



---

An MSCI Brand

---

Transparency. Inclusiveness. Global Expertise.

## 2014 Sustainability International Proxy Voting Summary Guidelines

January 2014

---

Institutional Shareholder Services Inc

Copyright © 2014 by ISS

[www.issgovernance.com](http://www.issgovernance.com)

## 2014 Sustainability International Proxy Voting Summary Guidelines

### Table of Contents

<b>1. OPERATIONAL ITEMS.....</b>	<b>4</b>
Financial Results/Director and Auditor Reports .....	4
Appointment of Auditors and Auditor Fees .....	4
Appointment of Internal Statutory Auditors.....	4
Allocation of Income .....	5
Stock (Scrip) Dividend Alternative .....	5
Amendments to Articles of Association .....	5
Change in Company Fiscal Term .....	5
Lower Disclosure Threshold for Stock Ownership .....	5
Amend Quorum Requirements .....	5
Transact Other Business.....	5
<b>2. BOARD OF DIRECTORS.....</b>	<b>6</b>
Director Elections.....	6
Classification of Directors – International Policy 2014 .....	12
Contested Director Elections .....	13
Discharge of Board and Management .....	13
Director, Officer, and Auditor Indemnification and Liability Provisions .....	14
Board Structure.....	14
<b>3. CAPITAL STRUCTURE .....</b>	<b>15</b>
Share Issuance Requests.....	15
Increases in Authorized Capital.....	15
Reduction of Capital.....	15
Capital Structures.....	15
Preferred Stock .....	16
Debt Issuance Requests .....	16
Pledging of Assets for Debt .....	17
Increase in Borrowing Powers .....	17
Share Repurchase Plans .....	18
Reissuance of Shares Repurchased .....	19
Capitalization of Reserves for Bonus Issues/Increase in Par Value.....	19
<b>4. COMPENSATION .....</b>	<b>20</b>
Preamble .....	20
European Guidelines .....	20
Canadian Guidelines .....	23
International Guidelines .....	25
<b>4. OTHER ITEMS .....</b>	<b>26</b>
Reorganizations/Restructurings.....	26
Mergers and Acquisitions .....	26
Mandatory Takeover Bid Waivers.....	26
Reincorporation Proposals.....	26
Expansion of Business Activities .....	26



An MSCI Brand

Transparency. Inclusiveness. Global Expertise.

Related-Party Transactions .....	27
Antitakeover Mechanisms .....	27
Social and Environmental Proposals .....	27
<b>DISCLOSURE/DISCLAIMER .....</b>	<b>29</b>

## 1. Operational Items

### Financial Results/Director and Auditor Reports

Vote FOR approval of financial statements and director and auditor reports, unless:

- There are concerns about the accounts presented or audit procedures used; or
- The company is not responsive to shareholder questions about specific items that should be publicly disclosed.

### Appointment of Auditors and Auditor Fees

Vote FOR the reelection of auditors and proposals authorizing the board to fix auditor fees, unless:

- There are serious concerns about the accounts presented or the audit procedures used;
- There is a reason to believe that the auditor has rendered an opinion which is neither accurate nor indicative of the company's financial position;
- External auditors have previously served the company in an executive capacity or can otherwise be considered affiliated with the company;
- Name of the proposed auditors has not been published;
- The auditors are being changed without explanation; or
- Non-audit-related fees are substantial.

In circumstances where fees for non-audit services include fees related to significant one-time capital structure events (initial public offerings, bankruptcy emergencies, and spin-offs) and the company makes public disclosure of the amount and nature of those fees, which are exceptions to the standard "non-audit fee" category, then such fees may be excluded from the non-audit fees considered in determining the ratio of non-audit to audit fees.

For concerns related to the audit procedures, independence of auditors, and/or name of auditors, the Sustainability policy may vote AGAINST the auditor (re) election. For concerns related to fees paid to the auditors, the Sustainability policy may vote AGAINST remuneration of auditors if this is a separate voting item; otherwise the Sustainability policy may recommend AGAINST the auditor election. Where firms have failed to disclose audit and/or non-audit fees, the Sustainability policy may recommend votes AGAINST members of the audit committee up for election.

Tax and governance haven companies listed on U.S. exchanges as Foreign Private Issuers (FPIs) will be subject to the U.S. policy criteria.

### Appointment of Internal Statutory Auditors

Vote FOR the appointment or reelection of statutory auditors, unless:

- There are serious concerns about the statutory reports presented or the audit procedures used;
- Questions exist concerning any of the statutory auditors being appointed; or
- The auditors have previously served the company in an executive capacity or can otherwise be considered affiliated with the company.



An MSCI Brand

Transparency. Inclusiveness. Global Expertise.

## **Allocation of Income**

Vote FOR approval of the allocation of income, unless:

- The dividend payout ratio has been consistently below 30 percent without adequate explanation; or
- The payout is excessive given the company's financial position.

## **Stock (Scrip) Dividend Alternative**

Vote FOR most stock (scrip) dividend proposals.

Vote AGAINST proposals that do not allow for a cash option unless management demonstrates that the cash option is harmful to shareholder value.

## **Amendments to Articles of Association**

Vote amendments to the articles of association on a CASE-BY-CASE basis.

## **Change in Company Fiscal Term**

Vote FOR resolutions to change a company's fiscal term unless a company's motivation for the change is to postpone its AGM.

## **Lower Disclosure Threshold for Stock Ownership**

Vote AGAINST resolutions to lower the stock ownership disclosure threshold below 5 percent unless specific reasons exist to implement a lower threshold.

## **Amend Quorum Requirements**

Vote proposals to amend quorum requirements for shareholder meetings on a CASE-BY-CASE basis.

## **Transact Other Business**

Vote AGAINST other business when it appears as a voting item.

## 2. Board of Directors

### Director Elections

Vote FOR management nominees in the election of directors, unless:

- Adequate disclosure has not been provided in a timely manner;
- There are clear concerns over questionable finances or restatements;
- There have been questionable transactions with conflicts of interest;
- There are any records of abuses against minority shareholder interests; or
- The board fails to meet minimum corporate governance standards, including board independence standards.

Vote FOR individual nominees unless there are specific concerns about the individual, such as criminal wrongdoing or breach of fiduciary responsibilities.

Vote AGAINST individual directors if absences at board meetings have not been explained (in countries where this information is disclosed).

Vote FOR employee and/or labor representatives if they sit on either the audit or compensation committee *and* are required by law to be on those committees. Vote AGAINST employee and/or labor representatives if they sit on either the audit or compensation committee, if they are not required to be on those committees.

Vote AGAINST or WITHHOLD from directors individually, on a committee, or potentially the entire board due to:

- Material failures of governance, stewardship, risk oversight<sup>1</sup>, or fiduciary responsibilities at the company, including failure to adequately manage or mitigate environmental, social and governance (ESG) risks;
- Failure to replace management as appropriate;
- Egregious actions related to the director(s)' service on the boards that raise substantial doubt about his or her ability to effectively oversee management and serve the best interests of shareholders at any company.

At Canadian TSX and TSXV firms, generally WITHHOLD votes from all directors nominated by slate ballot at the annual/general or annual/special shareholders' meetings. This policy will not apply to contested director elections.

While a firm's country of incorporation will remain the primary basis for evaluating companies, the U.S. policies will generally be applied to the extent possible with respect to issuers that file DEF 14As, 10-K annual reports, and 10-Q quarterly reports, and are thus considered domestic issuers by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). U.S. policies will also apply to companies listed on U.S. exchanges as Foreign Private Issuers (FPIs) and that may be exempt from the disclosure and corporate governance requirements that apply to most companies traded on U.S. exchanges, including a number of SEC rules and stock market listing requirements. Corporations that have reincorporated outside the U.S. have found themselves subject to a combination of governance regulations and best practice standards that may not be entirely compatible with an evaluation framework based solely on the country of incorporation.

---

<sup>1</sup> Examples of failure of risk oversight include, but are not limited to: bribery; large or serial fines or sanctions from regulatory bodies; significant environmental incidents including spills and pollution; large scale or repeat workplace fatalities or injuries; significant adverse legal judgments or settlements; hedging of company stock; or significant pledging of company stock.

In Europe, the Sustainability policy looks at a different set of factors to make determinations regarding director elections. The following factors are taken into account:

### **Director Terms**

For Belgium, France, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, and Switzerland, vote against the election or re-election of any director when his/her term is not disclosed or when it exceeds four years and adequate explanation for non-compliance has not been provided. In these markets, the maximum board terms are either recommended best practice or required by legislation. Under best practice recommendations, companies should shorten the terms for directors when the terms exceed the limits suggested by best practices. The policy will be applied to all companies in these markets, for bundled as well as unbundled items.

Clients will also be advised to vote against article amendment proposals to extend board terms. In cases where a company's articles provide for a shorter limit and where the company wishes to extend director terms from three or fewer years to four years, for example, the Sustainability policy will recommend a vote against, based on the general principle that director accountability is maximized by elections with a short period of renewal.

### **Bundling of Proposals**

For the markets of Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain, vote against the election or reelection of any directors if the company proposes a single slate of directors.

In France, unbundled director elections are market practice. In Germany, it has been recommended best practice since July 20, 2005, and in Spain, it has been recommended best practice since Jan. 1, 2007. The policy will be applied to all companies in these markets.

Bundling together proposals that could be presented as separate voting items is not considered good market practice. Bundled resolutions leave shareholders with an all-or-nothing choice, skewing power disproportionately towards the board and away from shareholders. As director elections are one of the most important voting decisions that shareholders make, directors should be elected individually.

### **Board Independence**

Note that this section is subject to an exception for companies with a majority shareholder. This exception is presented at the end of this subsection.

For the markets of Austria, Belgium, Germany, Hungary, France, Spain, Switzerland, and the Netherlands, vote AGAINST the election or reelection of any non-independent directors (excluding the CEO) if the proposed board is not at least 50-percent independent (as defined by the Sustainability policy's [director classification guidelines](#)). If a nominee cannot be classified, that person will be assumed non-independent and include that nominee in the independence calculation. The policy will apply to widely-held companies in these seven markets.

For Denmark, Norway, Finland, Sweden, and Luxembourg, the Sustainability policy will apply the same policy only for those companies that are part of a local main index market index and/or the MSCI-EAFE index.

In Ireland, vote AGAINST non-independent directors if there is not a majority independent board, but only for those companies that are constituents of the ISE 20. Companies that are not part of the ISE 20 will be required to have at least two independent NEDs on the board, as required by the UK Corporate Governance Code, as applied in Ireland. In instances where this is not the case, the Sustainability policy will consider voting against the non-independent members of the board.



An MSCI Brand

Transparency. Inclusiveness. Global Expertise.

For widely held companies in Austria and Germany that must by law include labor representatives who are by definition not independent, the Sustainability policy will require that a minimum of one-third of the total board be independent. For Swedish, Norwegian, and Danish local main index and/or MSCI-EAFE companies, as well as widely-held Hungarian companies, with labor representatives, the above policy will apply to shareholder-elected board members. In addition, the Sustainability policy will require that one-third of the total board (shareholder-elected members and labor representatives) be independent non-executive directors.

In Portugal, companies that belong to the PSI-20 and/or MSCI-EAFE index will be required to have at least 25 percent of the board independent, as recommended by the Code of Corporate Governance issued by the Portuguese Securities Exchange. The Sustainability policy will recommend a vote against the entire slate of candidates (bundled elections) or a vote against the election of any non-independent directors (unbundled elections) if board independence level does not meet the recommended 25-percent threshold.

In Italy, for companies that are part of a local main index market index and/or MSCI-EAFE index with a controlling shareholder, companies will be required to have a board consisting of at least one-third independent members (33 percent), and, for all other companies, at least half of the board should be independent (50 percent).

For Greece, vote against the election or reelection of any non-independent directors if the proposed board is not at least one-third independent (as defined by the Sustainability policy's director classification guidelines). If elections are bundled and the proposed board is not at least one-third independent, vote against the entire slate. If a nominee cannot be categorized, the Sustainability policy will assume that person is non-independent and include that nominee in the calculation. This policy will be applied to widely held companies incorporated in Greece.

### **Board Independence at Controlled Companies**

For companies with a majority shareholder, generally vote against the election or reelection of any non-independent directors (excluding the CEO) if the level of independence on the board will be lower than minority shareholders' percentage of equity ownership, or if the board will be less than one-third independent (whichever is higher).

Minority shareholders' ownership percentage is calculated by subtracting the majority shareholder's equity ownership percentage from 100 percent. Majority control is defined in terms of economic interest and not voting rights, and is considered to be any shareholder or group of shareholders acting collectively that control at least 50 percent + 1 share of the company's equity capital.

This independence threshold is applied to controlled widely held companies or main index-listed/MSCI-EAFE member companies which would otherwise fall under a 50-percent independence guideline as described in the Board Independence Policy.

Carve Out: In markets where the local corporate governance code addresses board independence at controlled companies, Sustainability Advisory Services will generally recommend against the election or reelection of any non-independent directors (excluding the CEO) if the level of independence on the board is lower than the local code recommendation, but in any case if the level of board independence is below one-third.

*This policy is not applied for Italy and Portugal.*

### **Disclosure of Nominee Names**

Vote AGAINST the (re)election of any directors when the names of the nominees are not available at the time the proxy analysis is written. This policy will be applied to all companies in these markets, for bundled as well as unbundled items.

### **Combined Chairman/CEO**

Vote AGAINST (re)election of a combined chair/CEO at widely held European companies.



An MSCI Brand

Transparency. Inclusiveness. Global Expertise.

However, when the company provides assurance that the chair/CEO would only serve in the combined role on an interim basis (no more than two years), with the intent of separating the roles within a given time frame, considerations should be given to these exceptional circumstances. In this respect, the vote would be made on a CASE-BY-CASE basis. In order to consider a favorable vote for a combined chair/CEO to serve on an interim basis, the company would need to provide adequate control mechanisms on the board (such as a lead independent director, a high overall level of board independence, and a high level of independence on the board's key committees).

This policy will be applied to all widely-held European companies that propose the (re)election of a combined chair/CEO to the board, including cases where the chair/CEO is included in an election by slate.

### *Election of Former CEO as Chairman of the Board*

The Sustainability policy will generally vote against the election or re-election of a former CEO as Chairman to the supervisory board or board of directors at widely held companies in Germany, Austria, the UK, and the Netherlands. In markets such as Germany, where the general meeting only elects the nominees and, subsequently, the new board's chairman, the Sustainability policy will generally vote against the election or reelection of a former CEO, unless the company has publicly confirmed prior to the general meeting that he will not proceed to become chairman of the board. Considerations should be given to any of the following exceptional circumstances on a CASE-BY-CASE basis if:

- There are compelling reasons that justify the election or re-election of a former CEO as chairman;
- The former CEO is proposed to become the board's chairman only on an interim or temporary basis;
- The former CEO is proposed to be elected as the board's chairman for the first time after a reasonable cooling-off period; or
- The board chairman will not receive a level of compensation comparable to the company's executives nor assume executive functions in markets where this is applicable (U.K. only).

### **Overboarded Directors**

In markets where local law or best practice governance codes address overboarding, disclosure is sufficient, and markets permit individual election of directors, vote AGAINST a candidate when he/she holds an excessive number of board appointments referenced by the more stringent of the provisions prescribed in local law or best practice governance codes, or the following guidelines:

- Executive directors are expected not to hold other executive or chairmanship positions. They may, however, hold up to two other non-executive directorships;
- Non-executive chairmen are expected not to hold other executive positions or more than one other chairmanship position. They may, however, hold up to three other non-executive directorships; and
- Non-executive directors who do not hold executive or chairmanship positions may hold up to four other non-executive directorships.

An adverse vote recommendation will not be applied to a director within a company where he/she serves as CEO or chair; instead, any adverse vote recommendations will be applied to his/her additional seats on other company boards.

The Sustainability policy will take into account board positions held in global publicly listed companies.

For directors standing for (re)election at French companies, take into account board appointments as censors in French publicly listed companies.



An MSCI Brand

Transparency. Inclusiveness. Global Expertise.

## ***Voto di Lista (Italy)***

In Italy, for MSCI EAFE companies, the election of directors takes place through the voto di lista mechanism (similar to slate elections). Since the Italian implementation of the European Shareholder Rights Directive (effective since Nov. 1, 2010), issuers must publish the various lists 21 days in advance of the meeting.

Since shareholders only have the option to support one such list, where lists are published in sufficient time, the Sustainability policy will recommend a vote on a CASE-BY-CASE basis, determining which list of nominees are considered best suited to add value for shareholders based, as applicable, on the Sustainability policy European policies for Director Elections and for Contested Director Elections.

Those companies that are excluded from the provisions of the European Shareholder Rights Directive publish lists of nominees 10 days before the meeting. In the case where nominees are not published in sufficient time, the Sustainability policy will recommend a vote AGAINST the director elections before the lists of director nominees are disclosed. Once the various lists of nominees are disclosed, an alert will be issued to clients and, if appropriate, the vote recommendation will be updated to reflect support for one particular list.

## ***One Board Seat per Director***

In cases where a director holds more than one board seat and corresponding votes, manifested as one seat as a physical person *plus* an additional seat(s) as a representative of a legal entity, vote AGAINST the (re)election of such legal entities and vote on the physical person.

However, an exception is made if the representative of the legal entity holds the position of CEO. In such circumstances, vote in favor of the legal entity and AGAINST the (re)election of the physical person.

## ***Composition of Committees***

Vote AGAINST the (re)election of executive members of the audit or remuneration committees. The Sustainability policy may vote AGAINST if the poor disclosure prevents an evaluation of whether an executive serves or will serve on a committee. If a company does not have an audit or a remuneration committee, the Sustainability policy may consider that the entire board fulfills the role of a committee. In such cases, a vote AGAINST the executives, including the CEO, up for election to the board may be appropriate.

In Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland, vote AGAINST the (re)election of executives who serve on the company's audit or remuneration committee. ISS may recommend AGAINST if the disclosure is too poor to determine whether an executive serves or will serve on a committee. If a company does not have an audit or a remuneration committee, ISS may consider that the entire board fulfills the role of a committee. In such case, Sustainability Advisory Services may recommend AGAINST the executives, including the CEO, up for election to the board.

For Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, vote AGAINST the (re)election of non-independent members of the audit committee and/or the remuneration committee if their (re)election would lead to a non-independent majority on the respective committee.

Markets where local corporate governance codes prescribe specific composition requirements are assessed in accordance with compliance with their local codes. More stringent requirements are applied to those markets whose local corporate governance codes prescribe more robust composition requirements.



An MSCI Brand

Transparency. Inclusiveness. Global Expertise.

### ***Composition of the Nominating Committee (Sweden/Norway/Finland)***

Vote FOR proposals in *Sweden, Norway, and Finland* to elect or appoint a nominating committee consisting mainly of non-board members.

Vote FOR shareholder proposals calling for disclosure of the names of the proposed candidates at the meeting, as well as the inclusion of a representative of minority shareholders in the committee.

The above policy notwithstanding, vote AGAINST proposals in *Sweden* to elect or appoint such a committee if the company is on the MSCI-EAFE or local main index and the following conditions are met:

- A member of the executive management would be a member of the committee;
- More than one board member who is dependent on a major shareholder would be on the committee; or
- The chair of the board would also be the chair of the committee.

In cases where the principles for the establishment of the nominating committee, rather than the election of the committee itself, are being voted on, vote AGAINST the adoption of the principles if any of the above conditions are met for the current committee, and there is no publicly available information indicating that this would no longer be the case for the new nominating committee.

### ***Election of Censors (France)***

Generally vote AGAINST proposals seeking shareholder approval to elect a censor, to amend bylaws to authorize the appointment of censors, or to extend the maximum number of censors to the board.

However, vote on a CASE-BY-CASE basis when the company provides assurance that the censor would serve on a short-term basis (maximum one year) with the intent to retain the nominee before his/her election as director.

In consideration of the principle that censors should be appointed on a short-term basis, vote against any proposal to renew the term of a censor or to extend the statutory term of censors.

Please see the International Classification of Directors on the following page.

**Classification of Directors – International Policy 2014****Executive Director**

- Employee or executive of the company;
- Any director who is classified as a non-executive, but receives salary, fees, bonus, and/or other benefits that are in line with the highest-paid executives of the company.

**Non-Independent Non-Executive Director (NED)**

- Any director who is attested by the board to be a non-independent NED;
- Any director specifically designated as a representative of a significant shareholder of the company;
- Any director who is also an employee or executive of a significant shareholder of the company;
- Any director who is nominated by a dissenting significant shareholder unless there is a clear lack of material<sup>5</sup> connection with the dissident, either currently or historically;
- Beneficial owner (direct or indirect) of at least 10 percent of the company's stock, either in economic terms or in voting rights (this may be aggregated if voting power is distributed among more than one member of a defined group, e.g., members of a family that beneficially own less than 10 percent individually, but collectively own more than 10 percent), unless market best practice dictates a lower ownership and/or disclosure threshold (and in other special market-specific circumstances);
- Government representative;
- Currently provides (or a relative<sup>1</sup> provides) professional services<sup>2</sup> to the company, to an affiliate of the company, or to an individual officer of the company or of one of its affiliates in excess of \$10,000 per year;
- Represents customer, supplier, creditor, banker, or other entity with which the company maintains a transactional/commercial relationship (unless the company discloses information to apply a materiality test<sup>3</sup>);
- Any director who has conflicting or cross-directorships with executive directors or the chairman of the company;
- Relative<sup>1</sup> of a current or former executive of the company or its affiliates;
- A new appointee elected other than by a formal process through the general meeting (such as a contractual appointment by a substantial shareholder);
- Founder/co-founder/member of founding family but not currently an employee;
- Former executive (five-year cooling off period);
- Years of service<sup>4</sup> is generally not a determining factor unless it is recommended best practice in a market and/or in extreme circumstances, in which case it may be considered.
- Any additional relationship or principle considered to compromise independence under local corporate governance best practice guidance.

**Independent NED**

- Not classified as non-independent by ISS (see above);
- No material<sup>5</sup> connection, either direct or indirect, to the company (other than a board seat) or to a significant shareholder.

**Employee Representative**

- Represents employees or employee shareholders of the company (classified as "employee representative" and considered a non-independent NED).

**Footnotes**

<sup>1</sup> "Relative" follows the definition of "immediate family members" which covers spouses, parents, children, stepparents, step-children, siblings, in-laws, and any person (other than a tenant or employee) sharing the household of any director, nominee for director, executive officer, or significant shareholder of the company.

<sup>2</sup> Professional services can be characterized as advisory in nature and generally include the following: investment banking/financial advisory services; commercial banking (beyond deposit services); investment services; insurance services; accounting/audit services; consulting services; marketing services; and legal services. The case of participation in a banking syndicate by a non-lead bank should be considered a transaction (and hence subject to the associated materiality test) rather than a professional relationship.

<sup>3</sup> A business relationship may be material if the transaction value (of all outstanding transactions) entered into between the company and the company or organization with which the director is associated is equivalent to either 1 percent of the company's turnover or 1 percent of the turnover of the company or organization with which the director is associated; or

A business relationship may be material if the transaction value (of all outstanding financing operations) entered into between the company and the company or organization with which the director is associated is more than 10 percent of the company's shareholder equity or the transaction value (of all outstanding financing operations) compared to the company's total assets is more than 5 percent.

<sup>4</sup> For example, in continental Europe, directors with a tenure exceeding 12 years will be considered non-independent. In the United Kingdom, Ireland, Hong Kong and Singapore, directors with a tenure exceeding nine years will be considered non-independent, unless the company provides sufficient and clear justification that the director is independent despite his long tenure.

<sup>5</sup> For purposes of the Sustainability policy's director independence classification, "material" will be defined as a standard of relationship (financial, personal, or otherwise) that a reasonable person might conclude could potentially influence one's objectivity in the boardroom in a manner that would have a meaningful impact on an individual's ability to satisfy requisite fiduciary standards on behalf of shareholders.

## Contested Director Elections

For contested elections of directors, e.g. the election of shareholder nominees or the dismissal of incumbent directors, determine which directors are best suited to add value for shareholders on a CASE-BY-CASE basis.

The analysis will generally be based on, but not limited to, the following major decision factors:

- Company performance relative to its peers;
- Strategy of the incumbents versus the dissidents;
- Independence of directors/nominees;
- Experience and skills of board candidates;
- Governance profile of the company;
- Evidence of management entrenchment;
- Responsiveness to shareholders;
- Whether a takeover offer has been rebuffed; and
- Whether minority or majority representation is being sought.

When analyzing a contested election of directors, generally focus on two central questions: (1) Have the dissidents proved that board change is warranted? and (2) if so, are the dissident board nominees likely to effect positive change (i.e., maximize long-term shareholder value)?

## Discharge of Board and Management

Generally vote FOR discharge of directors, including members of the management board and/or supervisory board, unless there is reliable information about significant and compelling controversies that the board is not fulfilling its fiduciary duties such as:

- A lack of oversight or actions by board members which invoke shareholder distrust related to malfeasance or poor supervision, such as operating in private or company interest rather than in shareholder interest;
- Any legal issues (e.g. civil/criminal) aiming to hold the board responsible for breach of trust in the past or related to currently alleged actions yet to be confirmed (and not only the fiscal year in question), such as price fixing, insider trading, bribery, fraud, and other illegal actions; or
- Other egregious governance issues where shareholders will bring legal action against the company or its directors.

For markets which do not routinely request discharge resolutions (e.g. common law countries or markets where discharge is not mandatory), analysts may voice concern in other appropriate agenda items, such as approval of the annual accounts or other relevant resolutions, to enable shareholders to express discontent with the board.

Vote AGAINST proposals to remove approval of discharge of board and management from the agenda.

### **Director, Officer, and Auditor Indemnification and Liability Provisions**

Vote proposals seeking indemnification and liability protection for directors and officers on a CASE-BY-CASE basis.

Vote AGAINST proposals to indemnify auditors.

### **Board Structure**

Vote FOR proposals to fix board size.

Vote AGAINST the introduction of classified boards and mandatory retirement ages for directors.

Vote AGAINST proposals to alter board structure or size in the context of a fight for control of the company or the board.



An MSCI Brand

Transparency. Inclusiveness. Global Expertise.

### 3. Capital Structure

#### Share Issuance Requests

**General Issuances:**

Vote FOR issuance requests with preemptive rights to a maximum of 100 percent over currently issued capital (33 percent for the UK, 50 percent for France).

Vote FOR issuance requests without preemptive rights to a maximum of 20 percent of currently issued capital (five percent for the UK).

In France, vote FOR general issuance requests with preemptive rights, or without preemptive rights but with a binding “priority right,” for a maximum of 50 percent over currently issued capital. Vote for general authorities to issue shares without preemptive rights up to a maximum of 10 percent of share capital

A vote FOR issuance requests may be recommended only if the share issuance authorities’ periods are clearly disclosed (or implied by the application of a legal maximum duration) and in line with market-specific practices and/or recommended guidelines (e.g. issuance periods limited to 18 months for the UK and Netherlands).

**Specific Issuances:**

Vote on a CASE-BY-CASE basis on all requests, with or without preemptive rights.

#### Increases in Authorized Capital

Vote FOR non-specific proposals to increase authorized capital up to 100 percent over the current authorization unless the increase would leave the company with less than 30 percent of its new authorization outstanding.

Vote FOR specific proposals to increase authorized capital to any amount, unless:

- The specific purpose of the increase (such as a share-based acquisition or merger) does not meet the guidelines for the purpose being proposed; or
- The increase would leave the company with less than 30 percent of its new authorization outstanding after adjusting for all proposed issuances.

Vote AGAINST proposals to adopt unlimited capital authorizations.

#### Reduction of Capital

Vote FOR proposals to reduce capital for routine accounting purposes unless the terms are unfavorable to shareholders.

Vote proposals to reduce capital in connection with corporate restructuring on a CASE-BY-CASE basis.

#### Capital Structures

Vote FOR resolutions that seek to maintain or convert to a one-share, one-vote capital structure.

Vote AGAINST requests for the creation or continuation of dual-class capital structures or the creation of new or additional supervoting shares.

## Preferred Stock

Vote FOR the creation of a new class of preferred stock or for issuances of preferred stock up to 50 percent of issued capital unless the terms of the preferred stock would adversely affect the rights of existing shareholders.

Vote FOR the creation/issuance of convertible preferred stock as long as the maximum number of common shares that could be issued upon conversion meets the guidelines on equity issuance requests.

Vote AGAINST the creation of a new class of preference shares that would carry superior voting rights to the common shares.

Vote AGAINST the creation of blank check preferred stock unless the board clearly states that the authorization will not be used to thwart a takeover bid.

Vote proposals to increase blank check preferred authorizations on a CASE-BY-CASE basis.

## Debt Issuance Requests

Vote non-convertible debt issuance requests on a CASE-BY-CASE basis, with or without preemptive rights.

Vote FOR the creation/issuance of convertible debt instruments as long as the maximum number of common shares that could be issued upon conversion meets the guidelines on equity issuance requests.

Vote FOR proposals to restructure existing debt arrangements unless the terms of the restructuring would adversely affect the rights of shareholders.

In evaluating debt-related proposals, the following factors will be considered:

- Rationale/use of proceeds: Why does the company need additional capital? How will that capital be used?
- Terms of the debts: Are the debt instruments convertible into equity? What are the interest rate and maturity dates? Any call or put options? Often these terms will not be determined until the time of issuance of debt instruments (or when the actual loan agreement is signed). The terms of the debts would generally be determined by the market conditions, and lack of disclosure concerning these terms should not be a cause for significant concern so long as the debt is not convertible into equity.
- Size: At a minimum, the size of the debt issuance/potential borrowing should be disclosed.
- The company's financial position: What is the company's current leverage and how does that compare to its peers?
- The risk of non-approval: What might happen if the proposal is not approved? Are there any alternative sources of funding? Could the company continue to fund its operations? Would it hinder the company's ability to realize opportunities?

A distinction should be made between a specific debt issuance or pledging of assets, and authority to issue or increase debt; as in the case of specific equity issuances and requests for authority to issue equity. For specific debt issuances or pledging of assets, while the above factors will be examined, in general a vote FOR these proposals will be warranted if:

- The size of the debt being requested is disclosed;
- A credible reason for the need for additional funding is provided;

- Details regarding the assets to be pledged are disclosed (for specific asset pledge proposals); AND
- There are no significant causes for shareholder concern regarding the terms and conditions of the debt.

So long as the proposal meets the above conditions, a vote FOR will be warranted even if the company has a high level of debt or the proposed issuance could result in a large increase in debt. A vote AGAINST will be warranted only in extremely egregious cases or where the company fails to provide sufficient information to enable a meaningful shareholder review. Where a general authority to issue debt or pledge assets is requested, in addition to the above criteria, we will oppose such proposal if it could result in a potentially excessive increase in debt. A potential increase in debt may be considered excessive when:

- The proposed maximum amount is more than twice the company's total debt;
- It could result in the company's debt-to-equity ratio exceeding 300 percent (for non-financial companies); AND
- The maximum hypothetical debt-to-equity ratio is more than three times the industry and/or market norm.

When the above conditions are met, the proposed increase in debt may be considered excessive and thus a vote AGAINST the proposal may be warranted. If we do not have data regarding the normal level of debt in that particular industry or market, only the company-specific information will be considered.

### Pledging of Assets for Debt

Vote FOR proposals to approve the specific pledging of assets for debt if:

- The size of the debt being requested is disclosed;
- A credible reason for the need for additional funding is provided;
- Details regarding the assets to be pledged are disclosed; and
- There are no significant causes for shareholder concern regarding the terms and conditions of the debt.

For proposals seeking a general authority to pledge assets for debt, the specific assets to be pledged need not be disclosed. However, in such cases, the authority should be limited such that it would not result in an excessive increase in debt. If the proposal grants excessive authority to the board or management, a vote AGAINST will be recommended.

In certain countries, shareholder approval is required when a company needs to secure a debt issuance with its assets. In many cases, this is a routine request and is a formality under the relevant law. When reviewing such proposals, the terms of the proposed debt issuance, the company's overall debt level, and the company's justification for the pledging of assets will be taken into account.

Vote recommendations against specific requests to pledge an asset will be issued in cases where no information regarding the size of the debt to be raised is disclosed, no credible explanation for the need for funding is provided, no details regarding the assets to be pledged are disclosed, or in extreme cases where shareholders' rights and economic interests could be negatively affected. When the board is requesting a general authority to pledge assets, the details regarding the assets to be pledged need not be disclosed; however, proposal that would grant the board excessive authority will be opposed.

### Increase in Borrowing Powers

Vote FOR proposals to approve increases in a company's borrowing powers if:

- The size of the debt being requested is disclosed;
- A credible reason for the need for additional funding is provided;

- The potential increase in debt is not excessive; and
- There are no significant causes for shareholder concern regarding the terms and conditions of the debt.

In some countries, companies are required to seek shareholder approval for increases in their aggregate borrowing power authorities. The aggregate limit on the board's ability to borrow money is often fixed in a company's articles, and shareholder approval to change this limit is therefore legally required. The analysis of borrowing power increase requests takes into account management's stated need for the increase, the size of the increase, and the company's current gearing level. Large increases in borrowing powers can sometimes result in dangerously high debt-to-equity ratios that could harm shareholder value. If no information regarding the limit on the borrowing power is disclosed, no credible explanation for the need of funding is provided, or an increase is excessive considering the company's debt level as well as normal levels of debt in its industry or market, the request will be opposed.

### Share Repurchase Plans

Generally vote FOR share repurchase programs/market repurchase authorities, *provided that* the proposal meets the following parameters:

- A repurchase limit of up to 10 percent of outstanding issued share capital (15 percent in UK/Ireland);
- A holding limit of up to 10 percent of a company's issued share capital in treasury ("on the shelf"); and
- A duration of no more than 5 years, or such lower threshold as may be set by applicable law, regulation or code of governance best practice.

Authorities to repurchase shares in excess of the 10 percent repurchase limit will be assessed on a case-by-case basis. The Sustainability policy may support such share repurchase authorities under special circumstances, which are required to be publicly disclosed by the company, provided that, on balance, the proposal is in shareholders' interests. In such cases, the authority should comply with the following criteria:

- A holding limit of up to 10 percent of a company's issued share capital in treasury ("on the shelf"); and
- A duration of no more than 18 months.

In markets where it is normal practice not to provide a repurchase limit, the Sustainability policy will evaluate the proposal based on the company's historical practice. However, companies should disclose such limits and, in the future, the Sustainability policy may vote AGAINST proposals at companies that fail to do so. In such cases, the authority should comply with the following criteria:

- A holding limit of up to 10 percent of a company's issued share capital in treasury ("on the shelf"); and
- A duration of no more than 18 months.

In addition, the Sustainability policy will vote AGAINST any proposal where any of the following criteria are met:

- The repurchase can be used for takeover defenses;
- There is clear evidence of abuse;
- There is no safeguard against selective buybacks; or
- Pricing provisions and safeguards are deemed to be unreasonable in light of market practice.

In *Italy and Germany*, vote FOR share-repurchase plans and share reissuance plans that would use call and put options if the following criteria are met:



An MSCI Brand

Transparency. Inclusiveness. Global Expertise.

- The duration of the authorization is limited in time to no more than 18 months;
- The total number of shares covered by the authorization is disclosed;
- The number of shares that would be purchased with call options and/or sold with put options is limited to a maximum of five percent of currently outstanding capital (or half of the total amounts allowed by law in Italy and Germany);
- A financial institution, with experience conducting sophisticated transactions, is indicated as the party responsible for the trading; and
- The company has a clean track record regarding repurchases.

### **Reissuance of Shares Repurchased**

Vote FOR requests to reissue any repurchased shares unless there is clear evidence of abuse of this authority in the past.

### **Capitalization of Reserves for Bonus Issues/Increase in Par Value**

Vote FOR requests to capitalize reserves for bonus issues of shares or to increase par value.

## 4. Compensation

### Preamble

The assessment of compensation follows the Sustainability Policy's Global Principles on Executive and Director Compensation which are detailed below. These principles take into account global corporate governance best practice.

The Global Principles on Compensation underlie market-specific policies in all markets:

1. Provide shareholders with clear, comprehensive compensation disclosures;
2. Maintain appropriate pay-for-performance alignment with emphasis on long-term shareholder value;
3. Avoid arrangements that risk "pay for failure";
4. Maintain an independent and effective compensation committee; and
5. Avoid inappropriate pay to non-executive directors.

In markets where disclosure practices allow for the application of these Global Executive and Director Compensation Principles, the Sustainability policy will evaluate corporate compensation programs through the prism of the five Global Principles. The compensation guidelines outlined below are applicable in the European markets that provide compensation disclosures which enable a more rigorous and informed evaluation of executive and director compensation policies. In all other markets, compensation proposals will be evaluated on a CASE-BY-CASE basis taking into consideration the Global Principles as applicable.

### European Guidelines

In line with European Commission Recommendation 2004/913/EC, the Sustainability policy believes that seeking annual shareholder approval for a company's compensation policy is a positive corporate governance provision.

In applying the Five Global Principles, the Sustainability policy utilizes European Compensation Guidelines which take into account local codes of governance, market best practice, and the Recommendations published by the European Commission. The Sustainability policy analyzes compensation-related proposals based on the role of the beneficiaries and has therefore bifurcated executive and director compensation policies into two domains:

- I. Executive compensation-related proposals; and
- II. Non-executive director compensation-related proposals.

### *Executive Compensation-Related Proposals*

The Sustainability policy will evaluate management proposals seeking ratification of a company's executive compensation-related items on a CASE-BY-CASE basis, and will generally vote AGAINST a company's compensation-related proposal if the proposal is out of alignment with one or a combination of several of the global principles and their corresponding provisions:

#### **1. Provide shareholders with clear and comprehensive compensation disclosures:**

- Information on compensation-related proposals shall be made available to shareholders in a timely manner;
- The level of disclosure of the proposed compensation policy shall be sufficient for shareholders to make an informed decision and shall be in line with what local market best practice standards dictate;
- Companies shall adequately disclose all elements of the compensation, including:

- Any short- or long-term compensation component must include a maximum award limit;
- Long-term incentive plans must provide sufficient disclosure of (i) the exercise price/strike price (options); (ii) discount on grant; (iii) grant date/period; (iv) exercise/vesting period; and, if applicable, (v) performance criteria; and
- Discretionary payments, if applicable.

**2. Maintain appropriate pay-for-performance alignment with emphasis on long-term shareholder value:**

- The structure of the company's short-term incentive plan shall be appropriate;
  - The compensation policy must notably avoid guaranteed or discretionary compensation.
- The structure of the company's long-term incentives shall be appropriate, including, but not limited to, dilution, vesting period, and, if applicable, performance conditions;
  - Equity-based plans or awards that are linked to long-term company performance will be evaluated using our [general European policy for equity-based plans](#); and
  - For awards granted to executives, the Sustainability policy will generally look for a clear link between shareholder value and awards, and stringent performance-based elements.
- The balance between short- and long-term variable compensation shall be appropriate;
  - The company's executive compensation policy must notably avoid disproportionate focus on short-term variable element(s).

**3. Avoid arrangements that risk “pay for failure”:**

- Severance pay agreements must not be in excess of (i) 24 months' pay or of (ii) any more restrictive provision pursuant to local legal requirements and/or market best practices;
- Arrangements with a company executive regarding pensions and post-mandate exercise of equity-based awards must not result in an adverse impact on shareholders' interests or be misaligned with good market practices;
- The board shall demonstrate good stewardship of investor's interests regarding executive compensation practices;
  - There shall be a clear link between the company's performance and variable awards.
  - There shall not be significant discrepancies between the company's performance and real executive payouts.
  - The level of pay for the CEO and members of executive management should not be excessive relative to peers, company performance, and market practices.
  - Significant pay increases shall be explained by a detailed and compelling disclosure.

**4. Maintain an independent and effective compensation committee:**

- No executives may serve on the compensation committee;
- In certain markets the compensation committee shall be composed of a majority of independent members, as per the Sustainability policy on director elections and board or committee composition.

In addition to the above, the Sustainability policy will generally vote AGAINST a compensation-related proposal if such proposal is in breach of any other supplemental market-specific voting policies.



## **Non-Executive Director Compensation**

### **5. Avoid inappropriate pay to non-executive directors:**

Generally vote FOR proposals to award cash fees to non-executive directors, and will otherwise:

Vote AGAINST where:

- Documents (including general meeting documents, annual report) provided prior to the general meeting do not mention fees paid to non-executive directors;
- Proposed amounts are excessive relative to other companies in the country or industry;
- The company intends to increase the fees excessively in comparison with market/sector practices, without stating compelling reasons that justify the increase;
- Proposals provide for the granting of stock options, or similarly structured equity-based compensation, to non-executive directors;
- Proposals introduce retirement benefits for non-executive directors.

And vote on a CASE-BY-CASE basis where:

- Proposals include both cash and share-based components to non-executive directors;
- Proposals bundle compensation for both non-executive and executive directors into a single resolution

### **Equity-Based Compensation Guidelines**

The Sustainability policy will generally vote FOR equity based compensation proposals for employees if the plan(s) are in line with long-term shareholder interests and align the award with shareholder value. This assessment includes, but is not limited to, the following factors;

The volume of awards transferred to participants must not be excessive: the potential volume of fully diluted issued share capital from equity-based compensation plans must not exceed the following guidelines:

- The shares reserved for all share plans may not exceed 5 percent of a company's issued share capital, except in the case of high-growth companies or particularly well-designed plans, in which case dilution of between 5 and 10 percent is allowed: in this case, we evaluate the performance conditions attached to the plans and assess whether the performance criteria is sufficiently challenging;
- The plan(s) must be sufficiently long-term in nature/structure: the minimum vesting period must be no less than three years from date of grant;
- The awards must be granted at market price. Discounts, if any, must be mitigated by performance criteria or other features that justify such discount.

If applicable, performance standards must be fully disclosed, quantified, and long-term, with relative performance measures preferred.

### **Compensation-Related Voting Sanctions**

Should a company be deemed to have egregious remuneration practices (as a result of one or a combination of several factors highlighted above) and has not followed market practice by submitting a resolution on executive compensation, vote AGAINST other "appropriate" resolutions as a mark of discontent against such practices.

An adverse vote recommendation could be applied to any of the following on a case-by case basis:

- The (re)election of members of the remuneration committee;
- The discharge of directors; or
- The annual report and accounts.

Failure to propose a resolution on executive compensation to shareholders in a market where this is routine practice may, by itself, lead to one of the above adverse vote recommendations regardless of the companies remuneration practices.

## Canadian Guidelines

Evaluate executive pay and practices, as well as certain aspects of outside director compensation on a CASE-BY-CASE basis.

Vote AGAINST management say on pay (MSOP) proposals, WITHHOLD from compensation committee members (or in rare cases where the full board is deemed responsible, all directors including the CEO), and/or AGAINST an equity-based incentive plan proposal if:

- There is a misalignment between CEO pay and company performance (pay for performance);
- The company maintains problematic pay practices; or
- The board exhibits poor communication and responsiveness to shareholders.

### Pay for Performance:

- Rationale for determining compensation (e.g., why certain elements and pay targets are used, how they are used in relation to the company's business strategy, and specific incentive plan goals, especially retrospective goals) and linkage of compensation to long-term performance;
- Evaluation of peer group benchmarking used to set target pay or award opportunities;
- Analysis of company performance and executive pay trends over time, taking into account our Pay for Performance policy;
- Mix of fixed versus variable and performance versus non-performance-based pay.

### Pay Practices:

- Assessment of compensation components included in the Problematic Pay Practices policy such as: perks, severance packages, employee loans, supplemental executive pension plans, internal pay disparity and equity plan practices (including option backdating, repricing, option exchanges, or cancellations/surrenders and re-grants etc);
- Existence of measures that discourage excessive risk taking which include but are not limited to: clawbacks, holdbacks, stock ownership requirements, deferred compensation practices etc.

### Board Communications and Responsiveness:

- Clarity of disclosure (e.g. whether the company's Form 51-102F6 disclosure provides timely, accurate, clear information about compensation practices in both tabular format and narrative discussion);
- Assessment of board's responsiveness to investor concerns on compensation issues (e.g., whether the company engaged with shareholders and / or responded to majority-supported shareholder proposals relating to executive pay).



## Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation (Say-on-Pay) Management Proposals

Vote CASE-BY-CASE on management proposals for an advisory shareholder vote on executive compensation taking into consideration the Global Principles as applicable. Vote AGAINST these resolutions in cases where boards have failed to demonstrate good stewardship of investors' interests regarding executive compensation practices.

In general, the management say on pay (MSOP) ballot item is the primary focus of voting on executive pay practices-- dissatisfaction with compensation practices can be expressed by voting against MSOP rather than withholding or voting against the compensation committee. However, if there is no MSOP on the ballot, then the negative vote will apply to members of the compensation committee. In addition, in egregious cases, or if the board fails to respond to concerns raised by a prior MSOP proposal, then vote withhold or against compensation committee members (or, if the full board is deemed accountable, all directors). If the negative factors involve equity-based compensation, then vote AGAINST an equity-based plan proposal presented for shareholder approval.

### Equity Compensation Plans

Vote CASE-BY-CASE on equity-based compensation plans. Vote AGAINST the plan if any of the following factors applies:

- *Cost of Equity Plans:* The total cost of the company's equity plans is unreasonable;
- *Dilution and Burn Rate:* Dilution and burn rate are unreasonable, where the cost of the plan cannot be calculated due to lack of relevant historical data;
- *Plan Amendment Provisions:* The provisions do not meet our guidelines as set out in this section;
- *Non-Employee Director Participation:* Participation of directors is discretionary or unreasonable;
- *Pay for performance:* There is a disconnect between CEO pay and the company's performance;
- *Repricing Stock Options:* The plan expressly permits the repricing of stock options without shareholder approval and the company has repriced options within the past three years; or
- *Problematic Pay Practices:* The plan is a vehicle for problematic pay practices.

### Other Compensation Plans

#### Employee Stock Purchase Plans (ESPPs, ESOPs)

Generally vote FOR broadly based (preferably all employees of the company with the exclusion of individuals with 5% or more beneficial ownership of the company) employee stock purchase plans where the following apply:

- Reasonable limit on employee contribution (may be expressed as a fixed dollar amount or as a percentage of base salary excluding bonus, commissions and special compensation);
- Employer contribution of up to 25% of employee contribution and no purchase price discount or employer contribution of more than 25% of employee contribution and SVT cost of the company's equity plans is within the allowable cap for the company;
- Purchase price is at least 80% of fair market value with no employer contribution;
- Potential dilution together with all other equity-based plans is ten percent of outstanding common shares or less; and
- The Plan Amendment Provision requires shareholder approval for amendments to:
  - the number of shares reserved for the plan;
  - the allowable purchase price discount;
  - the employer matching contribution amount.

Treasury funded ESPPs, as well as market purchase funded ESPPs requesting shareholder approval, will be considered to be incentive based compensation if the employer match is greater than 25% of the employee contribution. In this case, the plan will be run through the our proprietary compensation model to assess the Shareholder Value Transfer (SVT) cost of the plan together with the company's other equity-based compensation plans.

Eligibility and administration are also key factors in determining the acceptability of an ESPP/ESOP plan.

The Sustainability policy will also take into account other compensation and benefit programs, in particular pensions.

### **Deferred Share Unit Plans**

Generally vote FOR Deferred Compensation Plans if:

- Potential dilution together with all other equity-based compensation is ten percent of the outstanding common shares or less.

Other elements of director compensation to evaluate in conjunction with deferred share units include:

- Director stock ownership guidelines of a minimum of three times annual cash retainer
- Vesting schedule or mandatory deferral period which requires that shares in payment of deferred units may not be paid out until the end of three years
- The mix of remuneration between cash and equity
- Other forms of equity-based compensation, i.e. stock options, restricted stock.

### **International Guidelines**

Evaluate executive and director compensation proposals on a CASE-BY-CASE basis taking into consideration the Global Principles as applicable.

## 4. Other Items

### Reorganizations/Restructurings

Vote reorganizations and restructurings on a CASE-BY-CASE basis.

### Mergers and Acquisitions

Vote CASE-BY-CASE on mergers and acquisitions taking into account the following:

Every M&A analysis should include a review of publicly available information and a rigorous evaluation of the merits and drawbacks of the proposed transaction that balances various and sometimes countervailing factors including:

- Valuation - Is the value to be received by the target shareholders (or paid by the acquirer) reasonable? While the fairness opinion may provide an initial starting point for assessing valuation reasonableness, emphasis should be placed on the offer premium, market reaction, and strategic rationale;
- Market reaction - How has the market responded to the proposed deal? A negative market reaction will elicit greater scrutiny on a deal;
- Strategic rationale - Does the deal make sense strategically? From where is the value derived? Cost and revenue synergies should not be overly aggressive or optimistic, but reasonably achievable. Management should also have a favorable track record of successful integration of historical acquisitions;
- Conflicts of interest - Are insiders benefiting from the transaction disproportionately and inappropriately as compared to non-insider shareholders? Any special interests that may have influenced these directors and officers to support or recommend the merger should be considered;
- Governance - Will the combined company have a better or worse governance profile than the current governance profiles of the respective parties to the transaction? If the governance profile is to change for the worse, the burden is on the company to prove that other issues (such as valuation) outweigh any deterioration in governance;

Vote AGAINST if the companies do not provide sufficient information upon request to make an informed voting decision.

### Mandatory Takeover Bid Waivers

Vote proposals to waive mandatory takeover bid requirements on a CASE-BY-CASE basis.

### Reincorporation Proposals

Vote reincorporation proposals on a CASE-BY-CASE basis.

### Expansion of Business Activities

Vote FOR resolutions to expand business activities unless the new business takes the company into risky areas.

## Related-Party Transactions

Vote related-party transactions on a CASE-BY-CASE basis considering factors including, but not limited to, the following:

- The parties on either side of the transaction;
- The nature of the asset to be transferred/service to be provided;
- The pricing of the transaction (and any associated professional valuation);
- The views of independent directors (where provided);
- The views of an independent financial adviser (where appointed);
- Whether any entities party to the transaction (including advisers) is conflicted; and
- The stated rationale for the transaction, including discussions of timing.

If there is a transaction that is deemed problematic and that was not put to a shareholder vote, a vote against the election of the director involved in the related-party transaction or the full board may be warranted.

In Malaysia, vote AGAINST a related-party transaction mandate if:

- (a) A director who is classified by the company as independent has a vested interest<sup>2</sup> in the business transaction, AND
- (b) The value of the transaction exceeds MYR 250,000<sup>3</sup>.

In addition, directors involved in related-party transactions in excess of MYR 250,000 will be classified as non-independent.

## Antitakeover Mechanisms

Vote AGAINST all antitakeover proposals unless they are structured in such a way that they give shareholders the ultimate decision on any proposal or offer.

## Social and Environmental Proposals

Socially responsible shareholder resolutions receive a great deal more attention from institutional shareholders today than in the past. While focusing on value enhancement through risk mitigation and exposure to new sustainability-related opportunities, these resolutions also seek standardized reporting on ESG issues, request information regarding an issuer's adoption of, or adherence to, relevant norms, standards, codes of conduct or universally recognized international initiatives to promote disclosure and transparency.

The Sustainability policy generally supports standards-based ESG shareholder proposals that enhance long-term shareholder and stakeholder value while aligning the interests of the company with those of society at large. In particular, the focus is on resolutions seeking greater transparency and/or adherence to internationally recognized standards and

---

<sup>2</sup> By virtue of being a partner, executive, or major shareholder of the related-party holding more than a 10 percent equity stake or being the direct recipient of the transaction. For the purpose of clarification, directors who are deemed interested by virtue of being a director at the transacting party or who hold immaterial interest in the transacting party will be exempted.

<sup>3</sup> Under Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements, related-party transactions where the value of the transaction is less than MYR 250,000 are exempt from disclosure and approval requirements.



An MSCI Brand

Transparency. Inclusiveness. Global Expertise.

principles. In determining vote recommendations on standardized ESG reporting shareholder proposals, the following factors will be evaluated:

- Whether the proposal itself is well framed and reasonable;
- Whether adoption of the proposal would have either a positive or negative impact on the company's short-term or long-term share value;
- The percentage of sales, assets and earnings affected;
- Whether the company has already responded in some appropriate manner to the request embodied in a proposal;
- Whether the company's analysis and voting recommendation to shareholders is persuasive;
- What other companies have done in response to the issue;
- Whether implementation of the proposal would achieve the objectives sought in the proposal.



An MSCI Brand

Transparency. Inclusiveness. Global Expertise.

## Disclosure/Disclaimer

This document and all of the information contained in it, including without limitation all text, data, graphs, and charts (collectively, the "Information") is the property of Institutional Shareholder Services Inc. (ISS), its subsidiaries, or, in some cases third party suppliers.

The Information has not been submitted to, nor received approval from, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission or any other regulatory body. None of the Information constitutes an offer to sell (or a solicitation of an offer to buy), or a promotion or recommendation of, any security, financial product or other investment vehicle or any trading strategy, and ISS does not endorse, approve, or otherwise express any opinion regarding any issuer, securities, financial products or instruments or trading strategies.

The user of the Information assumes the entire risk of any use it may make or permit to be made of the Information.

ISS MAKES NO EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE INFORMATION AND EXPRESSLY DISCLAIMS ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES (INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF ORIGINALITY, ACCURACY, TIMELINESS, NON-INFRINGEMENT, COMPLETENESS, MERCHANTABILITY, AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE) WITH RESPECT TO ANY OF THE INFORMATION.

Without limiting any of the foregoing and to the maximum extent permitted by law, in no event shall ISS have any liability regarding any of the Information for any direct, indirect, special, punitive, consequential (including lost profits), or any other damages even if notified of the possibility of such damages. The foregoing shall not exclude or limit any liability that may not by applicable law be excluded or limited.