

Brazil

Proxy Voting Summary Guidelines

2016 Benchmark Policy Recommendations

Effective for Meetings on or after February 1, 2016

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


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1. OPERATIONAL ITEMS

Financial Results/Director and Statutory Reports



- > There are concerns about the accounts presented or audit procedures used;
- > The external auditor expresses no opinion or qualified opinion over the financial statements; or
- > The company is not responsive to shareholder questions about specific items that should be publicly disclosed.

ISS will note whenever fees for non-audit services exceed standard annual audit-related fees. However, Brazilian companies are not required to present the ratification of external auditors to a shareholder vote, and the establishment of an audit committee is not mandatory. (Brazilian regulations allow external auditors to serve for a five-year term, or a 10-year term if the company establishes an audit committee.) Consequently, excessive non-audit fees will generally not result in adverse vote recommendations.

In circumstances where fees for non-audit services include fees related to significant one-time capital structure events (initial public offerings, bankruptcy emergencies, and spinoffs) and the company makes public disclosure of the amount and nature of those fees, which are an exception to the standard "non-audit fee" category, then such fees may be excluded from the non-audit fees considered in determining the ratio of non-audit to audit fees.

Appointment of Internal Statutory Auditors (Fiscal Council)

General Recommendation: Vote for the appointment or (re)election of statutory auditors, unless:

- The name of the management nominee(s) is not disclosed in a timely manner prior to the meeting;
- > There are serious concerns about the statutory reports presented or the audit procedures used;
- Questions exist concerning any of the statutory auditors being appointed; or
- The auditors have previously served the company in an executive capacity or can otherwise be considered affiliated with the company.

Allocation of Income

Brazilian companies are generally required to distribute at least 25 percent of adjusted net income as dividends to shareholders. Brazilian law also considers interest-on-capital-stock payments as dividends.



- > The dividend payout ratio has been consistently below 30 percent without adequate explanation or in the absence of adequate total shareholder returns; or
- > The payout is excessive given the company's financial position.

Stock (Scrip) Dividend Alternative

General Recommendation: Vote for most stock (scrip) dividend proposals.

Vote against proposals that do not allow for a cash option unless management demonstrates that the cash option is harmful to shareholder value.



Amendments to Articles of Association

General Recommendation: Vote amendments to the articles of association on a case-by-case basis. Note that Brazilian companies frequently seek shareholder approval to ratify even non-material changes in share capital.

Change in Company Fiscal Term

General Recommendation: Vote for resolutions to change a company's fiscal term unless a company's motivation for the change is to postpone its AGM.

Lower Disclosure Threshold for Stock Ownership

General Recommendation: Vote against resolutions to lower the stock ownership disclosure threshold below 5 percent unless specific reasons exist to implement a lower threshold.

Amend Quorum Requirements

General Recommendation: Vote proposals to amend quorum requirements for shareholder meetings on a case-by-case basis.

2. BOARD OF DIRECTORS

Director Elections

The best practice code of the Brazilian Institute of Corporate Governance (IBGC) recommends that boards be at least majority independent. This recommendation has become increasingly pertinent as the free float of Brazilian companies continues to grow. Nonetheless, majority-independent boards remain very rare in Brazil.

Companies that are part of the Novo Mercado and Nivel 2 listing segments of the Sao Paulo Stock Exchange (BM&FBovespa) are required to maintain a minimum of 20-percent board independence. BM&FBovespa regulations also allow companies to round down the required number of independent directors. Companies that are part of the Nivel 1 listing segment and non-differentiated ("traditional") companies are not subject to a minimum requirement.

Institutional investors largely believe that the aforementioned board independence requirements are presently inadequate, in light of the current free float and average board independence of companies in the differentiated listing segments. Moreover, the BM&FBovespa itself has sought to raise its minimum independence requirements, though issuers belonging to the voluntary listing segments voted down a proposal to do so in 2010.

ISS' benchmark board independence policy specifies that the boards of issuers belonging to the Novo Mercado and Nivel 2, the country's highest levels of corporate governance, must be at least 30-percent independent, consistent with proportional board representation best practices and the growing expectations of institutional investors.

Very few companies present unbundled director election proposals. While directors nominated by a controlling shareholder must be disclosed 15 days prior to the meeting date, minority shareholders may present the names of their nominees up to the time of the meeting. These rules were designed to minimize restrictions on minority shareholders, but end up having a negative impact on international investors, who must often submit voting instructions in the absence of complete nominee information.





General Recommendation: Vote for the bundled election of directors, unless:

- > Adequate disclosure of management nominees has not been provided in a timely manner;
- There are clear concerns over questionable finances or restatements;
- > There have been questionable transactions with conflicts of interest;
- There are any records of abuses against minority shareholder interests; or
- > The board fails to meet minimum corporate governance standards.

Vote against the bundled election of directors if the post-election board at Novo Mercado and Nivel 2 companies is not at least 30-percent independent.

Vote against the bundled election of directors if the names of the management nominees are not disclosed in a timely manner prior to the meeting.

Vote abstain on the election of directors and fiscal council members nominated by non-controlling shareholders presented as a separate voting item if the nominee names are not disclosed in a timely manner prior to the meeting.

Vote for individual nominees unless there are specific concerns about the individual, such as criminal wrongdoing or breach of fiduciary responsibilities.

Vote on a case-by-case basis for contested elections of directors, e.g. the election of shareholder nominees or the dismissal of incumbent directors, determining which directors are best suited to add value for shareholders.

Under extraordinary circumstances, vote against individual directors, members of a committee, or the entire board, due to:

- Material failures of governance, stewardship, risk oversight, or fiduciary responsibilities at the company;
- > Failure to replace management as appropriate; or
- Egregious actions related to a director's service on other boards that raise substantial doubt about his or her ability to effectively oversee management and serve the best interests of shareholders at any company.

Vote against individual directors, members of a committee, or the entire board due to a conflict of interest that raises significant potential risk, in the absence of mitigating measures and/or procedures.



ISS Classification of Directors – Brazil Policy 2016

Executive Director

- > Employee or executive of the company;
- Any director who is classified as a non-executive, but receives salary, fees, bonus, and/or other benefits that are in line with the highest-paid executives of the company.

Non-Independent Non-Executive Director (NED)

- Any director who is attested by the board to be a non-independent NED;
- Any director specifically designated as a representative of a significant shareholder of the company;
- > Any director who is also an employee or executive of a significant shareholder of the company;
- Any director who is nominated by a dissenting significant shareholder, unless there is a clear lack of material[5] connection with the dissident, either currently or historically;
- Beneficial owner (direct or indirect) of at least 10 percent of the company's stock, either in economic terms or in voting rights (this may be aggregated if voting power is distributed among more than one member of a defined group, e.g., family members who beneficially own less than 10 percent individually, but collectively own more than 10 percent), unless market best practice dictates a lower ownership and/or disclosure threshold (and in other special market-specific circumstances);
- Government representative;
- Currently provides (or a relative^[1] provides) professional services^[2] to the company, to an affiliate of the company, or to an individual officer of the company or of one of its affiliates in excess of \$10,000 per year;
- Represents customer, supplier, creditor, banker, or other entity with which company maintains transactional/commercial relationship (unless company discloses information to apply a materiality test^[3]);
- > Any director who has conflicting or cross-directorships with executive directors or the chairman of the company;
- Relative^[1] of a current employee of the company or its affiliates;
- Relative^[1] of a former executive of the company or its affiliates;
- A new appointee elected other than by a formal process through the General Meeting (such as a contractual appointment by a substantial shareholder);
- > Founder/co-founder/member of founding family but not currently an employee;
- Former executive (five-year cooling off period);
- Years of service is generally not a determining factor unless it is recommended best practice in a market and/or in extreme circumstances, in which case it may be considered. [4]
- Any additional relationship or principle considered to compromise independence under local corporate governance best practice guidance.

Independent NED

No material^[5] connection, either directly or indirectly, to the company (other than a board seat) or the dissenting significant shareholder.

Employee Representative

Represents employees or employee shareholders of the company (classified as "employee representative" but considered a non-independent NED).

Footnotes:

- [1] "Relative" follows the definition of "immediate family members" which covers spouses, parents, children, stepparents, step-children, siblings, in-laws, and any person (other than a tenant or employee) sharing the household of any director, nominee for director, executive officer, or significant shareholder of the company.
- [2] Professional services can be characterized as advisory in nature and generally include the following: investment banking/financial advisory services; commercial banking (beyond deposit services); investment services; insurance services; accounting/audit services; consulting services; marketing services; and legal services. The case of participation in a banking syndicate by a non-lead bank should be considered a transaction (and hence subject to the associated materiality test) rather than a professional relationship.
- [3] A business relationship may be material if the transaction value (of all outstanding transactions) entered into between the company and the company or organization with which the director is associated is equivalent to either 1 percent of the company's




turnover or 1 percent of the turnover of the company or organization with which the director is associated. OR, A business relationship may be material if the transaction value (of all outstanding financing operations) entered into between the company and the company or organization with which the director is associated is more than 10 percent of the company's shareholder equity or the transaction value, (of all outstanding financing operations), compared to the company's total assets, is more than 5 percent.

[4] For example, in continental Europe, directors with a tenure exceeding 12 years will be considered non-independent. In the United Kingdom, Ireland, Hong Kong and Singapore, directors with a tenure exceeding nine years will be considered non-independent, unless the company provides sufficient and clear justification that the director is independent despite his long tenure.


[5] For purposes of ISS' director independence classification, "material" will be defined as a standard of relationship financial, personal or otherwise that a reasonable person might conclude could potentially influence one's objectivity in the boardroom in a manner that would have a meaningful impact on an individual's ability to satisfy requisite fiduciary standards on behalf of shareholders.

Combined Chairman/CEO



Vote against the election of the company's chairman, if the nominee is also the company's CEO, when it is presented as a separate election at companies listed under the differentiated corporate governance segments of the Sao Paulo Stock Exchange (BM&FBovespa), Novo Mercado, Nivel 2, and Nivel 1-- after three (3) years from the date the company's shares began trading on the respective differentiated corporate governance segment.

Contested Director Elections



The analysis will generally be based on, but not limited to, the following major decision factors:

- Company performance relative to its peers;
- Strategy of the incumbents versus the dissidents;
- Independence of directors/nominees;
- Experience and skills of board candidates;
- Governance profile of the company;
- > Evidence of management entrenchment;
- > Responsiveness to shareholders;
- Whether a takeover offer has been rebuffed;
- > Whether minority or majority representation is being sought.

When analyzing a contested election of directors, ISS will generally focus on two central questions: (1) Have the dissidents proved that board change is warranted? And (2) if so, are the dissident board nominees likely to effect positive change (i.e., maximize long-term shareholder value).



Discharge of Directors



General Recommendation: Generally vote for the discharge of directors, including members of the management board and/or supervisory board, unless there is reliable information about significant and compelling controversies as to whether the board is fulfilling its fiduciary duties, as evidenced by:

- A lack of oversight or actions by board members that invoke shareholder distrust related to malfeasance or poor supervision, such as operating in private or company interest rather than in shareholder interest; or
- Any legal proceedings (either civil or criminal) aiming to hold the board responsible for breach of trust in the past or related to currently alleged actions yet to be confirmed (and not only the fiscal year in question), such as price fixing, insider trading, bribery, fraud, and other illegal actions; or
- Other egregious governance issues where shareholders will bring legal action against the company or its directors.

Director, Officer, and Auditor Indemnification and Liability Provisions



Vote against proposals to indemnify external auditors.

Board Structure



General Recommendation: Vote for proposals to fix board size.

Vote against the introduction of classified boards and mandatory retirement ages for directors.

Vote against proposals to alter board structure or size in the context of a fight for control of the company or the board.

Vote against proposals to increase board terms.

3. CAPITAL STRUCTURE

Brazilian companies frequently seek shareholder approval to ratify even non-material changes in share capital through the approval of article amendments. However, Brazilian regulations also allow the board to issue shares up to the authorized capital limit, without additional shareholder approval, as long as such a provision is included in the company's bylaws.

Share Issuance Requests

General Issuances




General Recommendation: Vote for issuance requests with preemptive rights to a maximum of 100 percent over currently issued capital.


Vote for issuance requests without preemptive rights to a maximum of 20 percent of currently issued capital.



Specific Issuances



Increases in Authorized Capital



Vote for specific proposals to increase authorized capital to any amount, unless:

- > The specific purpose of the increase (such as a share-based acquisition or merger) does not meet ISS guidelines for the purpose being proposed; or
- > The increase would leave the company with less than 30 percent of its new authorization outstanding after adjusting for all proposed issuances.

Vote against proposals to adopt unlimited capital authorizations.

Reduction of Capital

General Recommendation: Vote for proposals to reduce capital for routine accounting purposes unless the terms are unfavorable to shareholders.

Vote proposals to reduce capital in connection with corporate restructuring on a case-by-case basis.

Capital Structures

General Recommendation: Vote for resolutions that seek to maintain or convert to a one-share, one-vote capital structure.

Vote against requests for the creation or continuation of dual-class capital structures or the creation of new or additional super voting shares.

Preferred Stock

General Recommendation: Vote for the creation/issuance of convertible preferred stock as long as the maximum number of common shares that could be issued upon conversion meets ISS guidelines on equity issuance requests.

Vote against the creation of a new class of preference shares that would carry superior voting rights to the common shares.

Vote against the creation of blank check preferred stock unless the board clearly states that the authorization will not be used to thwart a takeover bid.

Vote proposals to increase blank check preferred authorizations on a case-by-case basis.

Debt Issuance Requests

General Recommendation: Vote non-convertible debt issuance requests on a case-by-case basis, with or without preemptive rights.



Vote for the creation/issuance of convertible debt instruments as long as the maximum number of common shares that could be issued upon conversion meets ISS guidelines on equity issuance requests.

Vote for proposals to restructure existing debt arrangements unless the terms of the restructuring would adversely affect the rights of shareholders.

Pledging of Assets for Debt

General Recommendation: Vote proposals to approve the pledging of assets for debt on a case-by-case basis.

Increase in Borrowing Powers

General Recommendation: Vote proposals to approve increases in a company's borrowing powers on a case-by-case basis.

Share Repurchase Plans

- **General Recommendation:** Generally vote for market repurchase authorities (share repurchase programs) if the terms comply with the following criteria:
 - A repurchase limit of up to 10 percent of outstanding issued share capital; and
 - A holding limit of up to 10 percent of a company's issued share capital in treasury ("on the shelf").

Authorities to repurchase shares in excess of the 10 percent repurchase limit will be assessed on a case-by-case basis. ISS may support such share repurchase authorities under special circumstances, which are required to be publicly disclosed by the company, provided that, on balance, the proposal is in shareholders' interests.

In addition, ISS will recommend against any proposal where:

- > The repurchase can be used for takeover defenses;
- > There is clear evidence of abuse;
- > There is no safeguard against selective buybacks; and/or
- > Pricing provisions and safeguards are deemed to be unreasonable in light of market practice.

Reissuance of Repurchased Shares

General Recommendation: Vote for requests to reissue any repurchased shares unless there is clear evidence of abuse of this authority in the past.

Capitalization of Reserves for Bonus Issues/Increase in Par Value

General Recommendation: Vote for requests to capitalize reserves for bonus issues of shares or to increase par value.



4. COMPENSATION

Shareholders are asked to approve the aggregate remuneration of directors and executive officers at Brazilian annual general meetings in a binding vote. The company's board of directors then decides how to allocate this aggregate remuneration figure among different individuals. The aggregate remuneration figure approved by shareholders should be inclusive of the variable remuneration that directors and executive officers may receive.

The Brazilian Securities Regulator (CVM) requires companies to disclose the average and maximum total compensation of their highest paid director and executive officer. However, a number of issuers have opted not to comply with the CVM's requirement based on a federal injunction filed in 2010 by the Brazilian Institute of Finance Executives (IBEF).

Management Compensation



General Recommendation: Generally vote for management compensation proposals that are presented in a timely manner and include all disclosure elements required by the Brazilian Securities Regulator (CVM).

Vote against management compensation proposals when:

- The company fails to present a detailed remuneration proposal or the proposal lacks clarity; or
- > The company does not disclose the total remuneration of its highest-paid executive; or
- > The figure provided by the company for the total compensation of its highest-paid administrator is not inclusive of all elements of the executive's pay.

Vote case-by-case on global remuneration cap (or company's total remuneration estimate, as applicable) proposals that represent a significant increase of the amount approved at the previous AGM (year-over-year increase). When further scrutinizing year-over-year significant remuneration increases, jointly consider some or all of the following factors, as relevant:

- Whether there is a clearly stated and compelling rationale for the proposed increase;
- Whether the remuneration increase is aligned with the company's long-term performance and/or operational performance targets disclosed by the company;
- Whether the company has had positive TSR for the most recent one- and/or three-year periods;
- Whether the relation between fixed and variable executive pay adequately aligns compensation with the company's future performance.

Compensation Plans

In Brazil, equity-based compensation plans were rarely submitted to shareholder approval prior to 2006. Since the publication of Instruction 481 by the Brazilian Securities Regulator (CVM) in December 2009, effective as of January 2010, companies are required to publish all facts relevant to such plans at least 15 days prior to the meeting date. According to this regulation, Brazilian companies should, at a minimum, disclose detailed information regarding potential dilution, exercise prices, vesting features, and performance criteria.



General Recommendation: ISS will generally support reasonable equity pay plans that encourage long-term commitment and ownership by its recipients without posing significant risks to shareholder value.

Practically all of the plans presented since the implementation of the 2009 CVM guidelines have included reasonable dilution limits and adequate vesting conditions. Performance criteria, meanwhile, are rarely disclosed. ISS' assessments



of these plans have generally hinged on the presence of discounted exercise prices (which are common in Brazil), particularly in the absence of specific performance criteria.

Vote against a stock option plan and/or restricted share plan, or an amendment to the plan, if:

- The plan lacks a minimum vesting cycle of three years; and/or
- The plan permits options to be issued with an exercise price at a discount to the current market price, or permits restricted shares to be awarded (essentially shares with a 100 percent discount to market price), in the absence of explicitly stated, challenging performance hurdles related to the company's historical financial performance or the industry benchmarks; and/or
- The maximum dilution exceeds ISS guidelines of 5 percent of issued capital for a mature company and 10 percent for a growth company. However, ISS will support plans at mature companies with dilution levels up to 10 percent if the plan includes other positive features such as challenging performance criteria and meaningful vesting periods, as these features partially offset dilution concerns by reducing the likelihood that options will become exercisable unless there is a clear improvement in shareholder value; and/or
- > Directors eligible to receive options under the scheme are involved in the administration of the plan.

5. OTHER ITEMS

Reorganizations/Restructurings

General Recommendation: Vote reorganizations and restructurings on a case-by-case basis.

Mergers and Acquisitions

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on mergers and acquisitions taking into account the following:

For every M&A analysis, ISS reviews publicly available information as of the date of the report and evaluates the merits and drawbacks of the proposed transaction, balancing various and sometimes countervailing factors including:

- Valuation Is the value to be received by the target shareholders (or paid by the acquirer) reasonable? While the fairness opinion may provide an initial starting point for assessing valuation reasonableness, ISS places emphasis on the offer premium, market reaction, and strategic rationale.
- Market reaction How has the market responded to the proposed deal? A negative market reaction will cause ISS to scrutinize a deal more closely.
- Strategic rationale Does the deal make sense strategically? From where is the value derived? Cost and revenue synergies should not be overly aggressive or optimistic, but reasonably achievable. Management should also have a favorable track record of successful integration of historical acquisitions.
- Conflicts of interest Are insiders benefiting from the transaction disproportionately and inappropriately as compared to non-insider shareholders? ISS will consider whether any special interests may have influenced these directors and officers to support or recommend the merger.
- of Governance Will the combined company have a better or worse governance profile than the current governance profiles of the respective parties to the transaction? If the governance profile is to change for the worse, the burden is on the company to prove that other issues (such as valuation) outweigh any deterioration in governance.

Vote against if the companies do not provide sufficient and timely information upon request to make an informed voting decision.



Appointment of Independent Auditors



General Recommendation: Vote for the election of auditors to conduct valuation of proposed transactions, unless:

- Name of the proposed auditors has not been published;
- There are serious concerns about the procedures used by the auditor;
- There is reason to believe that the auditor has rendered an opinion which is neither accurate nor indicative of the company's financial position; or
- External auditors have previously served the company in an executive capacity or can otherwise be considered affiliated with the company.

Mandatory Takeover Bid Waivers



General Recommendation: Vote proposals to waive mandatory takeover bid requirements on a case-by-case basis.

Reincorporation Proposals



General Recommendation: Vote reincorporation proposals on a case-by-case basis.

Expansion of Business Activities



General Recommendation: Vote for resolutions to expand business activities unless the new business takes the company into risky areas.

Related-Party Transactions



General Recommendation: In evaluating resolutions that seek shareholder approval on related-party transactions (RPTs), vote on a case-by-case basis, considering factors including, but not limited to, the following:

- The parties on either side of the transaction;
- The nature of the asset to be transferred/service to be provided;
- The pricing of the transaction (and any associated professional valuation);
- The views of independent directors (where provided);
- The views of an independent financial adviser (where appointed);
- Whether any entities party to the transaction (including advisers) is conflicted; and
- The stated rationale for the transaction, including discussions of timing.

If there is a transaction that ISS deemed problematic and that was not put to a shareholder vote, ISS may recommend against the election of the director involved in the related-party transaction or the full board.

Antitakeover Mechanisms

Mandatory Bid Provisions (sometimes referred to as poison pills in Brazil), are the antitakeover provisions most commonly used by these companies.

The ownership triggers for these mandatory bids typically range between 15-35 percent, and some include onerous minimum price provisions. The BM&FBovespa attempted in late 2010 to require all issuers in the Novo Mercado to adopt a mandatory bid provision with a 30-percent trigger, though the measure was voted down by issuers (since the Novo Mercado is a voluntary listing segment).

A few companies also include voting caps in their bylaws, though issuers in the differentiated listing segments may not have a voting cap below 5 percent.





General Recommendation: Generally vote against all antitakeover proposals, unless they are structured in such a way that they give shareholders the ultimate decision on any proposal or offer.

Vote for mandatory bid provisions that are structured in line with the recommendations of the Sao Paulo Stock Exchange's Novo Mercado listing segment:

- Ownership trigger of 30 percent or higher; and
- > Reasonable pricing provisions.

Shareholder Proposals



General Recommendation: Vote all shareholder proposals on a case-by-case basis.

Vote for proposals that would improve the company's corporate governance or business profile at a reasonable cost.

Vote against proposals that limit the company's business activities or capabilities or result in significant costs being incurred with little or no benefit.



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