provisions

**General Recommendation:** Vote proposals seeking indemnification and liability protection for directors and officers on a case-by-case basis.

Vote against proposals to indemnify external auditors.

Board Structure

**General Recommendation:** Vote for routine proposals to fix board size.

Vote against the introduction of classified boards and/or mandatory retirement ages for directors.

Vote against proposals to alter board structure or size in the context of a fight for control of the company or the board.
3. CAPITAL STRUCTURE

Capital Systems

European capital systems can be broadly defined as either authorized or conditional. Both systems provide companies with the means to finance business activities, but they are considerably different in structure. Which system is used by a company is determined by the economic and legal structure of the market in which it operates. However, many capital systems display slight variations on the two systems, and some systems bear features from both systems, if only on a cosmetic level.

Under the conditional capital system, companies seek authorizations for pools of capital, which typically have fixed periods of availability. For example, if a company seeks to establish a pool of capital for general issuance purposes, it requests the creation of a certain number of shares with or without preemptive rights, issuable piecemeal at the discretion of the board, generally for a fixed period of time. This type of authority would be used to carry out a general rights issue or small issuances without preemptive rights.

The authorized capital system sets a limit in a company’s articles on the total number of shares that can be issued by the company’s board. The system allows companies to issue shares from this preapproved limit, although in many markets shareholder approval must be obtained prior to an issuance. Companies also request shareholder approval for increases in authorization when the amount of shares contained in the articles is inadequate for issuance authorities.

Share Issuance Requests

General Issuances

**General Recommendation:** Vote for issuance authorities with pre-emptive rights to a maximum of 100 percent over currently issued capital and as long as the share issuance authorities’ periods are clearly disclosed (or implied by the application of a legal maximum duration) and in line with market-specific practices and/or recommended guidelines (e.g. issuance periods limited to 18 months for the Netherlands).

Vote for issuance authorities without pre-emptive rights to a maximum of 20 percent (or a lower limit if local market best practice recommendations provide) of currently issued capital as long as the share issuance authorities’ periods are clearly disclosed (or implied by the application of a legal maximum duration) and in line with market-specific practices and/or recommended guidelines (e.g. issuance periods limited to 18 months for the Netherlands).

For French companies:

› Vote for general issuance requests with preemptive rights, or without preemptive rights but with a binding “priority right,” for a maximum of 50 percent over currently issued capital.

› Generally vote for general authorities to issue shares without preemptive rights up to a maximum of 10 percent of share capital. When companies are listed on a regulated market, the maximum discount on share issuance price proposed in the resolution must, in addition, comply with the legal discount (i.e., a maximum of 5 percent discount to the share listing price) for a vote for to be warranted.
Specific Issuances

**General Recommendation:** Vote on a case-by-case basis on all requests, with or without preemptive rights.

Increases in Authorized Capital

**General Recommendation:** Vote for non-specific proposals to increase authorized capital up to 100 percent over the current authorization unless the increase would leave the company with less than 30 percent of its new authorization outstanding.

Vote for specific proposals to increase authorized capital to any amount, unless:

- The specific purpose of the increase (such as a share-based acquisition or merger) does not meet ISS guidelines for the purpose being proposed; or
- The increase would leave the company with less than 30 percent of its new authorization outstanding after adjusting for all proposed issuances.

Vote against proposals to adopt unlimited capital authorizations.

Reduction of Capital

**General Recommendation:** Vote for proposals to reduce capital for routine accounting purposes unless the terms are unfavorable to shareholders.

Vote proposals to reduce capital in connection with corporate restructuring on a case-by-case basis.

Capital Structures

**General Recommendation:** Vote for resolutions that seek to maintain, or convert to, a one-share, one-vote capital structure.

Vote against requests for the creation or continuation of dual-class capital structures or the creation of new or additional super voting shares.

**Florange Act - Double Voting Rights (France)**

For French companies that:

- Did not have a bylaw allowing for double voting rights before the enactment of the Law of 29 March 2014 (Florange Act); and
- Do not currently have a bylaw prohibiting double-voting rights; and either
  - Do not have on their ballot for shareholder approval a bylaw amendment to prohibit double-voting, submitted by either management or shareholders; or
  - Have not made a public commitment to submit such a bylaw amendment to shareholder vote before April 3, 2016;
Then, on a case-by-case basis, ISS may recommend against the following types of proposals:

- The re-election of directors or supervisory board members; or
- The approval of the discharge of directors; or
- If neither re-election of directors/supervisory board members nor approval of discharge is considered appropriate, then the approval of the annual report and accounts.

**Preferred Stock**

**General Recommendation:** Vote for the creation of a new class of preferred stock or for issuances of preferred stock up to 50 percent of issued capital unless the terms of the preferred stock would adversely affect the rights of existing shareholders.

Vote for the creation/issuance of convertible preferred stock as long as the maximum number of common shares that could be issued upon conversion meets ISS' guidelines on equity issuance requests.

Vote against the creation of a new class of preference shares that would carry superior voting rights to the common shares.

Vote against the creation of blank check preferred stock unless the board clearly states that the authorization will not be used to thwart a takeover bid.

Vote proposals to increase blank check preferred authorizations on a case-by-case basis.

**Debt Issuance Requests**

**General Recommendation:** Vote non-convertible debt issuance requests on a case-by-case basis, with or without pre-emptive rights.

Vote for the creation/issuance of convertible debt instruments as long as the maximum number of common shares that could be issued upon conversion meets ISS' guidelines on equity issuance requests.

Vote for proposals to restructure existing debt arrangements unless the terms of the restructuring would adversely affect the rights of shareholders.

**Pledging of Assets for Debt**

**General Recommendation:** Vote proposals to approve the pledging of assets for debt on a case-by-case basis.

**Increase in Borrowing Powers**

**General Recommendation:** Vote proposals to approve increases in a company's borrowing powers on a case-by-case basis.
Share Repurchase Plans

**General Recommendation:** ISS will generally recommend for market repurchase authorities (share repurchase programs) if the terms comply with the following criteria:

- A repurchase limit of up to 10 percent of outstanding issued share capital;
- A holding limit of up to 10 percent of a company’s issued share capital in treasury (“on the shelf”); and
- Duration of no more than 5 years, or such lower threshold as may be set by applicable law, regulation, or code of governance best practice.

Authorities to repurchase shares in excess of the 10 percent repurchase limit will be assessed on a case-by-case basis. ISS may support such share repurchase authorities under special circumstances, which are required to be publicly disclosed by the company, provided that, on balance, the proposal is in shareholders’ interests. In such cases, the authority must comply with the following criteria:

- A holding limit of up to 10 percent of a company’s issued share capital in treasury (“on the shelf”); and
- Duration of no more than 18 months.

In markets where it is normal practice not to provide a repurchase limit, ISS will evaluate the proposal based on the company’s historical practice. However, ISS expects companies to disclose such limits and, in the future, may recommend a vote against companies that fail to do so. In such cases, the authority must comply with the following criteria:

- A holding limit of up to 10 percent of a company’s issued share capital in treasury (“on the shelf”); and
- Duration of no more than 18 months.

In addition, ISS will recommend against any proposal where:

- The repurchase can be used for takeover defenses;
- There is clear evidence of abuse;
- There is no safeguard against selective buybacks;
- Pricing provisions and safeguards are deemed to be unreasonable in light of market practice.

**Market-Specific Exceptions**

For **Italy** and **Germany**, vote for share-repurchase plans and share reissuance plans that would use call and put options if the following criteria are met:

- The duration of the authorization is limited in time to no more than 18 months;
- The total number of shares covered by the authorization is disclosed;
- The number of shares that would be purchased with call options and/or sold with put options is limited to a maximum of 5 percent of currently outstanding capital (or half of the total amounts allowed by law in Italy and Germany);
- A financial institution, with experience conducting sophisticated transactions, is indicated as the party responsible for the trading; and
- The company has a clean track record regarding repurchases.

**Reissuance of Repurchased Shares**

**General Recommendation:** Vote for requests to reissue any repurchased shares unless there is clear evidence of abuse of this authority in the past.
Capitalization of Reserves for Bonus Issues/Increase in Par Value

General Recommendation: Vote for requests to capitalize reserves for bonus issues of shares or to increase par value.
4. COMPENSATION

Compensation Guidelines

Preamble

The assessment of compensation follows the ISS Global Principles on Executive and Director Compensation which are detailed below. These principles take into account global corporate governance best practice.

The ISS Global Principles on Compensation underlie market-specific policies in all markets:

1. Provide shareholders with clear, comprehensive compensation disclosures;
2. Maintain appropriate pay-for-performance alignment with emphasis on long-term shareholder value;
3. Avoid arrangements that risk “pay for failure;”
4. Maintain an independent and effective compensation committee;
5. Avoid inappropriate pay to non-executive directors.

In line with European Commission Recommendation 2004/913/EC, ISS believes that seeking annual shareholder approval for a company’s compensation policy is a positive corporate governance provision.

In applying the Five Global Principles, ISS has formulated European Compensation Guidelines which take into account local codes of governance, market best practice, and the Recommendations published by the European Commission. ISS analyzes compensation-related proposals based on the role of the beneficiaries and has therefore divided its executive and director compensation policy into two domains:

I. Executive compensation-related proposals; and
II. Non-executive director compensation-related proposals

Executive compensation-related proposals

General Recommendation: ISS will evaluate management proposals seeking ratification of a company’s executive compensation-related items on a case-by-case basis, and where relevant, will take into account the European Pay for Performance Model outcomes within a qualitative review of a company’s remuneration practices. ISS will generally recommend a vote against a company’s compensation-related proposal if such proposal fails to comply with one or a combination of several of the global principles and their corresponding rules:

2 Definition of Pay-for-Performance Evaluation:
ISS annually conducts a pay-for-performance analysis to measure the alignment between pay and performance over a sustained period. With respect to companies in the European Main Indices, this analysis considers the following:

- Peer Group Alignment:
  - The degree of alignment between the company's annualized TSR rank and the CEO’s annualized total pay rank within a peer group, each measured over a three-year period.
  - The multiple of the CEO's total pay relative to the peer group median.

- Absolute Alignment – the absolute alignment between the trend in CEO pay and company TSR over the prior five fiscal years – i.e., the difference between the trend in annual pay changes and the trend in annualized TSR during the period.
1. Provide shareholders with clear and comprehensive compensation disclosures:
   1.1. Information on compensation-related proposals shall be made available to shareholders in a timely manner;
   1.2. The level of disclosure of the proposed compensation policy shall be sufficient for shareholders to make an informed decision and shall be in line with what local market best practice standards dictate;
   1.3. Companies shall adequately disclose all elements of the compensation, including:
      1.3.1. Any short- or long-term compensation component must include a maximum award limit.
      1.3.2. Long-term incentive plans must provide sufficient disclosure of (i) the exercise price/strike price (options); (ii) discount on grant; (iii) grant date/period; (iv) exercise/vesting period; and, if applicable, (v) performance criteria.
   1.3.3. Discretionary payments, if applicable.
2. Maintain appropriate pay structure with emphasis on long-term shareholder value:
   2.1. The structure of the company's short-term incentive plan shall be appropriate.
      2.1.1. The compensation policy must notably avoid guaranteed or discretionary compensation.
   2.2. The structure of the company's long-term incentives shall be appropriate, including, but not limited to, dilution, vesting period, and, if applicable, performance conditions.
      2.2.1. Equity-based plans or awards that are linked to long-term company performance will be evaluated using ISS' general policy for equity-based plans; and
      2.2.2. For awards granted to executives, ISS will generally require a clear link between shareholder value and awards, and stringent performance-based elements.
   2.3. The balance between short- and long-term variable compensation shall be appropriate
      2.3.1. The company's executive compensation policy must notably avoid disproportionate focus on short-term variable element(s)
3. Avoid arrangements that risk “pay for failure”:
   3.1. The board shall demonstrate good stewardship of investor's interests regarding executive compensation practices (principle being supported by Pay for Performance Evaluation).
      3.1.1. There shall be a clear link between the company's performance and variable awards.
      3.1.2. There shall not be significant discrepancies between the company's performance and real executive payouts.
      3.1.3. The level of pay for the CEO and members of executive management should not be excessive relative to peers, company performance, and market practices.
      3.1.4. Significant pay increases shall be explained by a detailed and compelling disclosure.
   3.2. Severance pay agreements must not be in excess of (i) 24 months' pay or of (ii) any more restrictive provision pursuant to local legal requirements and/or market best practices.
   3.3. Arrangements with a company executive regarding pensions and post-mandate exercise of equity-based awards must not result in an adverse impact on shareholders' interests or be misaligned with good market practices.
4. Maintain an independent and effective compensation committee:
   4.1. No executives may serve on the compensation committee.
   4.2. In certain markets the compensation committee shall be composed of a majority of independent members, as per ISS policies on director election and board or committee composition.

In addition to the above, ISS will generally recommend a vote against a compensation-related proposal if such proposal is in breach of any other supplemental market-specific ISS voting policies.
Non-Executive Director Compensation

5. Avoid inappropriate pay to non-executive directors.

**General Recommendation:** ISS will generally recommend a vote for proposals to award cash fees to non-executive directors, and will otherwise:

Recommend a vote against where:

› Documents (including general meeting documents, annual report) provided prior to the general meeting do not mention fees paid to non-executive directors.
› Proposed amounts are excessive relative to other companies in the country or industry.
› The company intends to increase the fees excessively in comparison with market/sector practices, without stating compelling reasons that justify the increase.
› Proposals provide for the granting of stock options, performance-based equity compensation (including stock appreciation rights and performance-vesting restricted stock), and performance-based cash to non-executive directors.
› Proposals introduce retirement benefits for non-executive directors.

And recommend a vote on a case-by-case basis where:

› Proposals include both cash and share-based components to non-executive directors.
› Proposals bundle compensation for both non-executive and executive directors into a single resolution.

Equity-based Compensation Guidelines

**General Recommendation:** ISS will generally recommend a vote for equity based compensation proposals for employees if the plan(s) are in line with long-term shareholder interests and align the award with shareholder value. This assessment includes, but is not limited to, the following factors:

The volume of awards transferred to participants must not be excessive: the potential volume of fully diluted issued share capital from equity-based compensation plans must not exceed the following ISS guidelines:

› The shares reserved for all share plans may not exceed 5 percent of a company's issued share capital, except in the case of high-growth companies or particularly well-designed plans, in which case we allow dilution of between 5 and 10 percent; in this case, we will need to have performance conditions attached to the plans which should be acceptable under ISS criteria (challenging criteria);
› The plan(s) must be sufficiently long-term in nature/structure: the minimum vesting period must be no less than three years from date of grant;
› The awards must be granted at market price. Discounts, if any, must be mitigated by performance criteria or other features that justify such discount.
› If applicable, performance standards must be fully disclosed, quantified, and long-term, with relative performance measures preferred.

**Market-specific provisions for France:**

› The potential volume from equity-based compensation plans must not exceed 10 percent of fully diluted issued share capital.
› In addition, for companies that refer to the AFEP-MEDEF Code, all awards (including stock options and warrants) to executives shall be conditional upon challenging performance criteria or premium pricing. For companies referring
to the Middlenext Code (or not referring to any code) at least part of the awards to executives shall be conditional upon performance criteria or premium pricing. In both cases, free shares shall remain subject to performance criteria for all beneficiaries.

Finally, for large- and mid-cap companies, the company’s average three year unadjusted burn rate (or, if lower, the maximum volume per year implied by the proposal made at the general meeting) must not exceed the mean plus one standard deviation of its sector. If necessary, these sector-specific caps are adjusted so that they do not change by more than one percentage point from year to year.

In 2016, the GICS methodology was amended. Real Estate is now a separate sector rather than an industry group within the Financials sector. ISS has computed caps for the new Real Estate sector and for the new Financials sector (i.e. excluding the Real Estate group). It has also computed a cap based on the old definition of the Financials sector (i.e. including the Real Estate group). In 2017, ISS will compare the average burn rate of companies in these sectors with the appropriate cap according to the new sector definitions and with the cap computed based on the old definition of the Financials sector. The less stringent of these caps will be used in formulating recommendations. Starting in 2018, the caps calculated according to the new sector definitions will be the only ones affecting the recommendations.
French Burn Rate Table for 2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GICS</th>
<th>SECTOR</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Burn Rate Cap</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1010</td>
<td>ENERGY</td>
<td>0.51%</td>
<td>0.39%</td>
<td>0.91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1510</td>
<td>MATERIALS</td>
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<td>0.16%</td>
<td>0.42%</td>
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<tr>
<td>2010-2030</td>
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<td>0.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2510-2550</td>
<td>CONSUMER DISCRETIONARY</td>
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<td>0.56%</td>
<td>1.02%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3010-3030</td>
<td>CONSUMER STAPLES</td>
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<td>0.09%</td>
<td>0.22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3510-3520</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>4510-5010</td>
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<td>0.53%</td>
<td>1.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5510</td>
<td>UTILITIES</td>
<td>0.12%</td>
<td>0.11%</td>
<td>0.23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4010-4030</td>
<td>FINANCIALS (EXCLUDING REAL ESTATE)</td>
<td>0.32%</td>
<td>0.45%</td>
<td>0.77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6010 (NEW)</td>
<td>REAL ESTATE</td>
<td>0.26%</td>
<td>0.28%</td>
<td>0.54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4010-4030/6010 (OLD)</td>
<td>FINANCIALS (INCLUDING REAL ESTATE)</td>
<td>0.30%</td>
<td>0.39%</td>
<td>0.69%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Compensation-Related Voting Sanctions

**General Recommendation:** Should a company be deemed to have egregious remuneration practices (as a result of one or a combination of several factors highlighted above) and has not followed market practice by submitting a resolution on executive compensation, vote against other "appropriate" resolutions as a mark of discontent against such practices.

An adverse vote recommendation could be applied to any of the following on a case-by-case basis:

1. The (re)election of members of the remuneration committee;
2. The discharge of directors; or
3. The annual report and accounts.

Failure to propose a resolution on executive compensation to shareholders in a market where this is routine practice may, by itself, lead to one of the above adverse vote recommendations regardless of the companies remuneration practices.

Stock Option Plans – Adjustment for Dividend (Nordic Region)

**General Recommendation:** Vote against stock option plans in Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden if evidence is found that they contain provisions that may result in a disconnect between shareholder value and employee/executive reward.

This includes one or a combination of the following:

- Adjusting the strike price for future ordinary dividends AND including expected dividend yield above 0 percent when determining the number of options awarded under the plan;
- Having significantly higher expected dividends than actual historical dividends;
Favorably adjusting the terms of existing options plans without valid reason; and/or
Any other provisions or performance measures that result in undue award.

This policy applies to both new plans and amendments to introduce the provisions into already existing stock option plans. ISS will make an exception if a company proposes to reduce the strike price by the amount of future special (extraordinary) dividends only.

Generally vote against if the potential increase of share capital amounts to more than 5 percent for mature companies or 10 percent for growth companies or if options may be exercised below the market price of the share at the date of grant, or that employee options do not lapse if employment is terminated.

Share Matching Plans (Sweden and Norway)

General Recommendation: ISS considers the following factors when evaluating share matching plans:

- For every share matching plan, ISS requires a holding period.
- For plans without performance criteria, the shares must be purchased at market price.
- For broad-based share matching plans directed at all employees, ISS accepts an arrangement up to a 1:1 ratio, i.e. no more than one free share is awarded for every share purchased at market value.
- In addition, for plans directed at executives, we require that sufficiently challenging performance criteria be attached to the plan. Higher discounts demand proportionally higher performance criteria.

The dilution of the plan when combined with the dilution from any other proposed or outstanding employee stock purchase/stock matching plans, must comply with ISS’ guidelines.
5. ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL ISSUES

Voting on Social and Environmental Proposals

Issues covered under the policy include a wide range of topics, including consumer and product safety, environment and energy, labor standards and human rights, workplace and board diversity, and corporate political issues. While a variety of factors goes into each analysis, the overall principle guiding all vote recommendations focuses on how the proposal may enhance or protect shareholder value in either the short-term or long-term.

**General Recommendation:** ISS will generally recommend a vote on a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration whether implementation of the proposal is likely to enhance or protect shareholder value, and in addition the following will be considered:

- If the issues presented in the proposal are more appropriately or effectively dealt with through legislation or government regulation;
- If the company has already responded in an appropriate and sufficient manner to the issue(s) raised in the proposal;
- Whether the proposal's request is unduly burdensome (scope, timeframe, or cost) or overly prescriptive;
- The company's approach compared with any industry standard practices for addressing the issue(s) raised by the proposal;
- If the proposal requests increased disclosure or greater transparency, whether or not reasonable and sufficient information is currently available to shareholders from the company or from other publicly available sources; and
- If the proposal requests increased disclosure or greater transparency, whether or not implementation would reveal proprietary or confidential information that could place the company at a competitive disadvantage.
6. OTHER ITEMS

Reorganizations/Restructurings

**General Recommendation:** Vote reorganizations and restructurings on a case-by-case basis.

Mergers and Acquisitions

**General Recommendation:** Vote case-by-case on mergers and acquisitions taking into account the following:

For every M&A analysis, ISS reviews publicly available information as of the date of the report and evaluates the merits and drawbacks of the proposed transaction, balancing various and sometimes countervailing factors including:

- **Valuation** - Is the value to be received by the target shareholders (or paid by the acquirer) reasonable? While the fairness opinion may provide an initial starting point for assessing valuation reasonableness, ISS places emphasis on the offer premium, market reaction, and strategic rationale.
- **Market reaction** - How has the market responded to the proposed deal? A negative market reaction will cause ISS to scrutinize a deal more closely.
- **Strategic rationale** - Does the deal make sense strategically? From where is the value derived? Cost and revenue synergies should not be overly aggressive or optimistic, but reasonably achievable. Management should also have a favorable track record of successful integration of historical acquisitions.
- **Conflicts of interest** - Are insiders benefiting from the transaction disproportionately and inappropriately as compared to non-insider shareholders? ISS will consider whether any special interests may have influenced these directors and officers to support or recommend the merger.
- **Governance** - Will the combined company have a better or worse governance profile than the current governance profiles of the respective parties to the transaction? If the governance profile is to change for the worse, the burden is on the company to prove that other issues (such as valuation) outweigh any deterioration in governance.

Vote against if the companies do not provide sufficient information upon request to allow shareholders to make an informed voting decision.

Mandatory Takeover Bid Waivers

**General Recommendation:** Vote proposals to waive mandatory takeover bid requirements on a case-by-case basis.

Reincorporation Proposals

**General Recommendation:** Vote reincorporation proposals on a case-by-case basis.

Expansion of Business Activities

**General Recommendation:** Vote for resolutions to expand business activities unless the new business takes the company into risky areas.
**Related-Party Transactions**

**General Recommendation:** In evaluating resolutions that seek shareholder approval on related-party transactions (RPTs), vote on a case-by-case basis, considering factors including, but not limited to, the following:

- The parties on either side of the transaction;
- The nature of the asset to be transferred/service to be provided;
- The pricing of the transaction (and any associated professional valuation);
- The views of independent directors (where provided);
- The views of an independent financial adviser (where appointed);
- Whether any entities party to the transaction (including advisers) is conflicted; and
- The stated rationale for the transaction, including discussions of timing.

If there is a transaction that ISS deemed problematic and that was not put to a shareholder vote, ISS may recommend against the election of the director involved in the related-party transaction or the full board.

**Antitakeover Mechanisms**

**General Recommendation:** Generally vote against all antitakeover proposals, unless they are structured in such a way that they give shareholders the ultimate decision on any proposal or offer.

For the **Netherlands**, vote recommendations regarding management proposals to approve protective preference shares will be determined on a case-by-case basis. In general, ISS will recommend voting for protective preference shares (PPS) only if:

- The supervisory board needs to approve an issuance of shares and the supervisory board is independent within the meaning of ISS’ categorization rules ([ISS’ European Director Independence Guidelines](#)) and the Dutch Corporate Governance Code (i.e. a maximum of one member can be non-independent);
- No call / put option agreement exists between the company and a foundation for the issuance of PPS;
- The issuance authority is for a maximum of 18 months;
- The board of the company-friendly foundation is fully independent;
- There are no priority shares or other egregious protective or entrenchment tools;
- The company states specifically that the issue of PPS is not meant to block a takeover, but will only be used to investigate alternative bids or to negotiate a better deal;
- The foundation buying the PPS does not have as a statutory goal to block a takeover; and
- The PPS will be outstanding for a period of maximum 6 months (an EGM must be called to determine the continued use of such shares after this period).

As of Feb. 1, 2016, for **French** companies listed on a regulated market, generally vote against any general authorities impacting the share capital (i.e. authorities for share repurchase plans and any general share issuances with or without preemptive rights, including by capitalization of reserves) if they can be used for antitakeover purposes without shareholders’ prior explicit approval.
Shareholder Proposals

**General Recommendation:** Vote all shareholder proposals on a case-by-case basis.

Vote for proposals that would improve the company's corporate governance or business profile at a reasonable cost.

Vote against proposals that limit the company's business activities or capabilities or result in significant costs being incurred with little or no benefit.

Policies dealing with environmental and social themes are covered by their own dedicated policy, presented separately in this document.

**Authority to Reduce Minimum Notice Period for Calling a Meeting**

**General Recommendation:** A recommendation to approve the “enabling” authority proposal would be on the basis that ISS would generally expect companies to call EGMs/GMs using a notice period of less than 21 days only in limited circumstances where a shorter notice period will be to the advantage of shareholders as a whole, for example, to keep a period of uncertainty about the future of the company to a minimum. This is particularly true of capital raising proposals or other price sensitive transactions. By definition, AGMs, being regular meetings of the company, should not merit a notice period of less than 21 days.

In a market where local legislation permits an EGM/GM to be called at no less than 14-days' notice, ISS will generally recommend in favor of a resolution to approve the enabling authority if the company discloses that the shorter notice period of between 20 and 14 days would not be used as a matter of routine for such meetings, but only when the flexibility is merited by the business of the meeting. Where the proposal(s) at a given EGM/GM is (are) not time-sensitive, such as the approval of incentive plans, ISS would not expect a company to invoke the shorter notice notwithstanding any prior approval of the enabling authority proposal by shareholders.

In evaluating an enabling authority proposal, ISS would first require that the company make a clear disclosure of its compliance with any hurdle conditions for the authority imposed by applicable law, such as the provision of an electronic voting facility for shareholders. In addition, with the exception of the first AGM at which approval of the enabling authority is sought following implementation of the European Shareholder Rights Directive, when evaluating an enabling authority proposal ISS will take into consideration the company's use (if any) of shorter notice periods in the preceding year to ensure that such shorter notice periods were invoked solely in connection with genuinely time-sensitive matters. Where the company has not limited its use of the shorter notice periods to such time sensitive matters and fails to provide a clear explanation for this, ISS will consider a vote against the enabling authority for the coming year.

**Auditor Report Including Related Party Transactions (France)**

**General Recommendation:** ISS will review all auditor reports on related-party transactions and screen for and evaluate agreements with respect to the following issues:

- Director Remuneration (including Severance Packages and Pension Benefits)
- Consulting Services
- Liability Coverage
- Certain Business Transactions
In general, ISS expects companies to provide the following regarding related-party transactions:

› Adequate disclosure of terms under listed transactions (including individual details of any severance, consulting, or other remuneration agreements with directors and for any asset sales and/or acquisitions);
› Sufficient justification on transactions that appear to be unrelated to operations and/or not in shareholders’ best interests;
› Fairness opinion (if applicable in special business transactions); and
› Any other relevant information that may affect or impair shareholder value, rights, and/or judgment.

In the event that the company fails to provide an annual report in a timely manner, generally at least 21 days prior to the meeting, ISS will recommend votes against these proposals.
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