



An MSCI Brand

2013 Taft-Hartley U.S. Proxy Voting Guidelines

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TAFT-HARTLEY ADVISORY SERVICES

PROXY VOTING POLICY STATEMENT AND GUIDELINES

This statement sets forth the proxy voting policy of ISS' Taft-Hartley Advisory Services. The U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) has stated that the fiduciary act of managing plan assets that are shares of corporate stock includes the voting of proxies appurtenant to those shares of stock and that trustees may delegate this duty to an investment manager. ERISA section 3(38) defines an investment manager as any fiduciary who is registered as an investment adviser under the Investment Advisor Act of 1940. ISS is a registered investment adviser under the Investment Advisor Act of 1940.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services will vote the proxies of its clients solely in the interest of their participants and beneficiaries and for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to them. The interests of participants and beneficiaries will not be subordinated to unrelated objectives. Taft-Hartley Advisory Services shall act with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent person acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims. When proxies due to Taft-Hartley Advisory Services' clients have not been received, Taft-Hartley Advisory Services will make reasonable efforts to obtain missing proxies. Taft-Hartley Advisory Services is not responsible for voting proxies it does not receive.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services shall analyze each proxy on a case-by-case basis, informed by the guidelines elaborated below, subject to the requirement that all votes shall be cast solely in the long-term interest of the participants and beneficiaries of the plans. Taft-Hartley Advisory Services does not intend for these guidelines to be exhaustive. Hundreds of issues appear on proxy ballots every year, and it is neither practical nor productive to fashion voting guidelines and policies which attempt to address every eventuality. Rather, Taft-Hartley Advisory Services' guidelines are intended to cover the most significant and frequent proxy issues that arise. Issues not covered by the guidelines shall be voted in the interest of plan participants and beneficiaries of the plan based on a worker-owner view of long-term corporate value. Taft-Hartley Advisory Services shall revise its guidelines as events warrant and will remain in full conformity with the AFL-CIO proxy voting policy.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services shall report annually to its clients on proxy votes cast on their behalf. These proxy voting reports will demonstrate Taft-Hartley Advisory Services' compliance with its responsibilities and will facilitate clients' monitoring of Taft-Hartley Advisory Services. A copy of this *Proxy Voting Policy Statement and Guidelines* is provided to each client at the time Taft-Hartley Advisory Services is retained. Taft-Hartley Advisory Services shall provide its clients with revised copies of this proxy voting policy statement and guidelines whenever significant revisions have been made.



DIRECTOR ELECTIONS

Electing directors is the single most important stock ownership right that shareholders can exercise. By electing directors who share their views, shareholders can help to define performance standards against which management can be held accountable. Taft-Hartley Advisory Services holds directors to a high standard when voting on their election, qualifications, and compensation. We evaluate directors fairly and objectively, rewarding them for significant contributions and holding them ultimately accountable to shareholders for corporate performance. Institutional investors should use their voting rights in uncontested elections to influence financial performance and corporate strategies for achieving long term shareholder value.

Director accountability, independence and competence have become issues of prime importance to investors given the failings in oversight exposed by the global financial crisis. There is also concern over the environment in the boardrooms of certain markets, where past failures appear to be no impediment to continued or new appointments at major companies and may not be part of the evaluation process at companies in considering whether an individual is, or continues to be, fit for the role and best able to serve shareholders' interests.

Voting on Director Nominees in Uncontested Elections

Votes concerning the entire board of directors and members of key board committees are examined using the following factors:

Board Independence: Without independence from management, the board and/or its committees may be unwilling or unable to effectively set company strategy and scrutinize performance or executive compensation.

Board Competence: Companies should seek a diverse board of directors who can add value to the board through specific skills or expertise and who can devote sufficient time and commitment to serve effectively. While directors should not be constrained by arbitrary limits such as age or term limits, directors who are unable to attend board and committee meetings and/or who are overextended (i.e. serving on too many boards) raise concern on the director's ability to effectively serve in shareholders' best interests.

Board Accountability: Practices that promote accountability include; transparency into a company's governance practices, annual board elections, and providing shareholders the ability to remove problematic directors and to vote on takeover defenses or other charter/bylaw amendments. These practices help reduce the opportunity for management entrenchment.

Board Responsiveness: Directors should be responsive to shareholders, particularly in regard to shareholder proposals that receive a majority vote or management proposals that receive low shareholder support, and to tender offers where a majority of shares are tendered. Boards should also be sufficiently responsive to high withhold/against votes on directors. Furthermore, shareholders should expect directors to devote sufficient time and resources to oversight of the company.

Votes on individual director nominees are always made on a CASE-BY-CASE basis. Specific director nominee WITHHOLD/AGAINST¹ votes can be triggered by one or more of the following factors:

¹ In general, companies with a plurality vote standard use "Withhold" as the valid contrary vote option in director elections; companies with a majority vote standard use "Against". However, it will vary by company and the proxy must be checked to determine the valid contrary vote option for the particular company.



Board Independence

- Lack of board and key board committee independence (fully independent audit, compensation, and nominating committees).
- Lack of a board that is at least two-thirds (67 percent) independent – i.e. where the composition of non-independent board members is in excess of 33 percent of the entire board;
- Lack of an independent board chair;
- Lack of independence on key board committees (i.e. audit, compensation, and nominating committees);
- Failure to establish any key board committees (i.e. audit, compensation, or nominating).

Board Competence

- Attendance of director nominees at board and committee meetings of less than 75 percent in one year without valid reason or explanation.
- Directors serving on an excessive number of other boards which could compromise their primary duties of care and loyalty.

Board Accountability

Vote AGAINST/WITHHOLD from the entire board of directors, (except new nominees, who should be considered on a CASE-BY-CASE-BASIS) if:

Problematic Takeover Defenses

- The board lacks accountability and oversight due to the presence of problematic governance provisions, coupled with long-term poor corporate performance relative to peers;
- If the company has a classified board and a continuing director is responsible for a problematic governance issue at the board/committee level that would warrant a withhold/against vote, in addition to potential future withhold/against votes on that director, Taft-Hartley Advisory Services may vote against or withhold votes from any or all of the nominees up for election, with the exception of new nominees;
- The company's poison pill has a "dead-hand" or "modified dead-hand" feature;
- The board adopts a pill or makes a material adverse change to an existing pill without shareholder approval.

Governance Failures

- The presence of problematic governance practices including interlocking directorships, multiple related-party transactions, excessive risk-taking, imprudent use of corporate assets, etc.;
- Inadequate CEO succession planning, including the absence of an emergency and non-emergency/orderly CEO succession plan;
- Material failures of governance, stewardship, risk oversight², or fiduciary responsibilities at the company, failure to replace management as appropriate, flagrant or egregious actions related to the director(s)' service on other boards that raise substantial doubt about his or her ability to effectively oversee management and serve the best interests of shareholders at any company;

² Examples of failure of risk oversight include, but are not limited to: bribery; large or serial fines or sanctions from regulatory bodies; significant adverse legal judgments or settlements; hedging of company stock; or significant pledging of company stock.



- Chapter 7 bankruptcy, Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) violations or fines, and criminal investigations by the Department of Justice (DOJ), Government Accounting Office (GAO) or any other federal agency.

Problematic Compensation Practices/Pay-for-Performance Misalignment

Performance of compensation committee members and/or the entire board in relation to the approval of egregious or excessive executive compensation (including perquisites and cash or equity awards).

Vote AGAINST or WITHHOLD votes from members of the Compensation Committee and potentially the full board if:

- There is a misalignment between CEO pay and company performance (see [Pay-for-Performance](#) policy);
- The company maintains [problematic pay practices](#) including [options backdating](#), excessive perks and overly generous employment contracts etc.;
- The company fails to submit one-time transfers of stock options to a shareholder vote;
- The company fails to fulfill the terms of a burn rate commitment they made to shareholders;
- There is evidence that management/board members are using company stock in hedging activities.

Vote CASE-BY-CASE on Compensation Committee members (or, potentially, the full board) and the Management Say-on-Pay proposal if:

- The company's previous say-on-pay proposal received low levels of investor support, taking into account:
 - The company's response, including: a) disclosure of engagement efforts with major institutional investors regarding the issues that contributed to the low level of support; b) specific actions taken to address the issues that contributed to the low level of support; c) other recent compensation actions taken by the company;
 - Whether the issues raised are recurring or isolated;
 - The company's ownership structure; and
 - Whether the support level was less than 50 percent, which would warrant the highest degree of responsiveness.

Problematic Audit-Related Practices

Performance of audit committee members concerning the approval of excessive non-audit fees, material weaknesses, and/or the lack of auditor ratification upon the proxy ballot;

Vote AGAINST or WITHHOLD votes from the members of the Audit Committee when:

- Consulting (i.e. non-audit) fees paid to the auditor are excessive;
- Auditor ratification is not included on the proxy ballot;
- The company receives an adverse opinion on the company's financial statements from its auditor;
- There is evidence that the audit committee entered into an inappropriate indemnification agreement with its auditor that limits the ability of the company, or its shareholders, to pursue legitimate legal recourse against the audit firm; or
- Poor accounting practices such as: fraud; misapplication of GAAP; and material weaknesses identified in Section 404 disclosures, exist. Poor accounting practices may warrant voting against or withholding votes from the full board.



Board Responsiveness

Vote AGAINST/WITHHOLD from individual directors, committee members, or the entire board of directors as appropriate if:

- At the previous board election, any director received more than 50 percent withhold/against votes of the shares cast and the company has failed to address the underlying issue(s) that caused the high withhold/against vote;
- The board failed to act on takeover offers where the majority of the shareholders tendered their shares;
- The board failed to act on a shareholder proposal that received approval by a majority of the shares cast the previous year;
- The board implements an advisory vote on executive compensation on a less frequent basis than the frequency that received the majority of votes cast at the most recent shareholder meeting at which shareholders voted on the say-on-pay frequency.

Vote CASE-BY-CASE on the entire board if:

The board implements an advisory vote on executive compensation on a less frequent basis than the frequency that received a plurality, but not a majority, of the votes cast at the most recent shareholder meeting at which shareholders voted on the say-on-pay frequency, taking into account:

- The board's rationale for selecting a frequency that is different from the frequency that received a plurality;
- The company's ownership structure and vote results;
- Whether there are compensation concerns or a history of problematic compensation practices;
- The previous year's support level on the company's say-on-pay proposal.

Voting for Director Nominees in Contested Elections

Contested elections of directors frequently occur when a board candidate or “dissident slate” seeks election for the purpose of achieving a significant change in corporate policy or control of seats on the board. Competing slates will be evaluated on a CASE-BY-CASE basis with a number of considerations in mind. These include, but are not limited to, the following: personal qualifications of each candidate; the economic impact of the policies advanced by the dissident slate of nominees; and their expressed and demonstrated commitment to the interests of the shareholders of the company. Votes in a contested election of directors are evaluated on a CASE-BY-CASE basis with the following seven factors in consideration:

- Long-term financial performance of the target company relative to its industry;
- Management’s track record;
- Background to the proxy contest;
- Qualifications of director nominees (both slates);
- Strategic plan of dissident slate and quality of critique against management;
- Likelihood that the proposed goals and objectives can be achieved (both slates);
- Stock ownership positions.



Independent Directors

Board independence from management is of vital importance to a company and its shareholders. Accordingly, we believe votes should be cast in a manner that will encourage the independence of boards. Independence will be evaluated based upon a number of factors, including: employment by the company or an affiliate in an executive capacity; past or current employment by a firm that is one of the company's paid advisors or consultants; personal services contract with the company; family relationships of an executive or director of the company; interlocks with other companies on which the company's chairman or chief executive officer is also a board member; and service with a non-profit organization that receives significant contributions from the company.

- Generally vote AGAINST or WITHHOLD votes from non-independent director nominees (insiders and affiliated outsiders) where the entire board is not at least two-thirds (67 percent) independent;
- Generally vote AGAINST or WITHHOLD votes from non-independent director nominees (insiders and affiliated outsiders) when the nominating, compensation and audit committees are not fully independent;
- Generally consider independent board members who have been on the board continually for a period longer than 10 years as affiliated outsiders;
- Vote FOR shareholder proposals requesting that all key board committees (i.e. audit, compensation and/or nominating) include independent directors exclusively;
- Vote FOR shareholder proposals requesting that the board be comprised of a two-thirds majority of independent directors.

Non-Independent Chairman

Two major components at the top of every public company are the running of the board and the executive responsibility for the running of the company's business. Many institutional investors believe there should be a clear division of responsibilities at the head of the company that will ensure a balance of power and authority, such that no one individual has unfettered powers of decision. When there is no clear division between the executive and board branches of a company, poor executive and/or board actions often go unchecked to the ultimate detriment of shareholders. Since executive compensation is so heavily correlated to the managerial power relationship in the boardroom, the separation of the CEO and chairman positions is a critical step in curtailing excessive pay, which ultimately can become a drain on shareholder value.

Arguments have been made that a smaller company and its shareholders can benefit from the full-time attention of a joint chairman and CEO. This may be so in select cases, and indeed, using a case-by-case review of circumstances there may be worthy exceptions. But, even in these cases, it is the general view of many institutions that a person should only serve in the position of joint CEO and chairman on a temporary basis, and that these positions should be separated following their provisional combination.

We strongly believe that the potential for conflicts of interest in the board's supervisory and oversight duties trumps any possible corollary benefits that could ensue from a dual CEO/chairman scenario. Instead of having an ingrained quid pro quo situation whereby a company has a single leader overseeing both management and the boardroom, Taft-Hartley fiduciaries believe that it is the board's implicit duty to assume an impartial and objective role in overseeing the executive team's overall performance. Shareholder interests are placed in jeopardy if the CEO of a company is required to report to a board that she/he also chairs.

Inherent in the chairman's job description is the duty to assess the CEO's performance. This objectivity is obviously compromised when a chairman is in charge of evaluating her/his own performance or has a past or present affiliation with management. Moreover, the unification of chairman and CEO poses a direct threat to the smooth functioning of the entire



board process since it is the ultimate responsibility of the chairman to set the agenda, facilitate discussion, and make sure that directors are given complete access to information in order to make informed decisions.

- Generally vote AGAINST or WITHHOLD votes from any non-independent director who serves as board chairman;
- Generally vote AGAINST or WITHHOLD votes from a CEO who is also serving in the role of chairman at the same company;
- Generally support shareholder proposals calling for the separation of the CEO and chairman positions;
- Generally support shareholder proposals calling for a non-executive director to serve as chairman who is not a former CEO or senior-level executive of the company.

Excessive Directorships

As new regulations mandate that directors be more engaged and vigilant in protecting shareholder interests or else risk civil and/or criminal sanctions, board members have to devote more time and effort to their oversight duties. Recent surveys of U.S. directors confirm a desire for limiting board memberships, to between three and five seats. In view of the increased demands placed on corporate board members, Taft-Hartley fiduciaries believe that directors who are overextended may be impairing their ability to serve as effective representatives of shareholders. Taft-Hartley Advisory Services will vote against or withhold from directors serving on an excessive number of other boards, which could compromise their primary duties of care and loyalty.

- Generally vote AGAINST or WITHHOLD votes from directors serving on an excessive number of boards. As a general rule, vote AGAINST or WITHHOLD from director nominees who are:
 - CEOs of publicly traded companies who serve on more than two public boards besides their own. NOTE: Taft-Hartley Advisory Services will vote against or withhold from overboarded CEO directors only at their outside directorships³ and not at the company in which they presently serve as CEO); and
 - Non-CEO directors who serve on more than five public company boards.

Director Performance Evaluation

Many institutional investors believe long-term financial performance and the appropriateness of governance practices should be taken into consideration when determining vote recommendations with regard to directors in uncontested elections. When evaluating whether to vote against or withhold votes from director nominees, we will evaluate underperforming companies that exhibit sustained poor performance as measured by total returns to shareholders over a one- and three-year period.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services views deficient oversight mechanisms and the lack of board accountability to shareholders especially in the context of sustained poor performance, as problematic. As part of our framework for assessing director performance, we will also evaluate board accountability and oversight at companies that demonstrate sustained underperformance. A governance structure that discourages director accountability may lead to board and management entrenchment. For example, the existence of several anti-takeover provisions* has the cumulative effect of deterring legitimate tender offers, mergers, and corporate transactions that may have ultimately proved beneficial to shareholders. When a company maintains entrenchment devices, shareholders of poorly performing companies are left with few effective routes to beneficial change.

³ Although all of a CEO's subsidiary boards will be counted as separate boards, Taft-Hartley Advisory Services will not recommend a withhold/against vote from the CEO of a parent company board or any of the controlled (>50 percent ownership) subsidiaries of that parent, but will do so at subsidiaries that are less than 50 percent controlled and boards outside the parent/subsidiary relationships.



Taft-Hartley Advisory Services will assess the company's response to the ongoing performance issues, and consider recent board and management changes, board independence, overall governance practices, and other factors that may have an impact on shareholders. If a company exhibits sustained poor performance coupled with a lack of board accountability and oversight, we may also consider the company's five-year total shareholder return and five-year operational metrics in our evaluation.

*Problematic provisions include but are not limited to:

- A classified board structure;
- A supermajority vote requirement;
- Either a plurality vote standard in uncontested director elections or a majority vote standard with no plurality carve-out for contested elections;
- The inability for shareholders to call special meetings;
- The inability for shareholders to act by written consent;
- A dual-class structure; and/or
- A non-shareholder approved poison pill.

Vote AGAINST/WITHHOLD votes from all director nominees if the board lacks accountability and oversight, coupled with sustained poor performance relative to peers. Sustained poor performance is measured by one- and three-year total shareholder returns in the bottom half of a company's four-digit GICS industry group (Russell 3000 companies only). Sustained poor performance for companies outside the Russell 3000 universe is defined as underperforming peers or index on the basis of both one-year and three-year total shareholder returns.

Director Diversity

Gender and ethnic diversity are important components on a company's board. Diversity brings different perspectives to a board that in turn leads to a more varied approach to board issues. Taft-Hartley fiduciaries generally believe that increasing diversity in the boardroom to better reflect a company's workforce, customers, and community enhances shareholder value.

- Support proposals asking the board to make greater efforts to search for qualified female and minority candidates for nomination to the board of directors;
- Support endorsement of a policy of board inclusiveness;
- Support reporting to shareholders on a company's efforts to increase diversity on their boards.

Stock Ownership Requirements

Corporate directors should own some amount of stock of the companies on which they serve as board members. Stock ownership is a simple method to align the interests of directors with company shareholders. Nevertheless, many highly qualified individuals such as academics and clergy who can offer valuable perspectives in boardrooms may be unable to purchase individual shares of stock. In such a circumstance, the preferred solution is to look at the board nominees individually and take stock ownership into consideration when voting on the merits of each candidate.

- Vote AGAINST shareholder proposals requiring directors to own a minimum amount of company stock in order to qualify as a director nominee or to remain on the board.



Classified Boards ~ Annual Elections

The ability to elect directors is the single most important use of the shareholder franchise, and all directors should be accountable on an annual basis. Annually elected boards provide the best governance system for accountability to shareholders. A classified board is a board that is divided into separate classes, with directors serving overlapping terms. A company with a classified board usually divides the board into three classes. Under this system, only one class of nominees comes up to shareholder vote at the AGM each year.

As a consequence of these staggered terms, shareholders only have the opportunity to vote on a single director approximately once every three years. A classified board makes it difficult to change control of the board through a proxy contest since it would normally take two years to gain control of a majority of board seats. Under a classified board, the possibility of management entrenchment greatly increases. Classified boards can reduce director accountability by shielding directors, at least for a certain period of time, from the consequences of their actions. Continuing directors who are responsible for a problematic governance issue at the board/committee level would avoid shareholders' reactions to their actions because they would not be up for election in that year. Ultimately, in these cases, the full board should be responsible for the actions of its directors.

Many in management believe that staggered boards provide continuity. Some shareholders believe that in certain cases a staggered board can provide consistency and continuity in regard to decision-making and commitment that may be important to the long-term financial future of the company. Nevertheless, empirical evidence strongly suggests that staggered boards are generally not in the shareholders' best interest. In addition to shielding directors from being held accountable by shareholders on an annual basis, a classified board can entrench management and effectively preclude most takeover bids or proxy contests.

- Vote AGAINST management or shareholder proposals seeking to classify the board when the issue comes up for vote;
- Vote FOR management or shareholder proposals to repeal a company's classified board structure.
- If the company has a classified board and a continuing director is responsible for a problematic governance issue at the board/committee level that would warrant a withhold/against vote, in addition to potential future withhold/against votes on that director, we may vote against or withhold votes from any or all of the nominees up for election, with the exception of new nominees.

Board and Committee Size

While there is no hard and fast rule among institutional investors as to what may be an optimal size board, there is an acceptable range that companies should strive to meet and not exceed. A board that is too large may function inefficiently. Conversely, a board that is too small may allow the CEO to exert disproportionate influence or may stretch the time requirements of individual directors too thin.

Proposals seeking to set board size will be evaluated on a CASE-BY-CASE basis. Given that the preponderance of boards in the U.S. range between five and fifteen directors, many institutional investors believe this benchmark is a useful standard for evaluating such proposals.

- Generally vote AGAINST any proposal seeking to amend the company's board size to fewer than five seats;
- Generally vote AGAINST any proposal seeking to amend the company's board size to more than fifteen seats;
- Evaluate board size on a CASE-BY-CASE basis and consider WITHHOLD or AGAINST votes or other action at companies that have fewer than five directors and more than 15 directors on their board.



Limit Term of Office

Those who support term limits argue that this requirement would bring new ideas and approaches on to a board. While term of office limitations can rid the board of non-performing directors over time, it can also unfairly force experienced and effective directors off the board. When evaluating shareholder proposals on director term limits, consider whether the company's performance has been poor and whether problematic or entrenching governance provisions are in place at the company. Additionally, consider board independence, including whether the board chair is independent.

- Generally vote AGAINST shareholder proposals to limit the tenure of outside directors.

Cumulative Voting

Most corporations provide that shareholders are entitled to cast one vote for each share owned. Under a cumulative voting scheme, the shareholder is permitted to have one vote per share for each director to be elected. Shareholders are permitted to apportion those votes in any manner they wish among the director candidates. Thus, under a cumulative voting scheme shareholders have the opportunity to elect a minority representative to a board by cumulating their votes, thereby ensuring minority representation for all sizes of shareholders.

For example, if there is a company with a ten-member board and 500 shares outstanding-the total number of votes that may be cast is 5,000. In this case a shareholder with 51 shares (10.2 percent of the outstanding shares) would be guaranteed one board seat because all votes may be cast for one candidate. Without cumulative voting, anyone controlling 51 percent of shares would control the election of all ten directors.

With the advent and prevalence of majority voting for director elections, shareholders now have greater flexibility in supporting candidates for a company's board of directors. Cumulative voting and majority voting are two different voting mechanisms designed to achieve two different outcomes. While cumulative voting promotes the interests of minority shareholders by allowing them to get some representation on the board, majority voting promotes a democratic election of directors for all shareholders and ensures board accountability in uncontested elections. Though different in philosophic view, cumulative voting and majority voting can work together operationally, with companies electing to use majority voting for uncontested elections and cumulative voting for contested elections to increase accountability and ensure minority representation on the board.

In contested elections, similar to cumulative voting, proxy access allows shareholder access to the ballot without a veto from the nominating committee, but unlike cumulative voting, it also requires majority support to elect such directors.

At controlled companies, where majority insider control would preclude minority shareholders from having any representation on the board, cumulative voting would allow such representation and shareholder proposals for cumulative voting would be supported.

- Generally vote AGAINST proposals to eliminate cumulative voting;
- Generally vote FOR proposals to restore or provide for cumulative voting unless:
 - The company has proxy access thereby allowing shareholders to nominate directors to the company's ballot; and
 - The company has adopted a majority vote standard, with a carve-out for plurality voting in situations where there are more nominees than seats, and a director resignation policy to address failed elections.
- Vote FOR proposals for cumulative voting at controlled companies (where insider voting power exceeds 50%).



Failure to Act on Shareholder Proposals Receiving Majority Support

- Generally vote AGAINST or WITHHOLD from all director nominees at a company that has ignored a shareholder proposal that was approved by a majority of the votes cast at the last annual meeting.

Votes Against or Withholds from Directors for Shareholder Rights Plan (i.e. Poison Pills)

Institutional investors view shareholder rights plans, or poison pills, as among the most onerous of takeover defenses that may serve to entrench management and have a detrimental impact on their long-term share value. While recognizing that boards have a fiduciary duty to use all available means to protect shareholders' interests, as a best governance principle, boards should seek shareholder ratification of a poison pill (or an amendment thereof) within a reasonable period, to ensure that the features of the poison pill support the interests of shareholders and do not merely serve as a management entrenchment device. Boards that fail to do so should be held accountable for ultimately disregarding shareholders' interests. In applying this principle to voting in uncontested director elections, Taft-Hartley Advisory Services considers the term of the pill an important factor, as shorter term pills are generally less onerous as a takeover defense when compared to longer term pills, and may in some cases provide the board with a valuable tool to maximize shareholder value in the event of an opportunistic offer.

Companies that unilaterally adopt a long-term pill should be subject to a more frequent review — at least once every three years, beginning the first year following the adoption and extending until the pill has expired or been redeemed. However, we believe special consideration must be given to the combination of a poison pill and a classified board; together they create a powerful anti-takeover and entrenchment device. Instead of only reviewing such companies every 3 years, an annual review is more appropriate. Under a 3-year review, the same class of directors would be receiving against or withhold recommendations, while the other 2 classes of directors would be shielded. An annual review would hold responsible all directors of classified boards for not putting the pill to a shareholder vote.

- Vote AGAINST or WITHHOLD votes from all nominees of the board of directors (except new nominees, who should be considered on a CASE-BY-CASE basis) at a company that has a dead-hand or modified dead-hand poison pill in place. Vote AGAINST/WITHHOLD every year until this feature is removed;
- Vote AGAINST or WITHHOLD votes from all nominees of the board of directors (except new nominees, who should be considered on a CASE-BY-CASE basis) if the board has adopted a poison pill with a term of more than 12 months ("long-term pill") or renewed any existing pill, including any "short-term" pill (12 months or less) without shareholder approval, and there is no requirement or commitment to put the pill to a binding shareholder vote. Review such companies with classified boards every year, and such companies with annually-elected boards at least once every three years, and vote AGAINST or WITHHOLD votes from all nominees if the company still maintains a non-shareholder-approved poison pill;
- Vote AGAINST or WITHHOLD votes from all nominees of the board of directors (except new nominees, who should be considered on a CASE-by-CASE basis) if the board makes a material, adverse change to an existing poison pill without shareholder approval;
- Vote CASE-By-CASE on all nominees if the board adopts a poison pill with a term of 12 months or less ("short-term pill") without shareholder approval, taking into account the following factors:
 - The date of the pill's adoption relative to the date of the next meeting of shareholders- i.e. whether the company had time to put the pill on ballot for shareholder ratification given the circumstances;
 - The issuer's rationale;
 - The issuer's governance structure and practices; and
 - The issuer's track record of accountability to shareholders.



Shareholder Access to the Proxy

The current director election process as it exists leaves much to be desired. Companies currently nominate for election only one candidate for each board seat. Shareholders who oppose a candidate have no easy way to do so unless they are willing to undertake the considerable expense of running an independent candidate for the board. The only way for shareholders to register dissent about a certain director candidate is to vote against or “withhold” support from that nominee. But because directors are still largely elected by a plurality (those nominees receiving the most votes win board seats) at a large proportion of firms in the U.S., nominees running unopposed are typically reelected despite shareholder opposition.

Many investors view proxy access as an important shareholder right, one that is complementary to other best-practice corporate governance features. Taft-Hartley Advisory Services is generally supportive of reasonably crafted shareholder proposals advocating for the ability of long-term shareholders to cost-effectively nominate director candidates that represent their interests on management’s proxy card. Shareholder proposals that have the potential to result in abuse of the proxy access right by way of facilitating hostile takeovers will generally not be supported.

- Consider on a CASE-BY-CASE basis proposals to provide shareholders the ability to nominate director candidates to be included on management’s proxy card, taking into account, among other factors:
 - Company-specific factors including:
 - Responsiveness to shareholders (e.g. failing to implement majority-supported shareholder proposals);
 - Board and key committee independence;
 - Problematic governance and compensation practices; and
 - Past accounting or financial issues such as restatements.
 - Proposal-specific factors, including:
 - The ownership thresholds proposed in the resolution (i.e., percentage and duration);
 - The maximum proportion of directors that shareholders may nominate each year; and
 - The method of determining which nominations should appear on the ballot if multiple shareholders submit nominations.

Majority Threshold Voting Requirement for Director Elections

Shareholders have expressed strong support for precatory resolutions on majority threshold voting since 2005, with a number of proposals receiving majority support from shareholders. Taft-Hartley fiduciaries believe shareholders should have a greater voice in regard to the election of directors and view majority threshold voting as a viable alternative to the current deficiencies of the plurality system in the U.S.

- Generally support reasonably crafted shareholders proposals calling for directors to be elected with an affirmative majority of votes cast and/or the elimination of the plurality standard for electing directors (including binding resolutions requesting that the board amend the company’s bylaws), provided the proposal includes a carve-out for a plurality voting standard when there are more director nominees than board seats (e.g. in contested elections).
- Taft-Hartley Advisory Services may vote AGAINST/WITHHOLD votes from members of the board at companies without the carve-out for plurality voting in contested elections, as the use of a majority vote standard can act as an anti-takeover defense in contested elections. (e.g. although the dissident nominees may have received more shares cast, as long as the combination of withhold/against votes and the votes for the management nominees keep the dissident nominees under 50%, the management nominees will win, due to the holdover rules). This clearly contradicts the expressed will of shareholders.



- In addition to supporting proposals seeking a majority vote standard in director elections, we also support a post-election “director resignation policy” that addresses the situation of holdover directors to accommodate both shareholder proposals and the need for stability and continuity of the board.

CEO Succession Planning

- Vote FOR proposals seeking disclosure on a CEO succession planning policy.

Establish an Office of the Board

- Generally vote FOR shareholders proposals requesting that the board establish an *Office of the Board of Directors* in order to facilitate direct communication between shareholders and non-management directors, unless the company has effectively demonstrated via public disclosure that it already has an established structure in place.

Director and Officer Liability Protection

Management proposals typically seek shareholder approval to adopt an amendment to the company’s charter to eliminate or limit the personal liability of directors to the company and its shareholders for monetary damages for any breach of fiduciary duty to the fullest extent permitted by state law. In contrast, shareholder proposals seek to provide for personal monetary liability for fiduciary breaches arising from gross negligence.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services may support these proposals when the company persuasively argues that such action is necessary to attract and retain directors, but will likely oppose management proposals and support shareholder proposals in order to promote greater accountability.

- Vote AGAINST proposals to limit or eliminate entirely director and officer liability in regards to: (i) breach of the director’s fiduciary “duty of loyalty” to shareholders; (ii) acts or omissions not made in “good faith” or involving intentional misconduct or knowledge of violations under the law; (iii) acts involving the unlawful purchases or redemptions of stock; (iv) payment of unlawful dividends; or (v) use of the position as director for receipt of improper personal benefits.

Director and Officer Indemnification

Indemnification is the payment by a company of the expenses of directors who become involved in litigation as a result of their service to a company. Proposals to indemnify a company’s directors differ from those to eliminate or reduce their liability because with indemnification directors may still be liable for an act or omission, but the company will bear the expense. Taft-Hartley fiduciaries may support these proposals when the company persuasively argues that such action is necessary to attract and retain directors, but should generally oppose indemnification when it is being proposed to insulate directors from actions that have already occurred.

- Vote AGAINST indemnification proposals that would expand individual coverage beyond ordinary legal expenses to also cover specific acts of negligence that are more serious violations of fiduciary obligation than mere carelessness;
- Vote AGAINST proposals that would expand the scope of indemnification to provide for mandatory indemnification of company officials in connection with acts that previously the company was permitted to provide indemnification for at the discretion of the company’s board (i.e., “permissive indemnification”) but that previously the company was not required to indemnify;
- Vote FOR only those proposals which provide expanded coverage in cases when a director’s or officer’s legal defense was unsuccessful if: (1) the director was found to have acted in good faith and in a manner that he/she reasonably believed was in the best interests of the company; and (2) only if the director’s legal expenses would be covered.



COMPENSATION

The housing market collapse and resulting credit crisis resulted in significant erosion of shareholder value, unprecedented levels of market volatility, and a lack of confidence among financial market participants. Many Taft-Hartley trustees have questioned the role of executive compensation in incentivizing inappropriate or excessive risk-taking behavior by executives that could threaten a corporation's long-term viability. Further, generous severance packages and other payments to departing executives of failed institutions have heightened attention on the issue of pay for performance.

Trustees of Taft-Hartley funds, which have lost significant value in their investments as a result of the financial crisis, have little patience for "pay for failure" and continue to press for the adoption of executive compensation practices aimed at creating and sustaining long-term shareholder value.

Companies have long argued that legally binding executive compensation obligations cannot be modified. The Capital Purchase Program implemented under the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, the "bail out" program for the U.S. financial system, set the tone for executive compensation reform and requires participating firms to accept certain limits and requirements on executive compensation, regardless of existing contractual arrangements. A number of firms agreed to these requirements.

Evolving disclosure requirements have opened a wider window into compensation practices and processes, giving shareholders more opportunity and responsibility to ensure that pay is designed to create and sustain shareholder value. Companies in the U.S. are now required to evaluate and discuss potential risks arising from misguided or misaligned compensation programs. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act requires advisory shareholder votes on executive compensation (management "Say on Pay"), an advisory vote on the frequency of Say on Pay, as well as a shareholder advisory vote on golden parachute compensation. The advent of "Say on Pay" votes for shareholders in the U.S. has provided a new communication mechanism and impetus for constructive engagement between shareholders and managers/directors on pay issues.

Evaluation of Executive Pay

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services believes that executive pay programs should be fair, competitive, reasonable, and appropriate, and that pay for performance should be a central tenet in executive compensation philosophy. When evaluating executive and director pay programs and practices, Taft-Hartley Advisory Services looks for the following best practice considerations in the design and administration of executive compensation programs;

- **Appropriate pay-for-performance alignment with emphasis on long-term shareholder value:** executive pay practices must be designed to attract, retain, and appropriately motivate the key employees who drive shareholder value creation over the long term. Evaluating appropriate alignment of pay incentives with shareholder value creation includes taking into consideration, among other factors, the link between pay and performance, the mix between fixed and variable pay, performance goals, and equity-based plan costs.
- **Avoiding arrangements that risk "pay for failure":** this includes assessing the appropriateness of long or indefinite contracts, excessive severance packages, and guaranteed compensation.
- **Independent and effective compensation committee:** oversight of executive pay programs by directors with appropriate skills, knowledge, experience, and a sound process for compensation decision-making (e.g., including access to independent expertise and advice when needed) should be promoted.
- **Clear, comprehensive compensation disclosures:** shareholders expect companies to provide informative and timely disclosures that enable shareholders to evaluate executive pay practices fully and fairly.



- **Avoiding inappropriate pay to non-executive directors:** compensation to outside directors should not compromise their independence and ability to make appropriate judgments in overseeing managers' pay and performance.

Examples of best pay practices include:

Employment contracts: Companies should enter into employment contracts under limited circumstances for a short time period (e.g., new executive hires for a three-year contract) for limited executives. The contracts should not have automatic renewal feature and should have a specified termination date.

Severance agreements: Severance provisions should not be so appealing that they become an incentive for the executive to be terminated. The severance formula should be reasonable and not overly generous to the executive (e.g., use a reasonable severance multiple; use pro-rated target/average historical bonus and not maximum bonus). Failure to renew employment contract, termination under questionable events or for poor performance should not constitute "good reason" for termination with severance payments.

Change-in-control payments: Change-in-control payments should be "double-triggered" – i.e. payouts should only made when there is a significant change in company ownership structure, and when there is a loss of employment or substantial change in job duties associated with the change in company ownership structure. Change-in-control provisions should exclude excise tax gross-ups and should not authorize the acceleration of vesting of equity awards upon a change in control unless provided under a double-trigger scenario. Similarly, change in control provisions in equity plans should be double-triggered. A change in control event should not result in an acceleration of vesting of all unvested stock options or lapsing of vesting/performance requirements on restricted stock/performance shares, unless there is a loss of employment or substantial change in job duties.

Supplemental executive retirement plans (SERPs): SERPs should not include sweeteners that can increase the payout value significantly or even exponentially, such as additional years of service credited for pension calculations, or inclusion of variable pay (e.g. bonuses and equity awards) into the formula. Pension formulas should not include extraordinary annual bonuses paid close to the time of retirement and should be based on an average, not the maximum, level of compensation earned.

Deferred compensation: Above-market returns or guaranteed minimum returns should not be applied on deferred compensation.

Disclosure practices: The Compensation, Discussion and Analysis should be written in plain English, with as little "legalese" as possible and formatted using section headers, bulleted lists, tables and charts where possible to ease reader comprehension. Ultimately, the document should provide detail and rationale regarding compensation, strategy, pay mix, goals/metrics, challenges, competition and pay for performance linkage, etc. in a narrative fashion.

Responsible use of company stock: Companies should adopt policies that prohibit executives from speculating in company's stock or using company stock in hedging activities, such as "cashless" collars, forward sales, equity swaps or other similar arrangements. Such behavior undermines the ultimate alignment with long-term shareholders' interests. In addition, the policy should prohibit or discourage the use of company stock as collateral for margin loans, to avoid any potential sudden stock sales (required upon margin calls) that could have a negative impact on the company's stock price.

Long-term focus: Executive compensation programs should be designed to support companies' long-term strategic goals. A short-term focus on performance does not necessarily create sustainable shareholder value. Instead, long-term goals may be sacrificed to achieve short-term expectations to the detriment of shareholder value, as evidenced by the financial crisis.



Compensation programs embedding a long-term focus with respect to company goals better align with the long-term interests of shareholders. Granting stock options and restricted stock to executives that vest in five years does not necessarily provide a long-term focus, as executives can sell off the company shares once they vest. However, requiring senior executives to hold company stock until retirement or after retirement can encourage a long-term focus on company performance.

Pay-For-Performance Alignment

Stock-based pay is often the main driver for excessive executive compensation, which could be fueled by poor plan design or administration. Therefore, it is important to closely examine any discrepancies between CEO pay and total shareholder returns over a sustained period of time in assessing equity-based compensation. Many investors do not consider standard stock options or time-vested restricted stock to be performance-based. If a company provides performance-based incentives to its executives, the company should provide complete disclosure of the performance measures and goals to allow shareholders to assess the rigor of the performance program. Complete and transparent disclosure enables shareholders to better comprehend the company's pay for performance linkage.

When financial or operational measures are utilized in incentive awards, the achievements related to these measures should ultimately translate into superior shareholder returns in the long-term. The use of non-GAAP financial metrics makes it very challenging for shareholders to ascertain the rigor of the program as shareholders often cannot tell the type of adjustments being made and if the adjustments were made consistently.

Pay-for-performance should be a central tenet in executive compensation philosophy. In evaluating the degree of alignment between the CEO's pay with the company's performance over a sustained period, Taft-Hartley Advisory Services conducts a pay-for-performance analysis.

With respect to companies in the Russell 3000 index, this analysis considers the following:

1. Peer Group⁴ Alignment:
 - The degree of alignment between the company's TSR rank and the CEO's total pay rank within a peer group, as measured over one-year and three-year periods (weighted 40/60);
 - The multiple of the CEO's total pay relative to the peer group median.
2. Absolute Alignment: The absolute alignment between the trend in CEO pay and company TSR over the prior five fiscal years – *i.e.*, the difference between the trend in annual pay changes and the trend in annualized TSR during the period.

If the pay-for-performance analysis demonstrates significant unsatisfactory long-term pay-for-performance alignment or, in the case of non-Russell 3000 index companies, misaligned pay and performance are otherwise suggested, the following qualitative factors will be evaluated to determine how various pay elements may work to encourage or to undermine long-term value creation and alignment with shareholder interests:

- The ratio of performance- to time-based equity awards;
- The ratio of performance-based compensation to overall compensation;
- The completeness/transparency of disclosure, rigor and appropriateness of performance hurdles;

⁴ The peer group is generally comprised of 14-24 companies that are selected using market cap, revenue (or assets for certain financial firms), GICS industry group and company's selected peers' GICS industry group with size constraints, via a process designed to select peers that are closest to the subject company in terms of revenue/assets and industry and also within a market cap bucket that is reflective of the company's.



- The company's peer group benchmarking practices;
- Actual results of financial/operational metrics, such as growth in revenue, profit, cash flow, workplace safety, environmental performance etc., both absolute and relative to peers;
- Special circumstances related to, for example, a new CEO in the prior fiscal year or anomalous equity grant practices (e.g., biennial awards);
- Realizable pay compared to grant pay; and
- Any other factors deemed relevant.

Problematic Compensation Practices

Poor disclosure, the absence or non-transparency of disclosure and flawed compensation plan design can lead to excessive executive pay practices that are detrimental to shareholders.

Companies are expected to meet a minimum standard of tally sheet disclosure as to allow shareholders to readily assess the total executive pay package, understand the actual linkage between pay and performance, and mitigate misinformation to shareholders. The SEC has issued rules on executive and director compensation that require expansive disclosure and a total compensation figure for each of the named executive officers. Poorly designed executive compensation plans or those lacking in transparency can be reflective of a poorly performing compensation committee.

Executive compensation will continue to be in the spotlight in the ensuing years, particularly when shareholders are expected to have access to more complete information.

The focus is on executive compensation practices that contravene best practice compensation considerations, including:

- Problematic practices related to non-performance-based compensation elements;
- Incentives that may motivate excessive risk-taking; and
- Options Backdating.

Problematic compensation practices include, but are not limited to, the following:

Non-Performance based Compensation Elements

While not exhaustive, the following list represents certain adverse practices that are contrary to a performance-based pay philosophy and executive pay best practices, and may lead to negative vote recommendations:

- Egregious employment contracts:
 - Contracts containing multi-year guarantees for salary increases, non-performance based bonuses, and equity compensation.
- New CEO with overly generous new-hire package:
 - Excessive “make whole” provisions without sufficient rationale;
 - Any of the problematic pay practices listed in this policy.
- Abnormally large bonus payouts without justifiable performance linkage or proper disclosure:
 - Includes performance metrics that are changed, canceled, or replaced during the performance period without adequate explanation of the action and the link to performance.
- Egregious pension/SERP (supplemental executive retirement plan) payouts:



- Inclusion of additional years of service not worked that result in significant benefits provided in new arrangements;
- Inclusion of performance-based equity or other long-term awards in the pension calculation.
- Excessive Perquisites:
 - Perquisites for former and/or retired executives, such as lifetime benefits, car allowances, personal use of corporate aircraft, or other inappropriate arrangements;
 - Extraordinary relocation benefits (including home buyouts);
 - Excessive amounts of perquisites compensation.
- Excessive severance and/or change in control provisions:
 - Change in control cash payments exceeding 3 times base salary plus target/average/last paid bonus;
 - Arrangements that provide for change-in-control payments without loss of job or substantial diminution of job duties (single-triggered or modified single-triggered - where an executive may voluntarily leave for any reason and still receive the change-in-control severance package);
 - Employment or severance agreements that provide for excise tax gross-ups. Modified gross-ups would be treated in the same manner as full gross-ups;
 - Excessive payments upon an executive's termination in connection with performance failure;
 - Liberal change in control definition in individual contracts or equity plans which could result in payments to executives without an actual change in control occurring.
- Tax Reimbursements/Gross-ups: income tax reimbursements on executive perquisites or other payments (e.g., related to personal use of corporate aircraft, executive life insurance, bonus, restricted stock vesting, secular trusts, etc; see also excise tax gross-ups above);
- Dividends or dividend equivalents paid on unvested performance shares or units;
- Executives using company stock in hedging activities, such as “cashless” collars, forward sales, equity swaps, or other similar arrangements;
- Internal pay disparity: Excessive differential between CEO total pay and that of next highest-paid named executive officer (NEO);
- Repricing or replacing of underwater stock options/stock appreciation rights (SARs) without prior shareholder approval (including cash buyouts, option exchanges, and certain voluntary surrender of underwater options where shares surrendered may subsequently be re-granted);
- Options backdating;
- Other pay practices that may be deemed problematic in a given circumstance but are not covered in the above categories.



Incentives that may Motivate Excessive Risk-Taking

Assess company policies and disclosure related to compensation that could incentivize excessive risk-taking, for example:

- Guaranteed bonuses or other abnormally large bonus payouts without justifiable performance linkage or appropriate disclosure;
- Mega annual equity grants that provide unlimited upside with no downside risk;
- A single performance metric used for short- and long-term plans;
- High pay opportunities relative to industry peers;
- Disproportionate supplemental pensions;
- Lucrative severance packages.

Factors that potentially mitigate the impact of risky incentives include rigorous claw-back provisions, robust stock ownership/holding guidelines, and substantive bonus deferral/escrowing programs.

Options Backdating

Options backdating has serious implications and has resulted in financial restatements, delisting of companies, and/or the termination of executives or directors. Taft-Hartley Advisory Services will adopt a CASE-BY-CASE approach to differentiate companies that had sloppy administration vs. deliberate action or fraud, as well as those companies which have since taken corrective action. Instances in which companies have committed fraud are considered most egregious, and Taft-Hartley Advisory Services will look to them to adopt formal policies to ensure that such practices will not re-occur in the future.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services will consider several factors, including, but not limited to, the following:

- Reason and motive for the options backdating issue, such as inadvertent vs. deliberate grant date changes;
- Duration of options backdating;
- Size of restatement due to options backdating;
- Corrective actions taken by the board or compensation committee, such as canceling or repricing backdated options, or recoupment of option gains on backdated grants;
- Adoption of a grant policy that prohibits backdating, and creation of a fixed grant schedule or window period for equity grants going forward.

Board Communications and Responsiveness

Consider the following factors when evaluating ballot items related to executive pay on the board's responsiveness to investor input and engagement on compensation issues:

- Failure to respond to majority-supported shareholder proposals on executive pay topics; or
- Failure to adequately respond to the company's previous say-on-pay proposal that received a low level of shareholder support, taking into account:
 - The company's response, including:
 - Disclosure of engagement efforts with major institutional investors regarding the issues that contributed to the low level of support;



- Specific actions taken to address the issues that contributed to the low level of support;
 - Other recent compensation actions taken by the company.
- Whether the issues raised are recurring or isolated;
 - The company's ownership structure; and
 - Whether the support level was less than 50 percent, which would warrant the highest degree of responsiveness.

Advisory Votes on Executive Compensation – Management Say-on-Pay Proposals

The Dodd-Frank Act Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 mandates advisory votes on executive compensation (aka management "say on pay" or MSOP) for a proxy or consent or authorization for an annual or other meeting of the shareholders that includes required SEC compensation disclosures. This non-binding shareholder vote on compensation must be included in a proxy or consent or authorization at least once every 3 years.

In general, the management say on pay (MSOP) ballot item is the primary focus of voting on executive pay practices – dissatisfaction with compensation practices can be expressed by voting against MSOP rather than voting AGAINST or WITHHOLDING from the compensation committee. However, if there is no MSOP on the ballot, then the negative vote will apply to members of the compensation committee. In addition, in egregious cases, or if the board fails to respond to concerns raised by a prior MSOP proposal, then Taft-Hartley fiduciaries should vote AGAINST or WITHHOLD votes from compensation committee members (or, if the full board is deemed accountable, all directors). If the negative factors involve equity-based compensation, then a vote AGAINST an equity-based plan proposal presented for shareholder approval may be warranted.

- Evaluate executive pay and practices, as well as certain aspects of outside director compensation on a CASE-BY-CASE basis.
- Vote AGAINST management say on pay (MSOP) proposals if:
 - There is a misalignment between CEO pay and company performance ([pay for performance](#));
 - The company maintains [problematic pay practices](#);
 - The board exhibits [poor communication and responsiveness](#) to shareholders;
 - The board has failed to demonstrate good stewardship of investors' interests regarding executive compensation practices.
- Vote AGAINST or WITHHOLD from the members of the Compensation Committee and potentially the full board if:
 - There is no MSOP on the ballot, and an AGAINST vote on an MSOP is warranted due to pay for performance misalignment, problematic pay practices, or the lack of adequate responsiveness on compensation issues raised previously, or a combination thereof;
 - The board fails to respond adequately to a previous MSOP proposal that received low levels of shareholder support;
 - The company has practiced or approved [problematic pay practices](#), including option repricing or option backdating; or
 - The situation is egregious.



- Vote AGAINST an equity plan on the ballot if:
 - A pay for performance misalignment exists, and a significant portion of the CEO's misaligned pay is attributed to non-performance-based equity awards, taking into consideration:
 - Magnitude of pay misalignment;
 - Contribution of non-performance-based equity grants to overall pay; and
 - The proportion of equity awards granted in the last three fiscal years concentrated at the named executive officer (NEO) level.

Frequency of Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation – Management Say on Pay

The Dodd-Frank Act, in addition to requiring advisory votes on compensation (aka management "say on pay" or MSOP), requires that each proxy for the first annual or other meeting of the shareholders (that includes required SEC compensation disclosures) occurring after Jan. 21, 2011, include an advisory voting item to determine whether, going forward, the "say on pay" vote by shareholders to approve compensation should occur every one, two, or three years.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services will vote FOR annual advisory votes on compensation. The MSOP is at its essence a communication vehicle, and communication is most useful when it is received in a consistent and timely manner. Support for an annual MSOP vote is merited for many of the same reasons Taft-Hartley Advisory Services supports annual director elections rather than a classified board structure: because this provides the highest level of accountability and direct communication by enabling the MSOP vote to correspond to the majority of the information presented in the accompanying proxy statement for the applicable shareholders' meeting. Having MSOP votes every two or three years, covering all actions occurring between the votes, would make it difficult to create the meaningful and coherent communication that the votes are intended to provide. Under triennial elections, for example, a company would not know whether the shareholder vote references the compensation year being discussed or a previous year, making it more difficult to understand the implications of the vote.

- Vote FOR annual advisory votes on compensation, which provide the most consistent and clear communication channel for shareholder concerns about companies' executive pay programs.

Advisory Vote on Golden Parachutes in an Acquisition, Merger, Consolidation, or Proposed Sale

This is a proxy item regarding specific advisory votes on "golden parachute" arrangements for Named Executive Officers (NEOs) that is required under The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. Taft-Hartley Advisory Services places particular emphasis on severance packages that provide inappropriate windfalls and cover certain executive tax liabilities.

- Vote CASE-BY-CASE on proposals to approve the company's golden parachute compensation, consistent with Taft-Hartley Advisory Services' policies on problematic pay practices related to severance packages. Features that may lead to a vote AGAINST include:
 - Agreements that include excise tax gross-up provisions;
 - Single- or modified-single-trigger cash severance;
 - Single trigger acceleration of unvested equity, including acceleration of performance-based equity despite the failure to achieve performance measures;



- Single-trigger vesting of equity based on a definition of change in control that requires only shareholder approval of the transaction (rather than consummation);
- Potentially excessive severance payments;
- Recent amendments or actions that may make packages so attractive as to influence merger agreements that may not be in the best interests of shareholders;
- The company's assertion that a proposed transaction is conditioned on shareholder approval of the golden parachute advisory vote. Such a construction is problematic from a corporate governance perspective.

In cases where the golden parachute vote is incorporated into a company's separate advisory vote on compensation ("management "say on pay"), Taft-Hartley Advisory Services will evaluate the say on pay proposal in accordance with these guidelines, which may give higher weight to that component of the overall evaluation.

Methodology for Analyzing Pay Plans

The theory that stock awards including stock options are beneficial to shareholders because they motivate management and align the interests of investors with those of executives is no longer held sacrosanct. Indeed, a number of academic studies have found that there is limited correlation between executive stock ownership and company performance. Misused stock options can give executives an incentive to inflate their company's earnings, take excessive risks, and make irresponsibly optimistic forecasts in order to keep stock prices high and their paychecks gargantuan.

Therefore, it is vital for shareholders to fully analyze all equity plans that appear on ballot. In general, Taft-Hartley Advisory Services evaluates executive and director compensation plans on a CASE-BY-CASE basis. When evaluating equity-based compensation items on ballot, the following elements will be considered:

Primary Considerations:

- *Dilution:* Vote AGAINST plans in which the potential voting power dilution (VPD) of all shares outstanding exceeds ten percent;
- *Full Market Value:* Awards must be granted at 100 percent of fair market value on the date of grant. However, in instances when a plan is open to broad-based employee participation and excludes the five most highly compensated employees, we accept a 15 percent discount;
- *Burn Rate:* Vote AGAINST plans where the company's three year burn rate exceeds the greater of: (1) the mean (μ) plus one standard deviation (σ) of the company's GICS group segmented by Russell 3000 index and non-Russell 3000 index; and (2) two percent of weighted common shares outstanding;
- *Liberal Definition of Change-in-Control:* Vote AGAINST equity plans if the plan provides for the accelerated vesting of equity awards even though an actual change in control may not occur. Examples of such a definition could include, but are not limited to, announcement or commencement of a tender offer, provisions for acceleration upon a "potential" takeover, shareholder approval of a merger or other transactions, or similar language;
- *Problematic Pay Practices:* Vote AGAINST equity plans if the plan is a vehicle for problematic pay practices (e.g. if the plan allows for change-in-control payouts that are single triggered).

Secondary Considerations:

- *Executive Concentration Ratio:* Vote AGAINST plans where the annual grant rate to the top five executives ("named officers") exceeds one percent of shares outstanding;



- *Pay-For-Performance*: Vote AGAINST plans where there is a misalignment between CEO pay and the company's performance, or if the performance criteria is not disclosed;
- *Evergreen Features*: Vote AGAINST plans that reserve a specified percentage of outstanding shares for award each year instead of having a termination date;
- *Repricing*: Vote AGAINST plans if the company's policy permits repricing of "underwater" options or if the company has a history of repricing past options;
- *Loans*: Vote AGAINST the plan if the plan administrator may provide loans to officers to assist in exercising the awards.

Stock Option Plans

Compensation to executive and other senior level employees should be strongly correlated to sustained performance. Stock options, restricted stock and other forms of non-cash compensation should be performance-based with an eye toward improving long-term corporate value. Well-designed stock option plans can align the interests of executives and shareholders by providing that executives benefit when stock prices rise so that the employees of the company, along with shareholders, prosper together. Likewise, option plans should not allow for the benefits of share price gains without the risk of share price declines. Poorly designed stock option plans can encourage excessive risk-taking behavior and incentivize executives to pursue corporate strategies that promote short-term stock price to the ultimate detriment of long-term shareholder value.

Many plans sponsored by management provide goals so easily attained that executives can realize massive rewards even though shareholder value is not created. Taft-Hartley Advisory Services supports option plans when they provide legitimately challenging performance targets that serve to truly motivate executives in the pursuit of sustained superior performance. Moreover, equity pay plans should be designed in a fashion that ensures executive compensation is veritably performance driven and "at risk" such that executives are penalized (by either reducing or withholding compensation) for failure to meet pre-determined performance hurdles. Taft-Hartley Advisory Services will oppose those plans that offer unreasonable benefits to executives that are not generally available to other shareholders or employees.

Voting Power Dilution (VPD) Calculation

Voting power dilution, or VPD, measures the amount of voting power represented by the number of shares reserved over the life of the plan. Industry norm dictates that ten percent dilution over the life of a ten-year plan is reasonable for most mature companies. Restricted stock plans or stand-alone stock bonus plans that are not coupled with stock option plans can be held to a lower dilution cap.

Voting power dilution may be calculated using the following formula:

- A: Shares reserved for this amendment or plan;
- B: Shares available under this plan and/or continuing plans prior to proposed amendment;
- C: Shares granted but unexercised under this plan and/or continuing plans;
- D: All outstanding shares plus any convertible equity, outstanding warrants, or debt.

The formula can be applied as follows: $\frac{A + B + C}{A + B + C + D}$

$$A + B + C + D$$



Fair Market Value, Dilution and Repricing

Consideration will be made as to whether the proposed plan is being offered at fair market value or at a discount; whether the plan excessively dilutes the earnings per share of the outstanding shares; and whether the plan gives management the ability to replace or reprice “underwater” options. Repricing is an amendment to a previously granted stock option contract that reduces the option exercise price. Options are “underwater” when their current price is below the current option contract price. Options can also be repriced through cancellations and re-grants. The typical new grant would have a ten-year term, new vesting restrictions, and a lower exercise price reflecting the current lower market price.

Burn Rate

The annual burn rate is a measure of dilution that illustrates how rapidly a company is deploying shares reserved for equity compensation plans. The burn or run rate is calculated by dividing the number of shares pursuant to awards granted in a given year by the number of shares outstanding. Taft-Hartley Advisory Services benchmarks a company’s burn rate against three-year industry and primary index burn rates, and generally opposes plans whose average three-year burn rates exceed the greater of: (1) the mean plus one standard deviation of the company’s GICS group segmented by Russell 3000 index and non-Russell 3000 index; or (2) two percent of weighted common shares outstanding. Additionally, year-over-year burn-rate cap changes will be limited to a maximum of two (2) percentage points (plus or minus) the prior year’s burn-rate cap. If a company fails to fulfill a burn rate commitment to shareholders, vote AGAINST or WITHHOLD from the compensation committee.

Executive Concentration Ratio

In examining stock option awards, restricted stock and other forms of long-term incentives, it is important to consider internal pay equity; that is, the concentration and distribution of equity awards to a company’s top five executives (“named officers”) as a percentage of overall grants. Taft-Hartley Advisory Services will consider voting against equity compensation plans whose annual grant rate to top executives exceeds one percent of shares outstanding.

Evergreen Provisions

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services will oppose plans that reserve a specified percentage of outstanding shares for award each year (evergreen plans) instead of having a termination date. Such plans provide for an automatic increase in the shares available for grant with or without limits on an annual basis. Because they represent a transfer of shareholder value and have a dilutive impact on a regular basis, evergreen plans are expensive to shareholders. Evergreen features also minimize the frequency that companies seek shareholder approval in increasing the number of shares available under the plan.

Option Exchange Programs/Repricing Options

Vote CASE-BY-CASE on management proposals seeking approval to exchange/reprice options taking into consideration the following factors:

- Historic trading patterns: the stock price should not be so volatile that the options are likely to be back “in-the-money” over the near term;
- Rationale for the re-pricing: was the stock price decline beyond management’s control?
- Option vesting: does the new option vest immediately or is there a black-out period?
- Term of the option: the term should remain the same as that of the replaced option;
- Exercise price: should be set at fair market or a premium to market;



- Participants: the plan should be broad-based and executive officers and directors should be excluded;
- Is this a value-for-value exchange?
- Are surrendered stock options added back to the plan reserve?

If the surrendered options are added back to the equity plans for re-issuance, then we will also take into consideration the impact on the company's equity plans and its three-year average burn rate.

In addition to the above considerations, we will evaluate the intent, rationale, and timing of the repricing proposal. The proposal should clearly articulate why the board is choosing to conduct an exchange program at this point in time. Repricing underwater options after a recent precipitous drop in the company's stock price demonstrates poor timing. We do not view market deterioration, in and of itself, as an acceptable reason for companies to reprice stock options and/or reset goals under performance plans. Repricing after a recent decline in stock price triggers additional scrutiny and may warrant a vote AGAINST the proposal. At a minimum, the decline should not have happened within the past year. Also, consider the terms of the surrendered options, such as the grant date, exercise price and vesting schedule. Grant dates of surrendered options should be far enough back (two to three years) so as not to suggest that repricings are being done to take advantage of short-term downward price movements. Similarly, the exercise price of surrendered options should be above the 52-week high for the stock price.

- Vote FOR shareholder proposals to put option repricings to a shareholder vote.

Restricted Stock

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services supports the use of performance-vesting restricted stock as long as the absolute amount of restricted stock being granted is a reasonable proportion of an executive's overall compensation. The best way to align the interests of executives with shareholders is through direct stock holdings, coupled with at-risk variable compensation that is tied to explicit and challenging performance benchmarks. Performance-vesting restricted stock both adds to executives direct share holdings and incorporates at-risk features.

To reward performance and not job tenure, restricted stock vesting requirements should be performance-based rather than time lapsing. Such plans should explicitly define the performance criteria for awards to senior executives and may include a variety of corporate performance measures in addition to the use of stock price targets. In addition, executives should be required to hold their vested restricted stock as long as they remain employees of the company.

Employee Stock Purchase Plans (ESPPs) - Qualified Plans

Vote CASE-BY-CASE on qualified employee stock purchase plans. Vote FOR plans if:

- Purchase price is at least 85 percent of fair market value;
- Offering period is 27 months or less; and
- The number of shares allocated to the plan is five percent or less of the outstanding shares.

Employee Stock Purchase Plans (ESPPs) – Non-Qualified Plans

Vote CASE-by-CASE on nonqualified employee stock purchase plans. Vote FOR plans with:

- Broad-based participation (i.e. all employees with the exclusion of individuals with 5 percent or more of beneficial ownership of the company);



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- Limits on employee contribution (a fixed dollar amount or a percentage of base salary);
- Company matching contribution up to 25 percent of employee's contribution, which is effectively a discount of 20 percent from market value;
- No discount on the stock price on the date of purchase since there is a company matching contribution.

Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs)

An Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) is an employee benefit plan that makes the employees of a company also owners of stock in that company. Recent academic research of the performance of ESOPs in closely held companies found that ESOPs appear to increase overall sales, employment, and sales per employee over what would have been expected absent an ESOP. Studies have also found that companies with an ESOP are also more likely to still be in business several years later, and are more likely to have other retirement oriented benefit plans than comparable non-ESOP companies.

- Vote FOR proposals that request shareholder approval in order to implement an ESOP or to increase authorized shares for existing ESOPs except in cases when the number of shares allocated to the ESOP is deemed excessive (i.e. generally greater than five percent of outstanding shares).

OBRA-Related Compensation Proposals

Cash bonus plans can be an important part of an executive's overall pay package, along with stock-based plans tied to long-term total shareholder returns. Section 162(m) of the IRS Code Section limits the deductibility of compensation in excess of \$1 million to a named executive officer unless certain prescribed actions are taken including shareholder approval and the establishment of performance goals.

- Generally vote FOR proposals to approve or amend executive incentive bonus plans if the proposal:
 - Is only to include administrative features;
 - Places a cap on the annual grants any one participant may receive to comply with the provisions of Section 162(m);
 - Adds performance goals to existing compensation plans to comply with the provisions of Section 162(m) unless they are clearly inappropriate; or
 - Covers cash or cash and stock bonus plans that are submitted to shareholders for the purpose of exempting compensation from taxes under the provisions of Section 162(m) if no increase in shares is requested.
- Vote AGAINST such proposals if:
 - If the plan provides for awards to individual participants in excess of \$2 million a year;
 - The compensation committee does not fully consist of independent outsiders as defined by Taft-Hartley Advisory Services' definition of director independence;
 - The plan contains excessive problematic provisions including lack of rigorous performance measures.
- Vote CASE-BY CASE on such proposals if:
 - In addition to seeking 162(m) tax treatment, the amendment may cause the transfer of additional shareholder value to employees (e.g., by requesting additional shares, extending the option term, or expanding the pool of plan participants);
 - A company is presenting the plan to shareholders for Section 162(m) favorable tax treatment for the first time after the company's initial public offering (IPO). Perform a full equity plan analysis, including consideration of



total shareholder value transfer, burn rate (if applicable), repricing, and liberal change in control. Other factors such as pay-for-performance or problematic pay practices as related to Management Say-on-Pay may be considered if appropriate.

Golden and Tin Parachutes

Golden parachutes are designed to protect the employees of a corporation in the event of a change-in-control. Under most golden parachute agreements, senior level management employees receive a lump sum payout triggered by a change-in-control at usually two to three times their current base salary. The SEC requires disclosure of all golden parachute arrangements in the proxy statement.

- Vote on a CASE-BY-CASE basis on management proposals to ratify or cancel golden parachutes taking into consideration the following factors;
 - Whether the triggering mechanism is beyond the control of management.
 - Whether the payout amount is based on an excessive severance multiple.
 - Whether the change-in-control payments are double-triggered, i.e., (1) after a change in control has taken place, and (2) termination of the executive as a result of the change in control. Change in control is defined as a change in the company ownership structure.
- Vote FOR shareholder proposals to all have golden parachute agreements submitted for shareholder ratification;

Shareholder Proposals on Compensation

Disclosure of Executive and Director Pay

- Generally vote FOR shareholder proposals that seek additional disclosure of executive and director pay information, including the preparation of a formal report on executive compensation practices and policies;

Limit Executive and Director Pay

- Generally vote FOR shareholder proposals that seek to eliminate outside directors' retirement benefits;
- Review on a CASE-BY-CASE basis all other shareholder proposals that seek to limit executive and director pay. This includes shareholder proposals that seek to link executive compensation to customer, employee, or stakeholder satisfaction.

Executive Perks and Retirement/Death Benefits

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services supports enhanced disclosure and shareholder oversight of executive benefits and other in-kind retirement perquisites. For example, compensation devices like executive pensions (SERPs), deferred compensation plans, below-market-rate loans or guaranteed post-retirement consulting fees can amount to significant liabilities to shareholders and it is often difficult for investors to find adequate disclosure of their full terms. Taft-Hartley Advisory Services opposes any perquisite or benefit to executives that exceeds what is generally offered to other company employees. From a shareholder perspective, the cost of these executive entitlements would be better allocated to performance-based forms of executive compensation during their term in office.



- Generally vote FOR shareholder proposals requesting to put extraordinary benefits contained in SERP agreements to a shareholder vote unless the company's executive pension plans do not contain excessive benefits beyond what is offered under employee-wide plans.
- Generally vote FOR shareholder proposals calling companies to adopt a policy of discontinuing or obtaining shareholder approval for any future agreements and corporate policies that could oblige the company to make payments or awards following the death of a senior executive in the form of unearned salary or bonuses, accelerated vesting or the continuation in force of unvested equity grants, perquisites and other payments or awards made in lieu of compensation. This would not apply to any benefit programs or equity plan proposals that the broad-based employee population is eligible.

Executive Holding Periods

Senior level executives should be required to hold a substantial portion of their equity compensation awards, including shares received from option exercises (e.g. 75% of their after-tax stock option proceeds), while they are employed at a company or even into retirement. Equity compensation awards are intended to align management interests with those of shareholders, and allowing executives to sell these shares while they are employees of the company undermines this purpose. Given the large size of a typical annual equity compensation award, holding requirements that are based on a multiple of cash compensation may be inadequate.

- Vote CASE-BY-CASE on shareholder proposals asking companies to adopt policies requiring senior executive officers to retain a significant portion of the shares acquired through compensation plans while employed or following the termination of their employment.

Pay for Superior Performance

- Generally vote FOR shareholder proposals that request the board to establish a pay-for-superior performance standard in the company's executive compensation programs for senior executives.

Performance-Based Options

Stock options are intended to align the interests of management with those of shareholders. However, stock option grants without performance-based elements can excessively compensate executives for stock increases due solely to a general stock market rise, rather than improved or superior company stock performance. When option grants reach the hundreds of thousands, a relatively small increase in the share price may permit executives to reap millions of dollars without providing material benefits to shareholders.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services advocates for performance-based awards – such as premium-priced or indexed – which encourage executives to outperform peers, certain indices, or the broader market rather than being rewarded for any minimal rise in the share price, which can occur if there are not empirical performance measures incorporated into the structure of the options. Additionally, it should be noted that performance-accelerated vesting and premium priced options allow fixed plan accounting, whereas performance-vested and indexed options entail certain expensing requirements.

- Generally vote FOR shareholder proposals that seek to provide for performance-based options such as indexed and/or premium priced options.

Tax Gross-up Proposals

- Generally vote FOR proposals calling for companies to adopt a policy of not providing tax gross-up payments to executives, except in situations where gross-ups are provided pursuant to a plan, policy, or arrangement applicable to management employees of the company, such as a relocation or expatriate tax equalization policy.



Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation (Say-on-Pay) Shareholder Proposals

- Generally, vote FOR shareholder proposals that call for non-binding shareholder ratification of the compensation of the Named Executive Officers and the accompanying narrative disclosure of material factors provided to understand the Summary Compensation Table.

Compensation Consultants - Disclosure of Board or Company's Utilization

- Generally vote FOR shareholder proposals seeking disclosure regarding the Company, Board, or Compensation Committee's use of compensation consultants, such as company name, business relationship(s) and fees paid.

Adopt Anti-Hedging/Pledging/Speculative Investments Policy

- Generally vote FOR proposals seeking a policy that prohibits named executive officers from engaging in derivative or speculative transactions involving company stock, including hedging, holding stock in a margin account, or pledging stock as collateral for a loan.

Bonus Banking/Bonus Banking "Plus"

- Generally vote FOR on proposals seeking deferral of a portion of annual bonus pay, with ultimate payout linked to sustained results for the performance metrics on which the bonus was earned (whether for the named executive officers or a wider group of employees)

Termination of Employment Prior to Severance Payment and Eliminating Accelerated Vesting of Unvested Equity

- Generally vote FOR shareholder proposals seeking a policy requiring termination of employment prior to severance payment, and eliminating accelerated vesting of unvested equity.

Recoup Bonuses

- Generally vote FOR proposals to recoup unearned incentive bonuses or other incentive payments made to senior executives if it is later determined that the figures upon which incentive compensation is earned later turn out to have been in error.

Link Compensation to Non-Financial Factors

- Generally vote FOR shareholder proposals seeking disclosure on linking executive pay to non-financial factors.
- Evaluate shareholder proposals calling for linkage of executive pay to non-financial factors, such as corporate downsizing, customer/employee satisfaction, community involvement, human rights, social and environmental goals and performance, and predatory lending on a CASE-BY-CASE basis.

Pension Plan Income Accounting

- Generally vote FOR shareholder proposals to exclude pension plan income in the calculation of earnings used in determining executive bonuses/compensation.



AUDITORS

Auditors play an integral role in certifying the integrity and reliability of corporate financial statements on which investors rely to gauge the financial well being of a company and the viability of an investment. The well-documented auditor-facilitated bankruptcies and scandals at several large public companies in recent years underscore the catastrophic consequences that investors can suffer when the audit process breaks down.

Auditor Independence

The wave of accounting scandals at companies in the over the past decade illuminate the need to ensure auditor independence in the face consulting services to audit clients. The ratio of non-audit services to total revenues at the large accounting firms grew significantly leading up to the accounting scandals. We believe the ratio of non-audit fees should make up no more than one-quarter of all fees paid to the auditor so as to properly discourage even the appearance of any undue influence upon an auditor's objectivity.

Under SEC rules, disclosed categories of professional fees paid for audit and non-audit services are as follows: (1) Audit Fees, (2) Audit-Related Fees, (3) Tax Fees, and (4) All Other Fees. Under the reporting requirements, companies are required to describe – in qualitative terms – the types of services provided under the three categories other than Audit Fees. The following fee categories are defined as: A) tax compliance or preparation fees are excluded from our calculations of non-audit fees; and B) fees for consulting services for tax-avoidance strategies and tax shelters will be included in "other fees" and will be considered non-audit fees if the proxy disclosure does not indicate the nature of the tax services. In circumstances where "Other" fees include fees related to significant one-time capital structure events: initial public offerings, bankruptcy emergence, and spin-offs; and the company makes public disclosure of the amount and nature of those fees which are an exception to the standard "non-audit fee" category, then such fees may be excluded from the non-audit fees considered in determining the ratio of non-audit to audit/audit-related fees/tax compliance and preparation for purposes of determining whether non-audit fees are excessive.

As auditors are the backbone upon which a company's financial health is measured, auditor independence is absolutely essential for rendering objective opinions upon which investors then rely. When an auditor is paid excessive consulting fees in addition to fees paid for auditing, the company-auditor relationship is left open to conflicts of interest.

Auditor Ratification

The ratification of auditors is an important component of good governance. In light of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and increased shareholder scrutiny, some companies are opting to take auditor ratification off the ballot. Neglecting to include the ratification of auditors on the proxy takes away the fundamental shareholder right to ratify the company's choice of auditor. Whereas shareholder ratification of auditors was once considered routine by many shareowners, accounting scandals have caused shareholders to be more vigilant about the integrity of the auditors certifying their companies' financial statements. It is now viewed as best practice for companies to place the item on ballot.

Although U.S. companies are not legally required to allow shareholders to ratify their appointment of independent auditors, submission of the audit firm for approval at the annual meeting on an annual basis gives shareholders the means to weigh in on their satisfaction (or lack thereof) on the auditor's independent execution of their duties. Taft-Hartley Advisory Services firmly believes mandatory auditor ratification is in line with sound and transparent corporate governance and remains an important mechanism to ensure the integrity of the auditor's work. In the absence of legislation mandating shareholder ratification of auditors, the failure by a company to present its selection of auditors for shareholder ratification should be discouraged as it undermines good governance and disenfranchises shareholders.



Proposals to ratify auditors is examined for potential conflicts of interest, with particular attention to the fees paid to the auditor, as well as whether the ratification of auditors has been put up for shareholder vote.

- Vote FOR proposals to ratify auditors when the amount of audit fees is equal to or greater than three times (75 percent) the amount paid for consulting, unless: i) An auditor has a financial interest in or association with the company, and is therefore not independent; or ii) There is reason to believe that the independent auditor has rendered an opinion which is neither accurate nor indicative of the company's financial position;
- Vote AGAINST proposals to ratify auditors when the amount of non-audit consulting fees exceeds a quarter of all fees paid to the auditor;
- Generally support shareholder proposals seeking to limit companies from buying consulting services from their auditor.

Auditor Rotation

Long-term relationships between auditors and their clients can impede auditor independence, objectivity and professional skepticism. Such long-standing relationships foster an undesirable coziness between audit firms and their clients, which can cause the auditors to lose their independence and become less questioning especially where lucrative contracts for the provision of non-audit consulting services are involved. Mandatory auditor rotation is a widely supported safeguard against improper audits and is viewed by many as an effective mechanism for mitigating the potential risks borne by long-term auditor-client relationships.

Proponents of compulsory audit firm rotation contend that rotation policies promote objectivity and independence among auditors and minimize the scope of vested interests developing in the audit. Opponents of audit firm rotation argue that regular re-tendering is a costly practice, likely to reduce audit quality and increase the risk of audit failure in the early years due to the time required to gain cumulative knowledge of an often complex and geographically diverse business. A solution around this apparent negative effect of mandatory rotation is to keep a longer rotation period.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services recommends that companies not maintain the same audit firm in excess of seven years, and will consider voting against auditors if their tenure at a company exceeds seven years. A revolving seven-year rotation period allows the auditor to develop cumulative knowledge of a company's business and the effect of changes in the business along with the corresponding changes in its risks, thereby enhancing the quality of the audit and trammeling potential loss of auditor objectivity and independence. Many institutional investors argue that the increased costs associated with compulsory auditor rotation are a lesser evil vis-à-vis the larger evil of the costs to shareholders when the objectionable coziness between clients and long-standing auditors leads to gross erosion of shareholder value.

- Generally support shareholder proposals to ensure auditor independence through measures such as mandatory auditor rotation (no less than every seven years).

Auditor Indemnification and Limitation of Liability

Indemnification clauses allow auditors to avoid liability for potential damages, including punitive damages. Eliminating concerns about being sued for carelessness could lead to; 1) potential impairment of external auditor independence and impartiality by contractual clauses limiting their liability; and 2) a decrease the quality and reliability of the audit given the lack of consequence for an inadequate audit.

Given the substantial settlements against auditors in recent years for poor audit practices and the cost of such insurance to the company and its shareholders, there are legitimate concerns over the broader use of indemnification clauses. Such agreements may weaken the objectivity, impartiality and performance of audit firms. Taft-Hartley Advisory Services believes it is important for shareholders to understand the full risks and implications of these agreements and determine



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what impact they could have on shareholder value. At the present time, however, due to poor disclosure in this area, it is difficult to identify the existence and extent of limited liability provisions and auditor agreements, and investors lack the information needed to make informed decisions regarding these agreements.

Without uniform disclosure, it is difficult to consistently apply policy and make informed vote recommendations. As such, Taft-Hartley Advisory Services reviews the use of indemnification clauses and limited liability provisions in auditor agreements on a case-by-case basis, when disclosure is present.

- Vote AGAINST or WITHHOLD from Audit Committee members if there is persuasive evidence that the audit committee entered into an inappropriate indemnification agreement with its auditor that limits the ability of the company, or its shareholders, to pursue legitimate legal recourse against the audit firm.

Disclosures Under Section 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act

Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires that companies document and assess the effectiveness of their internal financial controls. Beginning in 2005, most public companies must obtain annual attestation of the effectiveness of their internal controls over financial reporting from their outside auditors. Companies with significant material weaknesses identified in the Section 404 disclosures potentially have ineffective internal financial reporting controls, which may lead to inaccurate financial statements, hampering shareholders' ability to make informed investment decisions, and may lead to destruction of public confidence and shareholder value. The Audit Committee is ultimately responsible for the integrity and reliability of the company's financial information and its system of internal controls.

- Vote AGAINST or WITHHOLD votes from Audit Committee members under certain circumstances when a material weakness rises to a level of serious concern, if there are chronic internal control issues, or if there is an absence of established effective control mechanisms;
- Vote AGAINST management proposals to ratify auditors if there is reason to believe that the independent auditor has rendered an opinion which is neither accurate nor indicative of the company's financial position;

Adverse Opinions

An Adverse Opinion on the company's financial statements is issued when the auditor determines that the financial statements are materially misstated and, when considered as a whole, do not conform to GAAP. It essentially states that the information contained is materially incorrect, unreliable, and inaccurate in order to assess the company's financial position and results of operations.

Adverse opinions on companies' financial statements are generally very rare because they essentially state that a significant portion of the financial statements are unreliable and the auditor had no choice but to issue an adverse opinion after a long process of seeking resolution with the company subjected to the audit.

- Vote AGAINST or WITHHOLD votes from Audit Committee members if the company receives an Adverse Opinion on the company's financial statements from its auditors.



TAKEOVER DEFENSES

Poison Pills

Shareholder rights plans, typically known as poison pills, take the form of rights or warrants issued to shareholders and are triggered when a potential acquiring stockholder reaches a certain threshold of ownership. When triggered, poison pills generally allow shareholders to purchase shares from, or sell shares back to, the target company (“flip-in pill”) and/or the potential acquirer (“flip-out pill”) at a price far out of line with fair market value.

Depending on the type of pill, the triggering event can either transfer wealth from the target company or dilute the equity holdings of current shareholders. Poison pills insulate management from the threat of a change in control and provide the target board with veto power over takeover bids. Because poison pills greatly alter the balance of power between shareholders and management, shareholders should be allowed to make their own evaluation of such plans.

In evaluating management proposals on poison pills, Taft-Hartley Advisory Services considers the company’s rationale for adopting the pill and its existing governance structure in determining whether or not the pill appropriately serves in shareholders’ best interests. The rationale for adopting the pill should be thoroughly explained by the company. Additionally, we examine the company’s existing governance structure including: board independence, existing takeover defenses, or any problematic governance concerns.

- Vote FOR shareholder proposals that ask a company to submit its poison pill for shareholder ratification;
- Review on a CASE-BY-CASE basis shareholder proposals to redeem a company’s poison pill;
- Review on a CASE-BY-CASE basis management proposals to ratify a poison pill;
- Vote AGAINST or WITHHOLD from any board where a dead-hand poison pill provision is in place. From a shareholder perspective, there is no justification for a dead-hand provision. Directors of companies with these lethal protective devices should be held fully accountable.

Net Operating Loss (NOL) Poison Pills/Protective Amendments

The financial crisis prompted widespread losses in certain industries. This resulted in previously profitable companies considering the adoption of a poison pill and/or NOL protective amendment to protect their NOL tax assets, which may be lost upon an acquisition of 5 percent of a company’s shares.

When evaluating management proposals seeking to adopt NOL pills or protective amendments, the purpose behind the proposal, its terms, and the company’s existing governance structure should be taken into account to assess whether the structure actively promotes board entrenchment or adequately protects shareholder rights. While the high estimated tax value of NOLs would typically benefit shareholders, the ownership acquisition limitations contained in an NOL pill/protective amendment coupled with a company’s problematic governance structure could serve as an antitakeover device.

Given the low ownership thresholds involved, shareholders want to ensure that such pills/amendments do not remain in effect permanently. Taft-Hartley Advisory Services will closely review whether the pill/amendment contains a sunset provision or a commitment to cause the expiration of the NOL pill/protective amendment upon exhaustion or expiration of the NOLs.



- Vote AGAINST proposals to adopt a poison pill/ protective amendment for the stated purpose of protecting a company's net operating losses ("NOLs") if the term of the pill/ protective amendment would exceed the shorter of three years and the exhaustion of the NOL.
- Evaluate management proposals to ratify an NOL pill /adopt an NOL protective amendment if the term of the pill/amendment would be the shorter of three years (or less) and the exhaustion of the NOL on a CASE-BY-CASE basis considering the following factors;
 - The ownership threshold to transfer (NOL pills generally have a trigger slightly below 5% and NOL protective amendments generally prohibit stock ownership transfers that would result in a new 5-percent holder or increase the stock ownership percentage of an existing five-percent holder);
 - The value of the NOLs;
 - Shareholder protection mechanisms (sunset provision, or commitment to cause expiration of the pill upon exhaustion or expiration of NOLs);
 - The company's existing governance structure including: board independence, existing takeover defenses, track record of responsiveness to shareholders, and any other problematic governance concerns;
 - Any other factors that may be applicable.

Greenmail

Greenmail payments are targeted share repurchases by management of company stock from individuals or groups seeking control of the company. Since only the hostile party receives payment, usually at a substantial premium over the market value of shares, the practice discriminates against most shareholders. This transferred cash, absent the greenmail payment, could be put to much better use for reinvestment in the company, payment of dividends, or to fund a public share repurchase program.

- Vote FOR proposals to adopt an anti-greenmail provision in their charter or bylaws that would thereby restrict a company's ability to make greenmail payments to certain shareholders;
- Review on a CASE-BY-CASE basis all anti-greenmail proposals when they are presented as bundled items with other charter or bylaw amendments.

Shareholder Ability to Remove Directors/Fill Vacancies

Shareholder ability to remove directors, with or without cause, is either prescribed by a state's business corporation law, individual company's articles of incorporation, or its corporate bylaws. Many companies have sought shareholder approval for charter or bylaw amendments that would prohibit the removal of directors except for cause, thus ensuring that directors would retain their directorship for their full-term unless found guilty of self-dealing. By requiring cause to be demonstrated through due process, management insulates the directors from removal even if a director has been performing poorly, not attending meetings, or not acting in the best interests of shareholders.

- Vote AGAINST proposals that provide that directors may be removed only for cause;
- Vote FOR proposals which seek to restore the authority of shareholders to remove directors with or without cause;
- Vote AGAINST proposals that provide only continuing directors may elect replacements to fill board vacancies;
- Vote FOR proposals that permit shareholders to elect directors to fill board vacancies.



Shareholder Ability to Alter the Size of the Board

Proposals that would allow management to increase or decrease the size of the board at its own discretion are often used by companies as a takeover defense. Proposals to fix the size of the board at a specific number can prevent management from increasing the board size without shareholder approval when facing a proxy context. By increasing the size of the board, management can make it more difficult for dissidents to gain control of the board. Fixing the size of the board also prevents a reduction in the size of the board as a strategy to oust independent directors. Fixing board size also prevents management from increasing the number of directors in order to dilute the effects of cumulative voting.

- Vote FOR proposals that seek to fix the size of the board within an acceptable range;
- Vote AGAINST proposals that give management the ability to alter the size of the board without shareholder approval.



SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS

Confidential Voting

The confidential ballot ensures that voters are not subject to real or perceived coercion. In an open voting system, management can determine who has voted against its nominees or proposals before a final vote count. As a result, shareholders can be pressured to vote with management at companies with which they maintain or would like to establish a business relationship.

- Vote FOR shareholder proposals that request corporations to adopt confidential voting, the use of independent tabulators, and the use of independent inspectors for an election as long as the proposals include clauses for proxy contests. In the case of a contested election, management is permitted to request that the dissident group honor its confidential voting policy. If the dissidents agree, the policy remains in place. If the dissidents do not agree, the confidential voting policy is waived;
- Vote FOR management proposals to adopt confidential voting procedures.

Shareholder Ability to Call Special Meetings

Most state corporation statutes allow shareholders to call a special meeting when they want to take action on certain matters that arise between regularly scheduled annual meetings. Sometimes this right applies only if a shareholder or a group of shareholders own a specified percentage of shares, with ten percent being the most common. Shareholders may lose the ability to remove directors, initiate a shareholder resolution, or respond to a beneficial offer without having to wait for the next scheduled meeting if they are unable to act at a special meeting of their own calling.

- Vote AGAINST proposals to restrict or prohibit shareholder ability to call special meetings;
- Vote FOR proposals that remove restrictions on the right of shareholders to act independently of management;
- Vote AGAINST provisions that would require advance notice of more than sixty days.

Shareholder Ability to Act by Written Consent

Consent solicitations allow shareholders to vote on and respond to shareholder and management proposals by mail without having to act at a physical meeting. A consent card is sent by mail for shareholder approval and only requires a signature for action. Some corporate bylaws require supermajority votes for consents, while at others standard annual meeting rules apply. Shareholders may lose the ability to remove directors, initiate a shareholder resolution, or respond to a beneficial offer without having to wait for the next scheduled meeting if they are unable to act at a special meeting of their own calling.

- Vote AGAINST proposals to restrict or prohibit shareholder ability to take action by written consent;
- Vote FOR proposals to allow or make easier shareholder action by written consent.

Unequal Voting Rights

Incumbent managers are able to use unequal voting rights through the creation of a separate class of shares that has superior voting rights to the common shares of regular shareholders. This separate class of shares with disproportionate voting power allows management to concentrate its power and insulate itself from the wishes of the majority of shareholders. Dual class exchange offers involve a transfer of voting rights from one group of shareholders to another group of shareholders typically through the payment of a preferential dividend. A dual class recapitalization plan also



establishes two classes of common stock with unequal voting rights, but initially involves an equal distribution of preferential and inferior voting shares to current shareholders.

- Vote FOR resolutions that seek to maintain or convert to a one-share-one-vote capital structure;
- Generally vote AGAINST requests for the creation or continuation of dual class capital structures or the creation of new or additional super-voting shares.

Supermajority Shareholder Vote Requirement to Amend the Charter or Bylaws

Supermajority shareholder vote requirements for charter or bylaw amendments are often the result of “lock-in” votes, which are the votes required to repeal new provisions to the corporate charter. Supermajority provisions violate the principle that a simple majority of voting shares should be all that is necessary to effect change regarding a company and its corporate governance provisions. Requiring more than this may entrench managers by blocking actions that are in the best interests of shareholders.

The general lack of credit availability for financially distressed companies has resulted in “rescue” or highly dilutive stock and warrant issuances, which often comprise a majority of the company’s voting stock upon conversion. When an investor takes control of the company through the conversion of securities, the new owners often seek statutory amendments, such as adopting written consent, or allowing 50 percent shareholders to call a special meeting, that allow effective control over the company with little or no input from minority shareholders.

In such cases, the existing supermajority vote requirements would serve to protect minority shareholders’ interests. The reduction in the vote requirements, when coupled with low quorum requirements (in Nevada and other states) could shift the balance in power away from small shareholders while overly empowering large shareholders.

- Vote AGAINST management proposals to require a supermajority shareholder vote to approve charter and bylaw amendments;
- Vote AGAINST management proposals seeking to lower supermajority shareholder vote requirements when they accompany management sponsored proposals to also change certain charter or bylaw amendments;
- Vote FOR management or shareholder proposals to reduce supermajority vote requirements for charter and bylaw amendments. However, for companies with shareholders who have significant ownership levels, vote CASE-BY-CASE, taking into account i) ownership structure, ii) quorum requirements, and iii) supermajority vote requirements.

Supermajority Shareholder Vote Requirement to Approve Mergers

Supermajority provisions violate the principle that a simple majority of voting shares should be all that is necessary to effect change regarding a company and its corporate governance provisions. Requiring more than this may entrench managers by blocking actions that are in the best interests of shareholders.

- Vote AGAINST management proposals to require a supermajority shareholder vote to approve mergers and other significant business combinations;
- Vote FOR shareholder proposals to lower supermajority shareholder vote requirements for mergers and other significant business combinations.



Reimbursing Proxy Solicitation Expenses

- Generally support shareholder proposals to reimburse for proxy solicitation expenses;
- When voting in conjunction with support of a dissident slate, always support the reimbursement of all appropriate proxy solicitation expenses associated with the election;
- Generally support requests seeking to reimburse a shareholder proponent for all reasonable campaign expenditures for a proposal approved by the majority of shareholders.

Exclusive Venue

Exclusive venue management proposals were new for the 2011 proxy season, as issuers began seeking shareholder approval of exclusive charter provisions in 2011 after a court opinion suggested that unilaterally adopted exclusive venue bylaw provisions might not be enforceable. All the exclusive venue proposals to date have sought to make Delaware the exclusive forum for resolution on shareholder disputes.

Corporations have defended exclusive forum provisions on the grounds that the Delaware Chancery Court moves cases more quickly than other courts and is presided over by judges who are experienced in corporate law. Firms have also argued that making Delaware the sole forum for lawsuits avoids the possibility of duplicative suits arising out of the same events. A number of shareholder advocates have, however, countered that exclusive venue provisions deprive shareholders of the flexibility to choose the forum in which to assert claims of wrongdoing.

- Generally vote AGAINST management proposals to restrict the venue for shareholder claims by adopting charter or bylaw provisions that seek to establish an exclusive judicial forum.

Bundled Proposals

- Vote CASE-BY-CASE on bundled or conditional proxy proposals. In the case of items that are conditioned upon each other, examine the benefits and costs of the packaged items. In instances when the joint effect of the conditioned items is not in shareholders' best interests, vote AGAINST the proposals. If the combined effect is positive, support such proposals.



MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS / CORPORATE RESTRUCTURINGS

A number of academic and industry studies have estimated that nearly three quarters of all corporate acquisitions fail to create economically meaningful shareholder value. These studies have also demonstrated that the larger the deal the greater the risk in realizing long-term value for shareholders of the acquiring firm. These risks include integration challenges, over-estimation of expected synergies, incompatible corporate cultures and poor succession planning. Indeed, some studies have found that smaller deals within specialized industries on average outperform “big bet” larger deals by a statistically significant factor.

In analyzing M&A deals, private placements or other transactional related items on proxy, Taft-Hartley Advisory Services performs a well-rounded analysis that seeks to balance all facets of the deal to ascertain whether the proposed acquisition is truly going to generate long-term value for shareholders and enhance the prospects of the ongoing corporation.

Votes on mergers and acquisitions are always considered on a CASE-BY-CASE basis, taking into account the following factors:

- Impact of the merger on shareholder value;
- Perspective of ownership (target vs. acquirer) in the deal;
- Form and mix of payment (i.e. stock, cash, debt, etc.);
- Fundamental value drivers behind the deal;
- Anticipated financial and operating benefits realizable through combined synergies;
- Offer price (cost vs. premium);
- Change-in-control payments to executive officers;
- Financial viability of the combined companies as a single entity;
- Was the deal put together in good faith? What kind of auction setting took place? Were negotiations carried out at arm’s length? Was any portion of the process tainted by possible conflicts of interest?
- Fairness opinion (or lack thereof);
- Changes in corporate governance and their impact on shareholder rights;
- What are the potential legal or environmental liability risks associated with the target firm?
- Impact on community stakeholders and employees in both workforces;
- How will the merger adversely affect employee benefits like pensions and health care?

Fair Price Provisions

Fair price provisions were originally designed to specifically defend against the most coercive of takeover devices- the two-tiered, front-end loaded tender offer. In such a hostile takeover, the bidder offers cash for enough shares to gain control of the target. At the same time, the acquirer states that once control has been obtained, the target’s remaining shares will be purchased with cash, cash and securities, or only securities. Since the payment offered for the remaining stock is, by design, less valuable than the original offer for the controlling shares, shareholders are forced to sell out early to maximize the value of their shares. Standard fair price provisions require that in the absence of board or shareholder approval of the acquisition the bidder must pay the remaining shareholders the same price for their shares that brought control.



- Vote FOR fair price proposals as long as the shareholder vote requirement embedded in the provision is no more than a majority of disinterested shares;
- Vote FOR shareholder proposals to lower the shareholder vote requirement in existing fair price provisions.

Appraisal Rights

Rights of appraisal provide shareholders who do not approve of the terms of certain corporate transactions the right to demand a judicial review in order to determine the fair value for their shares. The right of appraisal applies to mergers, sale of corporate assets, and charter amendments that may have a materially adverse effect on the rights of dissenting shareholders.

- Vote FOR proposals to restore or provide shareholders with the right of appraisal.

Corporate Restructuring

- Votes concerning corporate restructuring proposals, including minority squeeze outs, leveraged buyouts, spin-offs, liquidations, and asset sales, are considered on a CASE-BY-CASE basis.

Spin-offs

- Votes on spin-offs are considered on a CASE-BY-CASE basis depending on the tax and regulatory advantages, planned use of sale proceeds, market focus, and managerial incentives.

Asset Sales

- Votes on asset sales are made on a CASE-BY-CASE basis after considering the impact on the balance sheet/working capital, value received for the asset, and potential elimination of diseconomies.

Liquidations

- Votes on liquidations are made on a CASE-BY-CASE basis after reviewing management's efforts to pursue other alternatives, appraisal value of assets, and the compensation plan for executives managing the liquidation.

Going Private Transactions (LBOs, Minority Squeezeouts)

- Vote on a CASE-BY-CASE basis on going private transactions, taking into account the following: offer price/premium, fairness opinion, how the deal was negotiated, conflicts of interest, other alternatives/offers considered, and non-completion risk.
- Vote CASE-BY-CASE on “going dark” transactions, determining whether the transaction enhances shareholder value by taking into consideration whether the company has attained benefits from being publicly-traded (examination of trading volume, liquidity, and market research of the stock), cash-out value, whether the interests of continuing and cashed-out shareholders are balanced, and market reaction to public announcement of transaction.



Changing Corporate Name

- Vote FOR changing the corporate name in all instances if proposed and supported by management and the board.

Plans of Reorganization (Bankruptcy)

The recent financial crisis has placed Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganizations as a potential alternative for distressed companies. While the number of bankruptcies has risen as evidenced by many firms, including General Motors and Lehman Brothers, the prevalence of these reorganizations can vary year over year due to, among other things, market conditions and a company's ability to sustain its operations. Additionally, the amount of time that lapses between a particular company's entrance into Chapter 11 and its submission of a plan of reorganization varies significantly depending on the complexity, timing, and jurisdiction of the particular case. These plans are often put to a vote of shareholders (in addition to other interested parties), as required by the Bankruptcy Code.

- Vote CASE-BY-CASE basis on proposals to common shareholders on bankruptcy plans of reorganization, considering the following factors including, but not limited to:
 - Estimated value and financial prospects of the reorganized company;
 - Percentage ownership of current shareholders in the reorganized company;
 - Whether shareholders are adequately represented in the reorganization process (particularly through the existence of an Official Equity Committee).
- The cause(s) of the bankruptcy filing, and the extent to which the plan of reorganization addresses the cause(s); Existence of a superior alternative to the plan of reorganization; and Governance of the reorganized company.



CAPITAL STRUCTURE

The management of a corporation's capital structure involves a number of important issues including dividend policy, types of assets, opportunities for growth, ability to finance new projects internally, and the cost of obtaining additional capital. Many financing decisions have a significant impact on shareholder value, particularly when they involve the issuance of additional common stock, preferred stock, or debt.

Common Stock Authorization

State statutes and stock exchanges require shareholder approval for increases in the number of common shares.

Corporations increase their supply of common stock for a variety of ordinary business purposes: raising new capital, funding stock compensation programs, business acquisitions, implementation of stock splits, or payment of stock dividends.

Clear justification should accompany all management requests for shareholders approval of increases in authorized common stock. We support increases in authorized common stock to fund stock splits that are in shareholders' interests. Consideration will be made on a case-by-case basis on proposals when the company intends to use the additional stock to implement a poison pill or other takeover defense. The amount of additional stock requested in comparison to the requests of the company's peers as well as the company's articulated reason for the increase must be evaluated. Dual requests on the same ballot, in which an increase in common stock is requested in tandem with a reverse stock split in which shares are not proportionately reduced may not be in shareholder best interests. Although the reverse stock split may be needed in the face of imminent delisting, there is little justification in effectively approving two increases in common stock on the same ballot.

- Vote on a CASE-BY-CASE basis proposals to increase the number of shares of common stock authorized for issue. The following factors will be considered:
 - Past Board Performance: the company's historical use of authorized shares in the previous three years;
 - The Current Request: i) disclosure on specific reasons/rationale for the proposed increase; ii) the dilutive impact of the request; and iii) disclosure of specific risks to shareholders of not approving the request.
- Vote AGAINST proposals at companies with dual-class capital structures to increase the number of authorized shares of the class of stock that has superior voting rights;
- Vote AGAINST proposed common stock authorizations that increase the existing authorization by more than fifty percent unless a clear need for the excess shares is presented by the company;
- Vote AGAINST proposals to increase the number of authorized common shares if a vote for a reverse stock split on the same ballot is warranted despite the fact that the authorized shares would not be reduced proportionally.

Reverse Stock Splits

Reverse splits exchange multiple shares for a lesser amount to increase share price. Increasing share price is sometimes necessary to restore a company's share price to a level that will allow it to be traded on the national stock exchanges. In addition, some brokerage houses have a policy of not monitoring or investing in very low priced shares. Reverse stock splits can help maintain stock liquidity.

Evaluation of management proposals to implement a reverse stock split will take into account whether there is a corresponding proportional decrease in authorized shares. Without a corresponding decrease, a reverse stock split is effectively an increase in authorized shares by way of reducing the number of shares outstanding while leaving the number of authorized shares to be issued at the pre-split level.



Generally support a reverse stock split if the number of authorized shares will be reduced proportionately. When there is not a proportionate reduction of authorized shares, Taft-Hartley trustees should oppose such proposals unless a stock exchange has provided notice to the company of a potential delisting. Shareholders should only vote for non-proportionate reverse stock splits in the most dire of situations. Companies should provide disclosure of external evidence that a potential delisting is imminent to separate the true emergencies from vague potential risks to shareholders.

Preferred Stock Authorization

Preferred stock is an equity security which has certain features similar to debt instruments- such as fixed dividend payments and seniority of claims to common stock - and usually carries little to no voting rights. The terms of blank check preferred stock give the board of directors the power to issue shares of preferred stock at their discretion with voting, conversion, distribution, and other rights to be determined by the board at time of issue.

- Vote FOR proposals to authorize preferred stock in cases where the company specifies the voting, dividend, conversion, and other rights of such stock and the terms of the preferred stock appear reasonable. Consider company-specific factors including;
 - Past Board Performance: the company's historical use of authorized preferred shares over the previous three years;
 - The Current Request: i) disclosure on specific reasons/rationale for the proposed increase; ii) the dilutive impact of the request; and iii) disclosure of specific risks to shareholders of not approving the request;
 - Whether the shares requested are blank check preferred shares that can be used for antitakeover purposes.

Blank Check Preferred Stock

"Blank check" preferred stock, with unspecified voting, conversion, dividend, distribution, and other rights, can be used for sound corporate purposes but can also be used as a device to thwart hostile takeovers without shareholder approval.

- Vote AGAINST proposals that would authorize the creation of new classes of blank check preferred stock;
- Vote AGAINST proposals to increase the number of blank check preferred stock authorized for issuance when no shares have been issued or reserved for a specific purpose.;
- Vote FOR proposals to create "declawed" blank check preferred stock (stock that cannot be used as a takeover defense);
- Vote FOR requests to require shareholder approval for blank check authorizations.

Adjust Par Value of Common Stock

Stock that has a fixed per share value that is on its certificate is called par value stock. The purpose of par value stock is to establish the maximum responsibility of a stockholder in the event that a corporation becomes insolvent. Proposals to reduce par value come from certain state level requirements for regulatory industries such as banks and other legal requirements relating to the payment of dividends.

- Vote FOR management proposals to reduce the par value of common stock.



Preemptive Rights

Preemptive rights permit shareholders to share proportionately in any new issues of stock of the same class. These rights guarantee existing shareholders the first opportunity to purchase shares of new issues of stock in the same class as their own and in the same proportion. The absence of these rights could cause stockholders' interest in a company to be reduced by the sale of additional shares without their knowledge and at prices unfavorable to them. Preemptive rights, however, can make it difficult for corporations to issue large blocks of stock for general corporate purposes. Both corporations and shareholders benefit when corporations are able to arrange issues without preemptive rights that do not result in a substantial transfer of control.

- Review on a CASE-BY-CASE basis proposals to create or abolish preemptive rights. In evaluating proposals on preemptive rights, we look at the size of a company and the characteristics of its shareholder base.

Debt Restructuring

We review on a CASE-BY-CASE basis proposals to increase common and/or preferred shares and to issue shares as part of a debt-restructuring plan. The following factors are considered:

- *Dilution*—How much will the ownership interest of existing shareholders be reduced, and how extreme will dilution to any future earnings be?
- *Change in Control*—Will the transaction result in a change in control of the company? Are board and committee seats guaranteed? Do standstill provisions and voting agreements exist?
- *Financial Issues*— company's financial situation, degree of need for capital, use of proceeds, and effect of the financing on the company's cost of capital;
- *Terms of the offer*—discount/premium in purchase price to investor including any fairness opinion, termination penalties and exit strategy;
- *Conflict of interest*—arm's length transactions and managerial incentives;
- Management's efforts to pursue other alternatives.

Vote on a CASE-BY-CASE basis proposals regarding debt restructurings.

Vote FOR the debt restructuring if it is expected that the company will file for bankruptcy if the transaction is not approved.



STATE OF INCORPORATION

Voting on State Takeover Statutes

Review on a CASE-BY-CASE basis proposals to opt in or out of state takeover statutes (including control share acquisition statutes, control share cash-out statutes, freeze out provisions, fair price provisions, stakeholder laws, poison pill endorsements, severance pay and labor contract provisions, anti-greenmail provisions, and disgorgement provisions). We generally support opting into stakeholder protection statutes if they provide comprehensive protections for employees and community stakeholders. Taft-Hartley Advisory Services is less supportive of takeover statutes that only serve to protect incumbent management from accountability to shareholders and which negatively influence shareholder value.

Reincorporation Proposals

Management or shareholder proposals to change a company's state of incorporation should be evaluated on a CASE-BY-CASE basis, giving consideration to both financial and corporate governance concerns including the following:

- Reasons for reincorporation;
- Comparison of company's governance practices and provisions prior to and following the reincorporation; and
- Comparison of corporation laws of original state and destination state.

Vote FOR reincorporation when the economic factors outweigh any neutral or negative governance changes.

Offshore Reincorporations and Tax Havens

For a company that seeks to reincorporate, Taft-Hartley Advisory Services evaluates the merits of the move on a CASE-BY-CASE basis, taking into consideration the company's strategic rationale for the move, the potential economic ramifications, potential tax benefits, and any corporate governance changes that may impact shareholders. Taft-Hartley Advisory Services believes there are a number of concerns associated with a company looking to reincorporate from the United States to offshore locales such as Bermuda, the Cayman Islands or Panama. With more U.S.-listed companies seeking to move offshore, shareholders are beginning to understand the web of complexities surrounding the legal, tax, and governance implications involved in such a transaction.

When reviewing a proposed offshore move, the following factors are considered:

- Legal recourse for U.S. stockholders of the new company and the enforcement of legal judgments against the company under the U.S. securities laws;
- The transparency (or lack thereof) of the new locale's legal system;
- Adoption of any shareholder-unfriendly corporate law provisions;
- Actual, quantifiable tax benefits associated with foreign incorporation;
- Potential for accounting manipulations and/or discrepancies;
- Any pending U.S. legislation concerning offshore companies;
- Prospects of reputational harm and potential damage to brand name via increased media coverage concerning corporate expatriation.

Furthermore, generally support shareholder requests calling for "expatriate" companies that are domiciled abroad yet predominantly owned and operated in America to re-domesticate back to a U.S. state jurisdiction. While a firm's country of



incorporation will remain the primary basis for evaluating companies, Taft-Hartley Advisory Services will generally apply its U.S. policies to the extent possible with respect to issuers that file DEF 14As, 10-K annual reports, and 10-Q quarterly reports, and are thus considered domestic issuers by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). U.S. policies will also apply to companies listed on U.S. exchanges as Foreign Private Issuers (FPIs) and that may be exempt from the disclosure and corporate governance requirements that apply to most companies traded on U.S. exchanges, including a number of SEC rules and stock market listing requirements. Corporations that have reincorporated outside the U.S. have found themselves subject to a combination of governance regulations and best practice standards that may not be entirely compatible with an evaluation framework based solely on the country of incorporation.



CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY & ACCOUNTABILITY

Social, Environmental and Sustainability Issues

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services generally supports social, workforce, and environmental shareholder-sponsored resolutions if they seek to create responsible corporate citizens while at the same time attempting to enhance long-term shareholder value. We typically support proposals that ask for disclosure reporting of information that is not available outside the company that is not proprietary in nature. Such reporting is particularly most vital when it appears that a company has not adequately addressed shareholder concerns regarding social, workplace, environmental and/or other issues. A determination whether the request is relevant to the company's core business and in-line with industry practice will be made on a CASE-BY-CASE basis. The proponent of the resolution must make the case that the benefits of additional disclosure outweigh the costs of producing the report.

In determining our vote on social, workplace, environmental, and other related proposals, we specifically analyze the following factors:

- Whether the proposal itself is well framed and reasonable;
- Whether adoption of the proposal would have either a positive or negative impact on the company's short-term or long-term share value;
- Whether the company's analysis and voting recommendation to shareholders is persuasive;
- The degree to which the company's stated position on the issues could affect its reputation or sales, or leave it vulnerable to boycott or selective purchasing;
- Whether the subject of the proposal is best left to the discretion of the board;
- Whether the issues presented in the proposal are best dealt with through legislation, government regulation, or company-specific action;
- The company's approach compared with its peers or any industry standard practices for addressing the issue(s) raised by the proposal;
- Whether the company has already responded in an appropriate or sufficient manner to the issue(s) raised in the proposal;
- If the proposal requests increased disclosure or greater transparency, whether or not sufficient information is publically available to shareholders and whether it would be unduly burdensome for the company to compile and avail the requested information to shareholders in a more comprehensive or amalgamated fashion;
- Whether implementation of the proposal would achieve the objectives sought in the proposal.

In general, Taft-Hartley Advisory Services supports proposals that request the company to furnish information helpful to shareholders in evaluating the company's operations from top to bottom. In order to be able to intelligently monitor their investments, shareholders often need information that is best provided by the company in which they have invested on behalf of their end beneficiaries. Qualified requests satisfying the aforementioned criteria usually merit support.

Proposals requesting that the company cease certain actions that the proponent believes are harmful to society or some segment of society will be evaluated on a CASE-BY-CASE basis. Special attention will be made to the company's legal and ethical obligations, its ability to remain profitable, and potential negative publicity if the company fails to honor the request. A high standard will need to be met by proponents requesting specific action like divesture of a business line or operation, legal remuneration, or withdrawal from certain high-risk markets.



I. GENERAL CSR RELATED

Special Policy Review and Shareholder Advisory Committees

These resolutions propose the establishment of special committees of the board to address broad corporate policy and provide forums for ongoing dialogue on issues including, but not limited to: shareholder relations, the environment, occupational health and safety, and executive compensation.

- Support these proposals when they appear to offer a potentially effective method for enhancing shareholder value.

International Financial Related

The rise of globalization has put increasing importance on the need for U.S. companies to periodically monitor their business operations abroad. As a means to preserve brand integrity and protect against potentially costly litigation and negative public relations, Taft-Hartley Advisory Services generally supports shareholder proposals which call for a report on the company's core business policies and procedures of its operations outside the United States.

Many of the resolutions which address a company's international policies can include: impact of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in emerging market economies; corporate safeguards against money laundering; terrorist financing; economic de-stabilization concerns; relationships with international financial institutions (IFIs); and product sales/marketing abroad (i.e., tobacco, pharmaceutical drug pricing).

- Generally support proposals asking for policy clarification and reporting on foreign-related matters that can materially impact the company's short and long-term bottom-line.

Affirm Political Non-Partisanship

Employees should not be put in a position where professional standing and goodwill within the corporation could be jeopardized as a result of political beliefs. Responsible employment practices should protect workers from an environment characterized by political indoctrination or intimidation. Corporations should not devote resources to partisan political activities, nor should they compel their employees to contribute to or support particular causes. Moreover, it is wise for a corporation to maintain a politically neutral stance as to avoid potentially embarrassing conflicts of interests that could negatively impact the company's brand name with consumers.

- Generally support proposals affirming political non-partisanship within the company.

Political Contributions Reporting & Disclosure

Changes in legislation that governs corporate political giving have, rather than limiting such contributions, increased the complexity of tracking how much money corporations contribute to the political process and where that money ultimately ends up. In January 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in *Citizens United vs. Federal Election Commission* lifted restrictions on corporate spending in federal elections. A company's involvement in the political process could impact shareholder value if such activities are not properly overseen and managed.

Shareholders have the right to know about corporate political activities, and management's knowledge that such information can be made publicly available should encourage a company's lawful and responsible use of political contributions.



Moreover, it is critical that shareholders understand the internal controls that are in place at a company to adequately manage political contributions. Given the significant reputational and financial risk involved in political giving, shareholders should expect management to have the necessary capabilities to monitor and track all monies distributed toward political groups and causes. These internal controls should be fully consistent with Section 404 requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.

While political contributions, lobbying and other corporate political activity can benefit the strategic interests of a company, it is important that accountability mechanisms are in place to ensure that monies disbursed in support of political objectives actually generate identifiable returns on shareholder wealth. Such mechanisms serve to insure against the use of shareholder funds in the furtherance of narrow management agendas.

When analyzing the proposals, special consideration will be made if the target company has been the subject of significant controversy stemming from its contributions or political activities, if the company fails to disclose a policy to shareholders that outlines the process by which the company considers its political contributions, or if the company has recently been involved in significant controversy or litigation related to the company's political contributions or governmental affairs.

- Support reporting of political and political action committee (PAC) contributions;
- Support establishment of corporate political contributions guidelines and internal reporting provisions or controls;
- Generally support shareholder proposals requesting companies to review and report on their political lobbying activities including efforts to influence governmental legislation;
- Vote AGAINST shareholder proposals asking to publish in newspapers and public media the company's political contributions as such publications could present significant cost to the company without providing commensurate value to shareholders.

Military Sales

Shareholder proposals from church groups and other community organizations ask companies for detailed reports on foreign military sales. These proposals often can be created at reasonable cost to the company and contain no proprietary data. Large companies can supply this information without undue burden and provide shareholders with information affecting corporate performance and decision-making.

- Generally support reports on foreign military sales and economic conversion of facilities and where such reporting will not disclose sensitive information that could impact the company adversely or increase its legal exposure;
- Generally vote AGAINST proposals asking a company to develop specific military contracting criteria.

Report on Operations in Sensitive Regions or Countries

Over the past decade, a number of public companies – especially within the extractive sector – have withdrawn from geopolitically sensitive regions as a result of being associated with political controversies involving their host countries (i.e. Myanmar, the Sudan, China, Iran, etc.). Oil and natural gas companies, in particular, continue to be the largest investors in many countries involved in human rights abuse and terrorist activities. As such, these companies become targets of consumer boycotts, public relations backlash and even governmental intervention.

- Generally support shareholder proposals to adopt labor standards in connection with involvement in a certain market and other potentially sensitive geopolitical regions;
- Generally support shareholder proposals seeking a report on operations within a certain market and documentation of costs of continued involvement in a given country or region;



- Generally support requests for establishment of a board committee to review and report on the reputational risks and legal compliance with U.S. sanctions as a result of the company's continued operations in countries associated with terrorist sponsored activities;
- Consider shareholder proposals to pull out of a certain market on a CASE-BY-CASE basis considering factors such as overall cost, FDI exposure, level of disclosure for investors, magnitude of controversy, and the current business focus of the company.

II. ENVIRONMENT & CLIMATE CHANGE

Shareholder proposals addressing environmental and energy concerns have been plentiful in recent years, and generally seek greater disclosure on an issue or seek to improve a company's environmental practices in order to protect the world's natural resources. In addition, some proponents cite the negative financial implications for companies with poor environmental practices, including liabilities associated with site clean-ups and lawsuits, as well as arguments that energy efficient products and clean environmental practices are sustainable business practices that will contribute to long-term shareholder value. Shareholders say the majority of independent atmospheric scientists agree that global warming poses a serious problem to the health and welfare of all countries, citing the findings of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the world's most authoritative scientific body on the subject. Shareholder proponents argue that companies can report on their greenhouse gas emissions within a few months at reasonable cost.

Greenhouse Gas Emissions

Scientists generally agree that gases released by chemical reactions including the burning of fossil fuels contribute to a "greenhouse effect" that traps the planet's heat. Environmentalists claim that the greenhouse gases produced by the industrial age have caused recent weather crises such as heat waves, rainstorms, melting glaciers, rising sea levels and receding coastlines. With notable exceptions, business leaders have described the rise and fall of global temperatures as naturally occurring phenomena and depicted corporate impact on climate change as minimal.

Shareholder proposals asking a company to issue a report to shareholders – at reasonable cost and omitting proprietary information – on greenhouse gas emissions ask that the report include descriptions of efforts within companies to reduce emissions, their financial exposure and potential liability from operations that contribute to global warming, and their direct or indirect efforts to promote the view that global warming is not a threat. Proponents argue that there is scientific proof that the burning of fossil fuels causes global warming, that future legislation may make companies financially liable for their contributions to global warming, and that a report on the company's role in global warming can be assembled at reasonable cost.

Investment in Renewable Energy

Filers of proposals on renewable energy ask companies to increase their investment in renewable energy sources and to work to develop products that rely more on renewable energy sources. Increased use of renewable energy will reduce the negative environmental impact of energy companies. In addition, as supplies of oil and coal exist in the earth in limited quantities, renewable energy sources represent a competitive, and some would even argue essential, long-term business strategy.

- Generally support shareholder proposals seeking increased investment in renewable energy sources, taking into account whether the terms of the resolution are realistic or overly restrictive for management to pursue.
- Generally vote FOR shareholder proposals calling for a company to commit to reducing its greenhouse gas emissions under a reasonable timeline.



Sustainability Reporting and Planning

The concept of sustainability is commonly understood as meeting the needs of the present generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. Indeed, the term sustainability is complex and poses significant challenges for companies on many levels. Many in the investment community have termed this broader responsibility the “triple bottom line,” referring to the triad of performance goals related to economic prosperity, social responsibility and environmental quality. In essence, the concept requires companies to balance the needs and interests of their various stakeholders while operating in a manner that sustains business growth for the long-term, supports local communities and protects the environment and natural capital for future generations.

Reporting and enhanced disclosure addressing sustainable development is important to companies namely because it offers a formal structure for decision making that helps management teams anticipate and address important global trends that can have serious consequences for business and society. Shareholders may request general sustainability reports on a specific location (i.e. drilling in ANWR) or operation (i.e. nuclear facility), often requesting that the company detail the environmental, social, legal and other risks and/or potential liabilities of the specific project in question.

A number of companies have begun to report on sustainability issues using established standards in the marketplace. Such reporting focuses on corporate compliance and measurement regarding key economic, environmental, and social performance indicators. Many best practice companies release annual sustainability reports in conjunction to regular annual statement of operations.

- Generally support shareholder proposals seeking greater disclosure on the company’s environmental practices, and/or environmental risks and liabilities.

Operations in Protected or Sensitive Areas

Operating in regions protected or established under national or international categorization guidelines, including wildlife refuges, national forests, and International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN) categorized areas expose companies to increased oversight and the potential for associated risk and controversy. While it is important for a company to have the flexibility to operate in these regions to take advantage of strategic placement or growth, additional disclosure could be an important mitigating factor when addressing increased risk and oversight. Restrictions to the company’s operations, damaging public opinion, and costly litigation resulting from failure to comply with the requirements associated with protected or categorized regions could have a significant impact on shareholder value.

- Generally support shareholder requests for reports outlining potential environmental damage from operations in protected regions, including wildlife refuges, unless the company does not currently have operations or plans to develop operations in these protected regions.

Hydraulic Fracturing

Shareholder proponents have elevated concerns on the use of hydraulic fracturing, an increasingly controversial process in which water, sand, and a mix of chemicals is blasted horizontally into tight layers of shale rock to extract natural gas. As this practice has gained more widespread use, environmentalists have raised concerns that the chemicals mixed with sand and water to aid the fracturing process can contaminate ground water supplies. Proponents of resolutions at companies that employ hydraulic fracturing are also concerned that wastewater produced by the process could overload the waste treatment plants to which it is shipped. Shareholders have asked companies that utilize hydraulic fracturing to report on the environmental impact of the practice and to disclose policies aimed at reducing hazards from the process.

- Vote FOR requests seeking greater transparency on the practice of hydraulic fracturing and its associated risks.



Taft Hartley Advisory Services’ guidelines
based on AFL-CIO proxy voting policy

Recycling Policy

A number of companies have received proposals to step-up their recycling efforts, with the goal of reducing the company's negative impact on the environment and reducing costs over the long-term.

- Generally vote FOR shareholder proposals that ask companies to increase their recycling efforts or to adopt a formal recycling policy.

Endorsement of CERES Principles

These resolutions call for the adoption of principles that encourage the company to protect the environment and the safety and health of its employees. The CERES Principles, formulated by the Coalition of Environmentally Responsible Economies, require signing companies to address environmental issues, including protection of the biosphere, sustainable use of natural resources, reduction and disposal of wastes, energy conservation, and employee and community risk reduction. A signee to the CERES Principles would disclose its efforts in such areas through a standardized report submitted to CERES and made available to the public.

Evidence suggests that environmentally conscious companies may realize long-term savings by implementing programs to pollute less and conserve resources. In addition, environmentally responsible companies stand to benefit from good public relations and new marketing opportunities. Moreover, the reports that are required of signing companies provide shareholders with more information concerning topics they may deem relevant to their company's financial well-being. Roughly thirty public companies have voluntarily adopted these principles.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services supports proposals that improve a company's public image, reduce exposure to liabilities, and establish standards so that environmentally responsible companies and markets are not at a competitive financial disadvantage.

- Vote FOR requests asking a company to formally adopt the CERES Principles;
- Vote FOR adoption of reports to shareholders on environmental issues.

Land Use

Many large retail stores and real estate development firms have received criticism over their policies and processes for acquiring and developing land. Often, in such cases, there are organizations that support as well as those that oppose the proposed development.

Many of these requests brought forth by the respective stakeholders raise serious issues that can have a real impact on short-term shareholder value. However in some cases, additional reporting may be duplicative of existing disclosure or may fail to provide added benefit to shareholders commensurate with the associated cost or burden of providing additional information. Some of the companies targeted with this resolution have been subject to recent litigation and/or significant fines stemming from its land use practices or recent community boycotts.

- Generally support shareholder resolutions that request better disclosure of detailed information on a company's policies related to land use or development or compliance with local and national laws and zoning requirements.



Water Use

Shareholders may ask for a company to prepare a report evaluating the business risks linked to water use and impacts on the company's supply chain, including subsidiaries and bottling partners. Such proposals also ask companies to disclose current policies and procedures for mitigating the impact of operations on local communities in areas of water scarcity.

- Vote FOR shareholder proposals seeking the preparation of a report on a company's risks linked to water use.

Kyoto Compliance

The Kyoto Protocol was officially ratified in November 2004 and requires the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by signatory countries in an effort to lower the global emissions of six key greenhouse gases and address concerns over climate change. While some Kyoto signatory markets have not yet released the details of their respective regulations for companies, it is clear that there will be some significant financial impact on corporate issuers, especially those that operate in industries profoundly impacted by greenhouse gas emission constraints or regulation. In order to comply with the anticipated standards, companies will have to consider options such as: capital improvement to their facilities to reduce emissions, the cost of "trading" carbon credits on an open market to offset emission overages, or the expense of fines or restrictions resulting from noncompliance.

- Taft-Hartley Advisory Services generally supports resolutions requesting that companies outline their preparations to comply with standards established by Kyoto Protocol signatory markets, unless: 1) The company does not maintain operations in Kyoto signatory markets; or 2) The company already evaluates and substantially discloses such information to shareholders; or, 3) Greenhouse gas emissions do not materially impact the company's core businesses.

III. WORKPLACE PRACTICES & HUMAN RIGHTS

Equal Employment Opportunity

These proposals generally request that a company establish a policy of reporting to shareholders its progress with equal opportunity and affirmative action programs. The costs of violating federal laws that prohibit discrimination by corporations are high and can affect corporate earnings.

The Equal Opportunities Employment Commission (EEOC) does not release the company's filings to the public unless it is involved in litigation, and it is difficult to obtain from other sources. Companies need to be very sensitive to minority employment issues as the new evolving work force becomes increasingly diverse. This information can be provided with little cost to the company and does not create an unreasonable burden on management.

- Vote FOR proposals calling for action on equal employment opportunity and anti-discrimination;
- Vote FOR legal and regulatory compliance and public reporting related to non-discrimination, affirmative action, workplace health and safety, environmental issues, and labor policies and practices that affect long-term corporate performance;
- Vote FOR non-discrimination in salary, wages, and all benefits.



High-Performance Workplace

High-performance workplace practices emphasize employee training, participation, and feedback. The concept of a high-performance workplace has been endorsed by the U.S. Department of Labor and refers to a workplace that is designed to provide workers with the information, skills, incentives, and responsibility to make decisions essential for innovation, quality improvement and rapid response to changes in the marketplace. These standards embrace a “what is good for the worker is good for the company” philosophy. Studies have shown that improvement in human resources practices is associated with increases in total return to shareholders. High-performance workplace standards proposals can include linking compensation to social measures such as employee training, morale and safety, environmental performance and workplace lawsuits.

- Generally support proposals that incorporate high-performance workplace standards.

Workplace Safety

In light of recent fatal accidents at oil refineries (Tesoro – Anacortes refinery, April 2010; and BP – Texas City refinery, March 2005), the 2010 BP Deepwater Horizon incident in the Gulf of Mexico, and the explosion at Massey Energy’s Upper Big Branch mine in 2010, shareholders have sought greater transparency and accountability regarding workplace safety by filing resolutions at a number of corporations.

- Generally vote FOR shareholder proposals requesting requests for workplace safety reports, including reports on accident risk reduction efforts.

Non-Discrimination in Retirement Benefits

A cash balance plan is a defined benefit plan that treats an earned retirement benefit as if it were a credit from a defined contribution plan, but which provides a stated benefit at the end of its term. Because employer contributions to these plans are credited evenly over the life of a plan and not based on a seniority formula, they may reduce payouts to long-term employees who are currently vested in plans.

Cash-balance pension conversions have undergone significant congressional and federal agency scrutiny in the wake of high-profile EEOC complaints on age discrimination and employee anger at several large blue-chip companies. While significant policy reform is unlikely in the short-term, business interests are worried enough that the *National Association of Manufacturers* and other pro-business lobbies have formed a coalition on Capitol Hill to preserve the essential features of the plans and to overturn an IRS ruling.

Driving the push behind conversions from traditional pension plans to cash-balance plans are the substantial savings that companies generate in the process. Critics point out that this savings is gained at the expense of the most senior employees. Shareholder resolutions call on corporate boards to establish a committee of outside directors to prepare a report to shareholders on the potential impact of pension-related proposals now being considered by national policymakers in reaction to the controversy spawned by the plans.

- Support proposals calling for a non-discrimination policy with regard to retirement benefits and pension management at a company.

Fair Lending Reporting and Compliance

These resolutions call for financial institutions to comply with fair lending laws and statutes while avoiding predatory practices in their sub-prime lending. These predatory practices include: lending to borrowers with inadequate income, who will then default; not reporting on payment performances of borrowers to credit agencies; implying that credit life



insurance is necessary to obtain the loan (packing); unnecessarily high fees; refinancing with high additional fees rather than working out a loan that is in arrears (flipping); and high pre-payment fees.

- Support proposals calling for full compliance with fair-lending laws;
- Support reporting on overall lending policies and data.

MacBride Principles

These resolutions call for the adoption of the MacBride Principles for operations located in Northern Ireland. They request companies operating abroad to support the equal employment opportunity policies that apply in facilities they operate domestically. The principles were established to address the sectarian hiring problems between Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland. It is well documented that Northern Ireland's Catholic community faces much higher unemployment figures than the Protestant community. In response to this problem, the U.K. government instituted the New Fair Employment Act of 1989 (and subsequent amendments) to address the sectarian hiring problems.

Many companies believe that the Act adequately addresses the problems and that further action, including adoption of the MacBride Principles, only duplicates the efforts already underway. In evaluating a proposal to adopt the MacBride Principles, shareholders must decide whether the principles will cause companies to divest, and therefore worsen the unemployment problem, or whether the principles will promote equal hiring practices. Proponents believe that the Fair Employment Act does not sufficiently address the sectarian hiring problems. They argue that the MacBride Principles will stabilize the situation and promote further investment.

- Support the MacBride Principles for operations in Northern Ireland that request companies to abide by equal employment opportunity policies.

Contract Supplier Standards

These resolutions call for compliance with governmental mandates and corporate policies regarding nondiscrimination, affirmative action, work place safety and health, and other basic labor protections.

We generally support proposals that:

- Seek publication of a "Worker Code of Conduct" to be implemented by the company's foreign suppliers and licensees, requiring they satisfy all applicable labor standards and laws protecting employees' wages, benefits, working conditions, freedom of association, right to collectively bargain, and other rights;
- Request a report summarizing the company's current practices for enforcement of its Worker Code of Conduct;
- Establishes independent monitoring mechanism in conjunction with local and respected religious and human rights groups to monitor supplier and licensee compliance with the Worker Code of Conduct;
- Create incentives to encourage suppliers to raise standards rather than terminate contracts;
- Implement policies for ongoing wage adjustments, ensuring adequate purchasing power and a sustainable living wage for employees of foreign suppliers and licensees;
- Request public disclosure of contract supplier reviews on a regular basis;
- Adopt labor standards for foreign and domestic suppliers to ensure that the company will not do business with foreign suppliers that manufacture products for sale in the U.S. using forced or child labor, or that fail to comply with applicable laws protecting employees' wages and working conditions.



Corporate Conduct and Labor Code of Conduct

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services generally supports proposals that call for the adoption and/or enforcement of clear principles or codes of conduct relating to countries in which there are systematic violations of human rights. These conditions include the use of slave, child, or prison labor, undemocratically elected governments, widespread reports by human rights advocates, fervent pro-democracy protests, or economic sanctions and boycotts.

Many proposals refer to the seven core conventions, commonly referred to as the “Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights At Work,” ratified by the International Labor Organization (ILO). The seven conventions fall under four broad categories: i) right to organize and bargain collectively; ii) non-discrimination in employment; iii) abolition of forced labor; and iv) end of child labor. Each of the 180 member nations of the ILO body are bound to respect and promote these rights to the best of their abilities.

- Support the principles and codes of conduct relating to company investment and/or operations in countries with patterns of human rights abuses or pertaining to geographic regions experiencing political turmoil (Northern Ireland, Columbia, Burma, former Soviet Union, and China);
- Support the implementation and reporting on ILO codes of conduct;
- Support independent monitoring programs in conjunction with local and respected religious and human rights groups to monitor supplier and licensee compliance with Codes.

IV CONSUMER HEALTH & PUBLIC SAFETY

Phase-out or Label Products Containing Genetically Engineered Ingredients

Shareholder activists request companies engaged in the development of genetically modified agricultural products (GMOs) to adopt a policy of not marketing or distributing such products until long term safety testing demonstrates that they are not harmful to humans, animals or the environment. Until further long term testing demonstrates that these products are not harmful, companies in the restaurant, prepared foods and packaging industries are being asked to remove genetically altered ingredients from products they manufacture, distribute or sell, and label such products in the interim. Shareholders are asking supermarket companies to do the same for their own private label brands.

- Vote FOR shareholder proposals to label products that contain genetically engineered products;
- Generally vote AGAINST proposals calling for a full phase out of product lines containing GMO ingredients.

Tobacco-Related Proposals

Shareholders file resolutions annually asking that companies with ties to the tobacco industry account for their marketing and distribution strategies, particularly as they impact smoking by young people. While the specific resolutions for shareholder proponents vary from year to year, activist shareholders consistently make the tobacco industry one of their most prominent targets. Examples of tobacco proposals include: attempting to link executive compensation with teen smoking rates; the placement of company tobacco products in retail outlets; the impact of second hand smoke; and a review of advertising campaigns and their impact on children and minority groups.

- Vote FOR shareholder proposals seeking to limit the sale of tobacco products to minors;
- Generally vote AGAINST proposals calling for a full phase out of tobacco related product lines.



Toxic Emissions

Shareholder proposals asking companies to take steps to minimize their emissions of toxic chemicals or release of toxic wastes into the environment can vary greatly. Some focus on reporting on the impact of these chemicals on the communities in which the company operates. Still others ask for a review of the company's efforts to minimize pollution.

- Vote FOR shareholder proposals calling on the company to establish a plan to reduce toxic emissions.

Toxic Chemicals

The use of toxic chemicals in cosmetics, consumables, and household products has become a growing issue of concern for shareholders as international regulations on this topic continue to expand, providing increased scrutiny over potentially toxic materials or compounds used or emitted in the conduct of operations or as an ingredient in consumer goods. Shareholders must recognize the impact that changing regulation and consumer expectations could have on shareholder value and should encourage companies to disclose their policies regarding the use or emission of toxic chemicals. Specific considerations should be made for a company's geographic markets and the appearance of historical difficulties with controversy, fines, or litigation, requests for disclosure on the potential financial and legal risk associated with toxic chemicals.

- Generally support resolutions requesting that a company disclose its policies related to toxic chemicals;
- Generally support shareholder resolutions requesting that companies evaluate and disclose the potential financial and legal risks associated with utilizing certain chemicals.
- Consider shareholder proposals requesting companies to substitute or replace existing products on a CASE-BY-CASE basis, with consideration for applicable regulations and standards in the markets in which the company participates.

Nuclear Safety

These resolutions are filed at companies that manage nuclear power facilities or produce components for nuclear reactors to request disclosure on the risks to the company associated with these operations, including physical security and the potential for environmental damage. Current reporting requirements for companies that operate nuclear facilities are managed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and include detailed reports on safety and security that are available to the public.

- Generally support shareholder resolutions requesting that companies report on risks associated with their nuclear reactor designs and/or the production and interim storage of irradiated fuel rods.

Concentrated Area Feeding Operations (CAFOs)

The level of pollution resulting from CAFOs has drawn increased attention in recent years as certain legal decisions have established the precedent that a company can be held liable for the actions of the contract farms it sources from. Fines and remediation expenses stemming from these cases have been significant and could have a notable impact on the companies' operations and shareholder value.

- Generally support resolutions requesting that companies report to shareholders on the risks and liabilities associated with concentrated animal feeding operations (CAFOs) unless the company has publicly disclosed guidelines for its corporate and contract farming operations, including compliance monitoring or if the company does not directly source from CAFOs.



Pharmaceutical Product Reimportation

One of the most visible aspects of the legal and political debate over rising health care costs in the United States can be seen through prescription drug reimportation through Canada. While U.S. and Canadian regulations limit reimportation, several states have taken steps to encourage employees to actively seek less expensive medications through reimportation.

Shareholder action at major pharmaceutical companies has requested increased disclosure of the financial and legal risks associated with company policies, or called on companies to change distribution limits to increase product availability in Canada, thereby encouraging product reimportation to the United States. The level of public concern over this issue and associated impact that a poorly developed policy could have on the companies suggest that additional disclosure of company policies related to reimportation could be beneficial to shareholders and generally merits support.

- Generally support shareholder proposals requesting that companies report on the financial and legal impact of their policies regarding prescription drug reimportation, unless such information is already publicly disclosed;
- Generally support shareholder proposals requesting that companies adopt specific policies to encourage or not constrain prescription drug reimportation.

Pharmaceutical Product Pricing

Pharmaceutical drug pricing, both within the United States and internationally, has raised many questions of the companies that are responsible for creating and marketing these treatments. Shareholder proponents, activists and even some legislators have called upon drug companies to restrain pricing of prescription drugs.

The high cost of prescription drugs is a vital issue for senior citizens across the country. Seniors have the greatest need for prescription drugs, accounting for about one-third of all prescription drug sales, but they often live on fixed incomes and are underinsured. Today about 20 million elderly people have little or no drug coverage in the U.S. In addition, the uninsured and underinsured pay substantially more for drugs than manufacturers favored customers such as HMOs and Federal agencies.

Proponents note that efforts to reign-in pharmaceutical costs will not negatively impact research and development (R&D) costs and that retail drug prices are consistently higher in the U.S. than in other industrialized nations. Pharmaceutical companies often respond that adopting a formal drug pricing policy could put the company at a competitive disadvantage.

Against the backdrop of the AIDS crisis in Africa, many shareholders have called on companies to address the issue of affordable drugs for the treatment of AIDS, as well as TB and Malaria throughout the developing world. When analyzing such resolutions, consideration should be made of the strategic implications of pricing policies in the market.

- Proposals asking a company to implement price restraints on its pharmaceutical products will be evaluated on a CASE-BY-CASE basis, taking into account the following factors:
 - Whether the proposal focuses on a specific drug and region;
 - Whether the economic benefits of providing subsidized drugs (e.g., public goodwill) outweigh the costs in terms of reduced profits, lower R&D spending, and harm to competitiveness;
 - The extent that reduced prices can be offset through the company's marketing expenditures without significantly impacting R&D spending;
 - Whether the company already limits price increases of its products;



- Whether the company already contributes life-saving pharmaceuticals to the needy and Third World countries;
- The extent to which peer companies implement price restraints.
- Generally support proposals requesting that companies implement specific price restraints for its pharmaceutical products in developing markets or targeting certain population groups;
- Generally support proposals requesting that the company evaluate their global product pricing strategy, considering the existing level of disclosure on pricing policies, any deviation from established industry pricing norms, and the company's existing philanthropic initiatives;
- Vote FOR shareholder proposals that call on companies to develop a policy to provide affordable HIV, AIDS, TB and Malaria drugs to citizens in the developing world.



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