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2011 China Proxy Voting Guidelines Summary

January 14, 2011

Institutional Shareholder Services Inc.

ISS' 2011 China Proxy Voting Guidelines Summary

Effective for Meetings on or after Feb. 1, 2011

Published January 14, 2011

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Approval of Financial Statements and Statutory Reports

Pursuant to Article 6.2 of Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) Listing Rules and Article 6.1 of Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) Listing Rules, listed companies are required to prepare and release annual reports within four months of the end of each financial year; interim reports within two months of the end of the first half of each financial year; and quarterly reports within one month of the end of the first three months and the end of the first nine months of each financial year, respectively.

In addition to financial statements, Chinese companies often submit directors' reports, supervisors' reports, and independent directors' reports (collectively referred to as statutory reports) to shareholders for approval.

- Directors' reports typically discuss the company's operations for the previous year, including a review of the company's performance, justification of dividend levels and profits or losses, special events such as acquisitions or disposals, and future plans for the company as reported by the company's directors.
- Supervisors' reports contain statements as to the company's performance, finances, related-party transactions, and other operating matters during the year. Supervisors review the company's various documents, management work reports, special reports, and major policy decision matters as presented in the company's shareholder meetings and board of directors meetings and determine whether these are in accordance with prevailing laws.

These reports are usually disclosed in the company's annual report and are ordinarily non-contentious in nature.

ISS generally recommends voting FOR such requests unless:

- There are concerns about the accounts presented or audit procedures used; or
- The external auditor expresses no opinion or qualified opinion over the financial statements; or
- The company is not responsive to shareholder questions about specific items that should be publicly disclosed.

Dividend Distribution

Chinese regulators have released a number of policy and guidance documents on the subject of dividend policies, the most recent of which ("Several Decisions over the Regulations on Cash Dividend Distribution of Listed Companies," released by the CSRC in 2008) states that companies:

- Specify in Articles of Association their income distribution policies;
- Are able to make interim income distributions; and
- Disclose cash dividend distributions and payout ratios for the past three years in the company's annual report.

The document also requires that, in order for a listed company to be eligible for a securities issuance (including stocks, convertible bonds, and other securities authorized by CSRC), the cumulative dividend distribution in the most recent three years shall not be less than 30 percent of the average annual distributable profit over the same period;

ISS generally recommends voting FOR approval of the allocation of income, unless:

- The dividend payout ratio has been consistently below 30 percent without adequate explanation; or
- The payout is excessive given the company's financial position.

Board of Directors

PRC Company Law (article 109) requires a company's board to constitute five to 19 directors, whilst a 2001 CSRC guidance document requires that independent directors should represent at least one-third of the board, of which at least one independent director must be an accounting professional. These independent directors are subject to a maximum term of six years.

Meeting attendance of independent directors is required to be disclosed by the Code of Corporate Governance 2002. Independent directors who do not join in a board of director meeting in person for three consecutive times are required to step down and be replaced.

Election of Directors

Where independent directors represent at least one-third of the board, ISS will recommend supporting election of a board-nominated candidate unless:

- He or she is classified by the company as independent, but fails to meet the ISS criteria for independence;
- He or she has been a partner of the company's auditor within the last three years, and is on the audit committee of the company; or
- He or she has attended less than 75 percent of board meetings over the most recent two years, without a satisfactory explanation.

Where independent directors represent less than one-third of the board, ISS will generally not support the election of a candidate if:

- He or she is classified by the company as independent, but fails to meet the ISS criteria for independence;
- He or she is an executive director. If more than one executive director is up for election, ISS will recommend against only one (typically, the director with the worst attendance record). Executives do not need to sit on the board for directors to access their expertise. Executives can be invited to board meetings to make presentations and answer questions.
- He or she is a representative of a substantial shareholder on a board where the reason independent directors constitute less than one-third of the board is because of a preponderance of executive directors and representatives of one substantial shareholder. In these cases, ISS will recommend against only one representative of the substantial shareholder (typically, the director with the worst attendance record);
- He or she has been a partner of the company's auditor within the last three years, and is on the audit committee of the company; or
- He or she has attended less than 75 percent of board meetings over the most recent two years, without a satisfactory explanation.

In the case of a bundled election, ISS will recommend a vote against the resolution, regardless of the qualifications of the candidates, as these proposals leave shareholders with an all-or-nothing choice.

In making these recommendations, ISS will not recommend against the election of the CEO or a company founder who is integral to the company.

ISS will recommend voting against shareholder-nominated candidates who lack board endorsement, unless they demonstrate a clear ability to contribute positively to board deliberations.

ISS will also consider the history of a particular director when deciding whether to recommend in favor of his or her (re)election. Examples of circumstances where ISS will consider recommending AGAINST a director's (re)election, regardless of board composition, are when a director has had significant involvement with a failed company and/or where a director has in the past appeared not to have acted in the best interests of all shareholders.

Board of Supervisors

Company Law of PRC requires that companies establish a supervisory board, and that this board consists of at least three members, with no less than one-third representing mass employees. These employee representatives are elected by employees and are not subject to shareholder approval in general meetings. Directors and senior executives are prohibited from serving as supervisors.

These supervisory boards are charged with overseeing company finances and supervising the conduct of directors and senior executives, with supervisors typically nominated by major shareholders of the company.

Election of Supervisors

ISS generally recommends voting FOR such candidates unless:

- He or she is a senior executive or director of the company;
- He or she has been a partner of the company's auditor within the last three years ; or
- There are concerns about the performance or conduct of an individual candidate.

Remuneration

Director Fees

In China, directors' and supervisors' remuneration requires shareholder approval. In most cases, however, it is disclosed as an aggregate amount. One exception is the finance industry, where state-owned entities are subject to higher disclosure requirements.

ISS generally supports resolutions regarding directors' fees unless they are excessive relative to fees paid by other companies of similar size.

Compensation Plans

Stock option plans have become increasingly popular in China in recent years, with companies employing increasingly sophisticated schemes.

ISS will recommend voting AGAINST an option scheme if:

- The plan permits options to be issued with an exercise price at a discount to the current market price; and/or
- The maximum dilution level for the scheme exceeds ISS guidelines of 5 percent of issued capital for a mature company and 10 percent for a growth company. However, ISS will support plans at mature companies with dilution levels up to 10 percent if the plan includes other positive features such as challenging performance criteria and meaningful vesting periods as these features partially offset dilution concerns by reducing the likelihood that options will become exercisable unless there is a clear improvement in shareholder value; and/or
- Directors eligible to receive options under the scheme are involved in the administration of the scheme.

Audit

The practice of auditors providing non-audit services to companies is problematic. While large auditors may have effective internal barriers to ensure that there are no conflicts of interest, an auditor's ability to remain objective becomes questionable when fees paid to the auditor for non-audit services such as management consulting, general bookkeeping, and special situation audits exceed the standard annual audit fees. While some compensation for non-audit services is customary, the importance of maintaining the independence of the auditor is paramount. If fees from non-audit services become significant without any clear safeguards against conflicts of interest, ISS recommends opposing the auditor's reappointment.

In China, the CSRC requires listed companies to disclose the aggregate amount of fees paid to the auditor, as opposed to component breakdowns.

With regard to the proposals to (re)appoint auditors, ISS will recommend supporting the appointment of auditors and authorizing the board to fix their remuneration, unless:

- There are serious concerns about the accounts presented or the audit procedures used;
- The auditor is being changed without explanation; or
- Non-audit related fees are substantial or are routinely in excess of standard annual audit fees.

Whilst ISS will consider the nature and scope of non-audit fees when assessing their magnitude, where non-audit fees have constituted more than 50 percent of total auditor compensation during three out of the five most recent financial years, ISS will ordinarily not recommend support for the reelection of the audit firm.

Share Issuance Requests

Share issuance requests allow companies to issue shares to raise funds for general financing purposes. The CSRC stipulates in a document entitled "Measures for the Administration of the Issuance of Securities by Listed Companies 2006" (referred to as Measures 2006 hereafter) that:

- Share issuances via a private placement shall be issued to not more than 10 specific parties.
- The share issue price shall not be lower than 90 percent of the average trading price of the company's A shares 20 trading days from the benchmark date.
- The share lock-up period shall be 12 months for minority investors and 36 months for the controlling shareholder and actual controlling person of the company.

Chinese companies do not ask for general mandates to issue shares to third parties, rather they request specific mandates for private placements. In analyzing such requests, ISS will examine such requests on a case-by-case basis, with reference to the identity of the place, the use of proceeds, and a company's past share issuance requests.

Related-Party Transactions

As with many Asian markets, two types of related-party transactions are commonly seen in China – the non-recurring transaction and the recurring service provision agreement. Commonly seen related-party transactions include (but are not limited to):

- Transactions involving the sale or purchase of goods;
- Transactions involving the sale or purchase of property and/or assets;
- Transactions involving the lease of property and/or assets;
- Transactions involving the provision or receipt of services or leases;
- Transactions involving the transfer of intangible items (e.g., research and development, trademarks, license agreements);
- Transactions involving the provision, receipt, or guarantee of financial services (including loans and deposit services);
- Transactions involving the assumption of financial/operating obligations;
- Transactions that include the subscription for debt/equity issuances; and
- Transactions that involve the establishment of joint-venture entities

According to article 5.1 of Guidelines for Introducing Independent Directors to the Board of Listed Companies by CSRC, 2001 (referred to as Guidelines 2001 hereafter), independent directors must ratify any related-party transaction amounting to more than 5 percent of net assets or RMB 3 million, whilst at board meetings held to discuss such transactions interested directors must abstain from voting (PRC Company Law (article 125)).

Related party transactions are regulated by Chapter 9 and 10 in the Listing Rules of Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange, with definitions of related parties and associated transactions given in articles 10.1.1, 10.1.3, and 10.1.5. These rules require that related parties abstain from voting on defined related party transactions at shareholder meetings.

Articles 12 to 14 of the Code of Corporate Governance also include principles regarding the disclosure, pricing and other issues involved in a typical related-party transaction.

General Stance on Related-Party Transactions

In considering such proposals, ISS assesses related-party transactions on a case-by-case basis. However, all analyses are conducted from the point of view of long-term shareholder value for the company's existing shareholders.

Loan Financing Requests

Chinese companies often seek loan financing from banks, financial institutions, or controlling shareholders. Occasionally, companies also undertake to provide funding for its subsidiaries, affiliates, or related parties. Generally, the funds obtained from the loan application are used by companies, its subsidiaries, affiliates, and related parties to supplement working capital, fund ongoing projects, and take advantage of investment plans.

Article 10.2.3 of the Shanghai and Shenzhen Listing Rules documents prohibit the making of loans to directors, supervisors, or senior management either directly or through its subsidiaries.

ISS analyzes loans and financing proposals on a CASE-BY-CASE basis.

In assessing requests for loan financing provided by a related party:

- ISS will examine stated uses of proceeds, the size or specific amount of the loan requested, along with interest rates to be charged. ISS also gives importance to, and seek disclosure on, the specific relation of the party to be granted the loan to the company.

In assessing requests to provide loan financing to a related party:

- ISS will examine stated uses of proceeds, the size or specific amount of the loan requested, along with interest rates to be charged. ISS also gives importance to, and seek disclosure on, the specific relation of the party to be granted the loan to the company.
- ISS will generally recommend shareholders vote AGAINST the provision of loans to clients, controlling shareholder, and actual controlling persons of the company.

Provision of Guarantees to Related Parties

Chinese companies often provide loan guarantees for subsidiaries, affiliates, and related parties.

Article 14 of Code of Corporate Governance states that a listed company shall not provide financial guarantees for its shareholders or their affiliates, whilst both the SSE and SZSE Listing Rules stipulate guarantee transactions that must be submitted to shareholders for approval.

In analyzing such requests, ISS will examine such requests on a case-by-case basis, with reference to the identity of the entity receiving the guarantees, the relationship between the listed company and the entity receiving the guarantee, the purpose of the guarantee, and the terms of the guarantee agreement.

Group Finance Companies

It is not uncommon for large companies in China to establish group finance companies (GFC) as an internal agent to accept deposits from, and make loans to, group companies. Shareholder approval is required when the company makes deposits to, obtains loans from, and/or receives other forms of financial services from a GFC.

Given that these GFCs may engage in intragroup lending, and that any default in the payment of loans awarded by finance companies to other members of the group may expose the company's deposited funds to further risks, ISS will recommend that shareholders vote AGAINST requests to deposit monies with a GFC.

Mergers & Acquisitions

ISS evaluates merger and restructuring transactions on a case-by-case basis, giving consideration to economic, operational, and governance factors. Our analyses are based on the following principles:

- *Current shareholders' viewpoint:* All analyses are conducted from the point of view of enhancing long-term shareholder returns for the company's existing shareholders. Since transactions will often involve more than one corporation, this may lead to contradictory recommendations. It is important for investors to evaluate our recommendations in light of their relative investment holdings. If an investor holds many shares of company A, for whom a transaction is deemed to be favorable, and relatively few shares of company B, for whom a transaction is held to be unfavorable, it may be in the best interests of the investor to vote for the transaction for both companies rather than follow ISS's recommendations.
- *Enhancing shareholder value:* The fundamental objective of these analyses is to determine whether a transaction will enhance shareholder value. While the post-transaction governance structure is an important factor in the decision, the paramount concern is whether the transaction makes economic sense and is expected to produce superior shareholder returns. If poor governance is being introduced as a result of the transaction, the company must demonstrate that the economic benefits clearly outweigh any reduction in shareholder rights.
- *Independent evaluation:* ISS prefers to see a fairness opinion prepared by a recognized investment banking firm. In transactions where inside directors or management have a conflict of interest, we prefer the assurance that the transaction was reviewed by the independent directors.

Structure of analysis

For every M&A analysis, ISS reviews publicly available information and evaluates the merits and drawbacks of the proposed transaction, balancing various and sometimes countervailing factors including:

Valuation

Is the value to be received by the target shareholders (or paid by the acquirer) reasonable? If a fairness opinion has been prepared, it provides an initial starting point for assessing valuation reasonableness, but ISS also places emphasis on the offer premium, market reaction, and strategic rationale.

Market reaction

How has the market responded to the proposed deal? A negative market reaction will cause ISS to scrutinize a deal more closely.

Strategic rationale

Does the deal make sense strategically? From where is the value derived? Cost and revenue synergies should not be overly aggressive or optimistic, but reasonably achievable. Management should also have a favorable track record of successful integration of historical acquisitions.

Negotiations and process

Were the terms of the transaction negotiated at arms-length? Was the process fair and equitable? A fair process helps to ensure the best price for shareholders.

Conflicts of interest

Are insiders benefiting from the transaction disproportionately and inappropriately as compared to non-insider shareholders? As the result of potential conflicts, the directors and officers of the company may be more likely

to vote to approve a merger than if they did not hold these interests. ISS will consider whether these interests may have influenced these directors and officers to support or recommend the merger.

Governance

Will the combined company have a better or worse governance profile than the respective current governance profiles of the respective parties to the transaction? If the governance profile is to change for the worse, the burden is on the company to prove that other issues (such as valuation) outweigh any deterioration in governance.

ISS Analytical Focus

The case-by-case basis is the appropriate and correct approach to analyzing M&A, but the emphasis of any ISS analysis will be first and foremost on shareholder value. ISS recognizes the importance of other factors, including corporate governance, to our clients, yet cases where corporate governance dominate an M&A vote decision will be rare.

Moreover, ISS cannot hold itself out as an industry expert. Any ISS analysis of strategic rationale will be limited to general comments on the typical strategic rationales themselves (e.g., economies of scale, aggressive/conservative synergy assumptions, horizontal vs. vertical vs. conglomerate mergers, etc.).

If the shareholder value is indeed fair, then all the other considerations listed above (e.g., conflicts, process, etc.) become secondary. However, negative factors may indicate that the valuation of a proposed transaction is not in fact “fair.” For example, a poor process can lead to a less than ideal valuation, or excessive change-in-control payments may transfer some of the rightful value due shareholders to conflicted insiders. In these cases, ISS will scrutinize a deal’s valuation more closely to determine whether it is fair to shareholders despite the applicable negative ancillary factors. A transaction can be fair from a valuation standpoint despite being “unfair” in other aspects. In such cases, shareholder value is the trump card.

Asset Divestments/Purchases

Divestments

Vote recommendations on asset sales will be determined on a case-by-case basis after considering:

- Impact on the balance sheet/working capital;
- Potential elimination of diseconomies;
- Anticipated financial and operating benefits;
- Anticipated use of funds;
- Value received for the asset; accountants' report; fairness opinion (if any);
- How the deal was negotiated;
- Conflicts of interest.

Asset Purchases

As with disposals, vote recommendations on asset purchases will be determined on a case-by-case basis taking into account:

- Purchase price, including earnout and contingent payments;
- independent accountants' report;
- Fairness opinion (if any);
- Financial and strategic benefits;
- How the deal was negotiated;
- Conflicts of interest;
- Other alternatives for the business;
- Noncompletion risk (company's going concern prospects, possible bankruptcy).